On the side of Magenta towards Turbigo, M'Mahon was superior to the Austrians. So also, at Solferino, Louis Napoleon managed to mass upon the centre such a number of men as was likely to outweigh all opposition. In both instances the required effect was attained, and that almost without employing some considerable portion of the force. But the concentration of the French reserve (the Imperial Guard) entirely on the centre at Solferino caused that portion of the line where Niel was posted to be comparatively weak. Canrobert's extreme care about a reported flank attack made the line even weaker than it need have been, and the Austrians had in this battle, as in each of the others, a favourable opportunity, which they failed to seize.

That they held their ground at San Martino must be in a great measure, if not entirely, ascribed to Benedek's generalship. By his arrangements there was a reserve ready to support them when the Sardinian soldiers, fewer than they, had driven them to the last point of their position. Had the Sardinians been equal in numbers and equally well handled, it is probable the result would have been favourable to them.

Now, observe the great difference in number between the French and Austrians at Montebello, and again at the Great Canal. I insist upon these cases more than the one at Solferino, because the difference existed before the fighting began, and did not result from the arrival of reserves during the engagement. Moreover, difference of number tries the courage of the men more in small forces than in large-tries it more when 2,000 are opposed to 3,000 than 20,000 to 30,000. And how are we to get over the testimony of these figures? I cannot conceive them to be so wrong as to influence the general comparison; but there is yet one other way in which we may test the endurance on either side, without being seduced by the flow of language or the magniloquent epithets of prejudiced authors.

We must see whether the losses suffered by the Austrians indicate very determined resistance. If so, we may yet attribute their repulses to causes over which the private soldiers had no control. It is a painful task to study lists of killed and wounded with the sole object of drawing statistical conclusions from their records; but I wish to leave no point unexamined which may help to determine the question fairly for both sides.

When the 1st Regiment of Zouaves stormed the barricades at Malegnano, it had one-third of its strength disabled. When the Piedmontese brigades struggled to win the heights of San Martino, they cheerfully came to the charge a third and a fourth time, although their losses were amounting to one-seventh of their number. The grenadier division of the Imperial Guard, which carried and held the canal bridges at Magenta, lost oneeighth of its force. Niel's corps, on the 24th of June, kept pressing on towards Guidizzolo, in spite of one-seventh of its men falling victims to the effort. I take these as examples of the perils and difficulties which did not prevent the allied soldiers from still obeying orders, and still presenting a firm front. And now, if you examine similar records on the other side, you will see that the first and second Austrian corps d'armée, which were so disorganized at Magenta that they abandoned the field and were utterly unavailable for duty on the following day, had lost but oneeighth and one-twelfth of their men respectively.

And you may also see that, of those three corps d'armée which failed to drive Niel's single corps out of Rebecco on the 24th of June, not one suffered so severely as their victorious opponents. It is not worth while to give further details, for none can be brought forward which will show that they had superior endurance to compensate for inferior dash or

energy.

Now, when we consider that the 8,000 British troops who were suddenly called upon to defend the heights of Inkermann against overwhelming numbers, and who had no advantages of ground or artificial defence in their favour, stood firmly whilst the gaps in their ranks widened and widened until they had swallowed up nearly one-third of the defenders' small force, we must protest against the highest terms of language being applied to men who were driven to retreat and thrown into helpless disorder by half the cause.

The vehemence of the French attacks may have been sometimes checked by the Austrians. Particular points-such as the cemetery at Montebello, the outskirts of Magenta, and the ridge of Solferino-may have been gallantly contested; but, sooner or later, the same result followed every collision between the two nations, and evinced the disparity between their fighting powers.

And, now that the dull testimony of figures has relieved the brilliancy of eloquent accounts, one or two subdued remarks, which may have previously escaped our dazzled notice, will assume more distinctness in our eyes. It is whispered," writes a correspondent from Vienna, "that the soldiers of the first and second corps at Solferino had lost all confidence in their commanders; in fact, some of the brigades could not be induced to march to the front." "I was astonished," another correspondent writes, "to see men from the field of Solferino retiring unwounded, and lying down exhausted when out of reach of the enemy's fire." Other paragraphs of similar tone are to be met with here and there. Even an Austrian officer of rank confessed the inferiority of their infantry in one respect. "Our brave fellows," he said, "had not quickness enough; they stood up to be shot at." This criticism, however complimentary to their passive resistance, is most damaging to their general reputation. Soldiers without activity are useless, and their presence in the field is a mere sacrifice.

Bad supplies of food, in addition to a bad system of feeding, did, I have no doubt, bring the men hungry into action at Solferino and Palestro, and lessen their physical powers. At Magenta the fatigue of a forced march was likewise urged in their favour; but on that ground the Allies might also claim consideration. They had marched many miles in the few days preceding the battle, and on the morning of the battle most of their divisions had to march a greater distance to the scene of action than those Austrian corps which they defeated. The weight which the men had to carry was also complained of, and, to relieve this, the Emperor ordered the men's knapsacks should be carried for them. Certainly, the weight of accoutrements and necessaries should be reduced to the lowest possible scale; but a soldier who cannot carry them is not an efficient infantry soldier at all, and, when a man's necessaries are once separated from him, any delay in re-issuing them is likely to be more injurious than

the fatigue of carrying them. Moreover, if want of transport had any share, as it must have had, in causing the bad supplies of food, the increased demand for animals and carts to carry the knapsacks would make the evil far worse.

