that important announcement by declaring from this humbler Arena, that the Principle adopted for the ships of England must render them incapable to support the honor of their Flag against those of France of equal force, except as his Country's honor was saved at Pavia by Francis the First. Such, are the present prospects of success in this great game as opened by the players upon England's side: and, so far more prominently than ever before, are mental, rather than physical, efforts taking lead in these days in the inevitable decisions of Warfare. Monday, June 10th, 1861. Captain E. G. FISHBOURNE, R.N. C.B. in the Chair. IRON-CASED SHIPS-continued. THE "WARRIOR'S" JUNIOR SISTERS.-PROPOSAL FOR A However painful it may have been in the prosecution of my task to bring structures, in many respects so noble as are the "Warrior" and "Black Prince," to the test of acknowledged principles, and find them fatally defective, a still deeper cause of lament arises on applying those same principles to their four smaller sisters. There appears no dispute that "Iron-cased Ships," of whatever size, must be most costly ones, and in such case it is reasonable to suppose that every study would be given to impart to them the highest qualities as Ships-of-war of which their size rendered them capable; it seems, therefore more than surprising to find the paramount quality of high speed not only not provided for, but actually provided against. For while it is quite possible, no doubt, perversely to give to the highest proportionate dimensions, even those of seven and eight times the breadth to the length, an abnormal and obstructive form for speed, we have seen that more than 16 years since it was found impossible to produce a speed-form out of proportions under six times the breadth to the length, as also that such impossibility had been both recognised and acted on in Admiralty designs, amongst others, in that of the "Warrior" herself; and it could therefore be only by deliberate choice, not error, that proportions but little more than five times their breadth to their length were selected for the "Resistance" and "Defence;" and, as if to make a low instead of a high speed, the object most obviously aimed at in these ships, this inferiority of their form has been further enhanced by providing them with a proportion of steam power inferior to that of any other ships of their class of equal size in the Navy. As in the "Warrior" and her sister, there are in these two juniors likewise the same proportion of unprotected ends covered only by the same fatal single plates, the proportion of guns thus unprotected being rather larger in these than in the elder ships. That proportion in the "Warrior" is 6 to 13 on the broadside; but in the "Resistance" and "Defence" it is 4 outside to 7 inside the "box;" the dimensions of the ships being 280 feet of length to a breadth of 54 feet, with a tonnage in round numbers of 3,700 tons, or rather more than one-third less than the "Warrior's," but with rather less than half the "Warrior's" power, or 600 horse-power only. Thus, every defect of the larger ships is sadly aggravated in these smaller ones, without the one redeeming point of high speed; and to place one of them in diagram before you in supposed action with an Ironcased Ship of an equal force of 22 guns under Complete Protection, would be but a repetition of the "Warrior's" case, with this addition,— that the position of the "Glory" as shown in Plate 3 figure 3 must be still more fatal, there being no superior speed with which to break away from the death-grip, in hope of returning again to the fight with better fortune; so completely in these ships is the fatal effect of false Principle provided for, not only by the weakness of construction in their two terminal quarter-lengths, and by their larger proportion of unprotected guns; but by their inability to decline engagement, and their incapability of escape from the inevitable results of their weakness, when once closely engaged. I am aware that this deliberate endowment of the "Defence" and "Resistance" with such serious disqualifications as Ships-of-war, is attributed to an intention to employ them as Coast defences; but for any such explanation to be valid, it would have to be shown that disqualifica tions which would be fatal in action out at sea, would cease to be so if engaged with the same enemy near the land; and if there be one quality more than another required in those vessels to whose safeguard is to be committed the defence of our immediate Coasts, and the enormous property which frequents them, it is that of superior speed, by which to succour with least delay every threatened point, and give surest account of any trespasser within the forbidden limits. Surely therefore in such ships as these it was only as a parody on the favorite project of one of our gallant Admirals that they were built at additional expense with a form of bow for that operation of running down other ships, or "ramming," as it is termed, in which high speed is the most essential requisite. The very recent date at which the construction of the "Valiant" and her sister has been entered on, affords hope that the similar errors which they too embody may yet come to be reconsidered, and that their completion will not be persevered in up to that point when " expense of alteration" can be pleaded for inflicting on the Country another pair of "specimens," in which most assuredly the Country will never see cause of either pride or profit if finished according to the design they are now building on. In these the paramount quality of speed has been as deliberately provided against, both by inferior form and low proportion of Power, as in the "Resistance" and "Defence," their proportionate dimensions being even less than five times their breadth for their length, with engines of 800 horsepower; and there is also reason to believe that from deficient displacement their height of ports will exhibit no improvement upon those of the "Gloire." But with 30 guns in ships of 4,000 tons, their powers of offence are an improvement on their two immediate predecessors, and it is most gratifying to observe that their two fatal "box-ends," have approached so near to the hawse-holes at one extremity, and the cabin windows at the other, that another friendly nudge or two may cause their entire disappearance, it is earnestly to be hoped, in them and in their sisterhood, for ever. Of their 30 guns 28 are to be protected, and there can be no doubt that the weight of metal on those limited " "boxends," which is now to exclude the other two from