Lastly, and to this I attach more importance than to any other excuses or explanations, the Austrian army had just then a great proportion of young raw soldiers; and the variety of the nationalities from whom they were recruited prevented their being animated by one and the same spirit. Hungarians, Poles, Croats, Germans, and Italians, composed different regiments; each race having its own peculiar affection, and each repudiating the name of Austrian. The difference went so far that it became positive disaffection; and, though the government papers denied the reports, it was asserted that at Magenta one battalion of Jägers surrendered at discretion; that many of an Italian regiment allowed themselves to be taken prisoners the same day; and that the Croats were not to be depended upon at Solferino.

If the combativeness of the Austrian soldiers does not bear a searching scrutiny so well as I hoped, I am bound to say that the French bear it better than I expected. They seem not only to have attacked with their usual vehemence on every occasion, but also to have sustained the counterattacks with more enduring steadiness than they usually show. And an impression, which perhaps you may have received (as I received), that the Zouaves and other picked troops were always sent to the front when anything serious was attempted, will vanish when you become acquainted with the organization of their brigades, and the formation of each at the moment of action.

The Sardinians' demeanour at the battle of San Martino justified the expectations which were founded on their soldier-like bearing and military habits; but in no other action was their gallantry much tried, except in those cavalry charges at Montebello, which did honour to the squadrons who made them.

So we have considered, as closely as time would allow, in what degree each side exhibited the qualities on which victory and defeat most closely depend.

And now, concentrating these remarks on the question before us— "What caused the result of the campaign?"-I submit that in strategy little advantage was gained on either side; and, with regard to the battles, that the inferior engagements of Montebello, Palestro, and Malegnano, were only important so far as they affected the moral tone of the soldiers in the opposing armies. The fate of the campaign hung on the battles of Magenta and Solferino, both of which were begun under auspices as favourable to the Austrians as to the Allies. At the former battle, Gyulai's slowness in bringing up to the field the troops at a distance from it, prevented the reinforcements from producing the effect which might otherwise have been expected. At the latter battle, there was no one on the Austrian side so favoured with the great gift of practical military genius as to remedy the embarrassment caused by the unexpected encounter, and to direct with judgment the unpremeditated movements of 150,000 men. There were no troops to execute the commander-in-chief's own orders when they were wanted, owing to the objectionable division of his army

into two separate independent wings, and the enemy's rifled artillery made gaps in the reserve brigades before the time was come to employ them. Lastly, it must be mentioned that the private soldiers of the Austrian army showed themselves unequal to sustain the dashing attacks of the French. Better men might have brought each battle to a different end. This may have been partly due to disaffection, and partly to bad commissariat arrangements, which brought them hungry into action. But, from whatever cause, the Austrian soldiers were not able to maintain their ground against the French infantry, far less were they equal to redeeming, as soldiers have before now redeemed, the mistakes or oversights of their generals.

If I had to express in the fewest possible words what caused the Austrians' reverses in this campaign, I should attribute them to inferiority (compared with their principal antagonists, the French) in the following points:

Principally In handling of the troops in action, and in the fight

Sub

ordinately

ing qualities of their soldiers. .

In the working of their commissariat and in organization of their army.

In these lectures I have tried to compress into a few words the account and review of many exciting events. The brief sketch which I have produced bears the same relation to the capabilities of the subject as the dry little books of history which we read at school bear to the interesting works which we take up in after years. I, remembering that those dull little books gave me a distaste to history for many a year afterwards, was afraid that my meagre description would put the campaign in a very uninteresting light. But, from the kind attention with which you have listened to me, I am induced to hope that the lectures have not fallen wearily on your ears. I am induced to hope that my sincere efforts to do justice to the subject, and to produce a lecture worthy of the Royal United Service Institution, have not been made in vain; and, finally, to trust that this imperfect abstract will lead you to a further study of the Campaign of 1859.

Friday, May 24th, 1861.

Col. P. J. YORKE, F.R.S. in the Chair.

THE TRAJECTORY OF BALLS.

By Major-General P. ANSTRUTHER, C.B., H.M. Madras Artillery.

PREFACE.

Extract from "Straith's Memoir of Artillery," pp. 81, 82: "Dr. Gregory, in his Lectures upon Gunnery, observes, on the difference between the times employed by a ball in ascending and descending vertically through the same space: If a 24-pound iron ball were projected vertically upwards, with a velocity of 2000 feet per second, it would ascend to the height of 6424 feet before its upward motion was extinguished, and it would pass over that space in less than 9 seconds. (This is computed in Hutton's Mathematics, vol. 3.) It might, on a cursory view of the subject, be supposed that the circumstances of the descent would be analogous to those of the ascent, but in an inverted order: and so they would in a nonresisting medium; but in the air the case is widely different. After the ball had descended 2700 feet, the resistance of the air would be equal to the weight of the ball, there would remain no further cause of acceleration, and the ball would descend uniformly with its terminal velocity (that is, the greatest velocity which a heavy body can acquire when falling in the air), which does not exceed 419 feet per second. It would require, there6424 2700 , or 6 seconds, to descend the remaining 3724 feet, in addition to the time, about 10 seconds, which had been occupied in descending through the first 2700 feet; so that, in this instance, the time of descent would be about double that of ascent. In all cases where the projectile velocity exceeds 300 or 400 feet, the time of descent will exceed that of ascent; and their difference is greater the more the initial velocity exceeds that limit."

fore,

419

1. As we are unable to procure a copy of Dr. Gregory's Lectures on Gunnery, we must content ourselves with an extract, quoted from Hector Straith's Memoir on Artillery, vide Preface.

Speaking of a ball fired vertically upwards, he says, after detailing the particulars of the initial velocity, time of flight, &c. &c. "so that, in this case, the time of descent would be about double that of ascent."

2. These are the words of a professor at the Military Seminary of Addiscombe, quoting those of the Professor of Mathematics at the Royal Military Academy of Woolwich; we may therefore safely infer that this was what the greater portion of Her Majesty's Artillery learned as part of the science of gunnery.