protection, would, if removed from the inside of the ships to the out, suffice to give cover to these guns also, thus enlisting these two ships at once under our Neighbour's sounder principle of Complete, instead of Partial Protection, and then with improved arrangements for speed and displacement, they may, perhaps, be rendered reliable Ships-of-war. In all past times, whether normal or transition, the measure of cost in Ships-of-war is taken at a price per gun; but high as that price must be, it is impossible to fix it in the case of any one of the three pair of specimens of which our Iron-cased Fleet at present consists. The cost of the "Warrior" is given in the semi-official "Cornhill Magazine" as 350,000l., showing a price for her entire armament of 40 guns of 8,7501. each; but, as the price of every article is based on its fitness for its purpose, the question arises, Are the unprotected and the protected guns of the "Warrior" and her sisters to be debited alike? It is not even pretended that they can do like work; and it has been already shown that under the conditions of laws which cannot be evaded, the work of the protected guns is entirely compromised by their inseparable combination, at present, with the unprotected ones. Thus, from whatever point of view we regard the British principle of Partial Protection, its essential defects become so unmistakeably prominent, that, on financial as well as physical and moral grounds, the demand seems equally strong for its abandonment, and the adoption of Complete Protection in its stead. It does come strictly within the professional sphere of a Naval Officer to note such qualities or arrangements in any class or description of ship as may best promote on the one hand, or most obstruct on the other, the successful issue of the Services entrusted for performance to himself or his brethren; but it is no part of his duties to undertake the labours of the Naval Architect, for which he is not, and is not expected to be qualified; it is, therefore, solely with a view to avoid the taunt that "it is easier to find a fault than a remedy," that I now venture, advisedly, to express my conviction that the material employed in the construction of the "Warrior," if judiciously applied, would have sufficed to give her every qualification of structure she now possesses for a Ship-of-war, and to have afforded besides as complete protection to her hull throughout as that which has been given to the "Trusty;" and I further believe that, without any great addition to her weights such practical invulnerability may be given even now.* I can hardly anticipate any argument to support the view that the enormous weight of those two "box-ends" are more usefully employed in providing against shot and shell after they have entered the ship, than in keeping them out of her altogether; and, taking into account the shot-deflection involved in the fine lines of the bow, the contents of the foremost cross bulkhead would almost alone suffice to give efficient * Owing to entire inexperience in constructions of iron, there is every reason to conclude that many hundred tons of metal have been injudiciously and unnecessarily introduced by their Designers into the several details of our Iron-cased Ships now built or building. protection to her foremost quarter-length. The contents of the after bulkhead would be less sufficient, no doubt, for covering her after end, but chiefly because the form given to that end has been such as to render inapplicable, as much as possible, the principle of shot-deflection. That principle has been largely employed in the similar constructions of our Neighbour, and has mainly contributed to enable him completely to protect his ships; the very form of the bow and stern strongly suggesting such modifications as may best prevent any direct impact; while the "glancing" of shot from even thin iron was established, now 20 years ago, by the experience of both the "Nemesis" and "Guadaloupe." The great amount of "overhang" in the after part of the "Warrior" and her proper-sister would no doubt cause too great a stress on the stern frame, were the after quarter-length in its present form to be plated; but that form is precisely what should be altered, since it now only adds to the already ample accommodation of the Captain, who, of all others, would be the party best disposed to surrender exaggerated comfort for the means of making the power of so noble a ship complete as an Engine of war. How came the Principle of Partial, instead of Complete, Protection to be adopted? We are told in a recent Blue Book-no doubt with perfect truth-that แ great consideration" was given to the design of the "Warrior" before finally determined on, and weighty reference is also made to "the advantage of having access to those records in the Admiralty, which contain the best and most reliable information connected with the construction, equipment, and performance of Ships-of-war." Now, amongst those "records" was most assuredly our old Blue Book friend, 737 of 1850, the contents of which were the results of special Admiralty orders; and when this deep consideration was being given to the construction of the "Warrior's" ends with plates only thick, it is greatly to be lamented that no thought was given to the proof these plates had undergone with shot some nine years previous, as we should surely then have escaped all public as well as private regrets over that which is probably the most serious and remarkable error, official or unofficial, ever yet connected with designs or proposals for Ships-of-war. That "record" would also have disclosed the scale of relative resistances to impacts of shot in wood and in iron, determined by the experiments of 1849, and would probably have led to a transposition, as it were, of the "Warrior's" design, either by actual drawing or by calculation, from iron into wood, and thus another practical view for considering so serious an undertaking would have been presented, and that under a phase far more familiar to all concerned than could have been afforded by any study of a fabric of iron, where the study of a fabric of iron had never been even permitted before. If an actual transposed drawing had been made, the "Warrior" would then have appeared having a central "box" of half the ship's length, specially built for security against shot on all four sides, with a 5-feet thickness of solid wood, the two terminal quarter-lengths having timbers of the proper dimensions truly, but with open spaces between them of 22 inches, instead of 5, and covered externally only with no more |