think we might consider it perfectly set at rest whether or not ships should be plated with armour. The plating of ships with iron is such an important question and is so serious for the country that it would be a pity to close the discussion upon it in one evening. There are many facts which I believe will show that it is not so extraordinary as some think, that naval men should suppose iron ships are not the ones that are best fitted for war purposes, or even for carrying troops. do not wish my opinion or the opinion of

any one else to be taken on that point unless backed by facts. I hope to have the opportunity of bringing forward some facts to show that that opinion is not an erroneous

one.

A MEMBER.-I wish to say one word. Almost all who have spoken here have pointed out the great desirableness of further experiments with shot and plates. It is the opinion of Captain Halsted that no target smaller than the "Trusty" is trustworthy. The small target which was fired at appears to have been pushed six or seven feet in the course of the firing. That fact shows, I think, that the smaller target made a greater resistance than the larger one. It occurs to me you should press upon the Government to put up small targets. If a shot makes a hole in the small targets it is clear it will make a hole through the "Trusty," therefore the experiments should be made on smaller targets than the "Trusty."

Wednesday, May 15th, 1861.

Captain M. S. NOLLOTH, R.N. in the Chair.

IRON-CASED SHIPS-continued.

THE "WARRIOR" AS A SHIP-OF-WAR.

In the first lecture I had the honour to deliver before you, I stated that, so far back as 1845, the use of iron instead of wood in the construction of ships was recognised to be attended with certain important advantages; and I specified, among others, its "affording greater facility for combining a maximum of strength with a minimum of material;" as also a "greater facility for imparting that strength to every subordinate portion, and in every direction throughout the structure."

Again, in the second lecture, I quoted-as one, among other grounds set forth by the Shot Association of 1851 for their dissatisfaction with the mode of conducting the Simoom experiments" because," as they truly state, no means were used to test the practicability of remedying the making of splinters. by inner plates or other contrivances, con

sidered by competent persons to be practicable."

Again, in the third lecture, I defined the "main question" for decision between the wooden ship-of-war, of whatever force, and the Iron-cased Ship, at present of one deck only, as standing upon the terms or conditions that These two structures being ships of perfectly equal qualities in every other respect, should alone differ in the fact that the one possessed the additional protection to her sides of an iron armour four inches thick, while the other possessed no such protection at all. And, with the view to distinguish between thus fixing a "principle" and working out that principle into practice, in the very next paragraph (page 58) to that in which the definition is thus rigidly stated, I so far modify its terms of requiring actual equality in all equipments, that I expressly specify certain very important conditions of equipment as "collateral or open questions, yet to be determined by "true experiment;" and I desire here" to point out that, in the above definition, as well as throughout all previous

Lectures, I have been treating of Iron-cased Ships in respect to their powers of successful contention with ships of wood only.

But it is obvious that there remains to be considered the equally important view of the relative qualifications for success in Iron-cased Ships, when in action against each other; for though it might be admitted that such ships must, as a rule, destroy all ships of wood they may engage with, yet, between any two plans or principles of Iron-cased Ships themselves, as adopted the one by one Naval Power, and the other by another, there may, and as I shall presently show there do, exist differences in warlike merit so great as to render the one Engine far better adapted for its work than the other; and in such case, if numerical equality exist likewise, then it is obvious that the Possessor of the superior machine must, if he so please, be able to enforce that superiority over the Possessor of the inferior one, with all attendant consequences. And thus it would seem, in the course of God's Providence, that the giant steps in human progress of the present day are bringing to decision within closer and closer limits those great struggles for paramount power which for so many ages have been swaying to and fro in the European balance; and that the great game for Naval Supremacy, the winning of which must turn the scale in that decision, is now being played out between ourselves and our powerful Rival, like the last moves on the chess-board, with choicest pieces of greatest power, and more as an effort of high intellect and practical knowledge, than, as in past times, by display of superior animal courage or mere brute force. I am fully aware, therefore, as indeed it is my express object, that in the professional remarks I am about to put before you on the "Warrior" and her sister ships, I openly submit for Public consideration, whether, according to the views propounded, and so far as the game has yet been played, there be evidence that the system under which it has been opened upon Our side is such as is best adapted to engage our ablest and most experienced players, and afford the best chance of winning in that tremendous stake which, to England at least, is at issue.

Now we know that the first armour-ships of our great Neighbour carry their plating upon wooden frames and bottoms; but there is little reason to doubt, that this is not intended as a continuous practice, but that it is only adopted for the moment, as a more rapid means of creating at first a certain force in this new Engine of war, under the security of which more time may be gained for educating that sufficient body of skilled labour to enable iron to be employed in the construction of all future ships destined to be iron-cased; the deficiency of such labour in France being a necessary condition of the deficiency of iron itself, which has always characterised that country while dependent for it on her own supplies alone. But, as she nas already commenced the construction of at least two iron hulls for her future Iron-cased ships, and as our decision has taken the same direction from the first, it may be taken for granted that in this respect the Iron Fleets of both countries will, with slight exception, be alike. But although fleets of a similar description of ships may be built of similar materials, there is ample room in iron, as in wood, for the employment of that material in ways so diverse as to produce practical results quite as much the reverse the one of the other as any arising from difference in material; and it was with an express view of enunciating in this concluding portion of my task the opinions I have ever held on this subject, that I so pointedly referred in my opening Lecture to the distinct natures of "study and practice"

in the respective branches of Naval Architecture in wood and in iron. It is in the liability to confound the special practice of these two distinct branches of one great Profession,-as if a like practice must necessarily exist where great principles are alike acknowledged, that not only our great danger lies of committing serious error, but, as I shall show, that grave error actually has been, and is still being committed; and it seems nothing short of a violation of all analogous experience to maintain that the Art of constructing the most abstruse and complicated of all works out of wood is practically the same as that of constructing it out of iron; so that the lifetime which has been passed in acquiring eminence in the one must be held to have been equally passed in acquiring eminence in the other. I hold to the doctrine that it is the distinct speciality of the material employed which enforces a distinct and special study of its properties and best modes of application, and thereby produces that distinct and special "art" which is practically known only to those who make it their calling; and any pretension to its possession without practice should, in my opinion, never be advanced, but if advanced, it should never be admitted; for, if admitted, it would be but little less unreasonable to expect a successful issue than it would be, in common life, to expect a good "fit" were coats and boots to be ordered indiscriminately from the same party, on the ground that both were articles of clothing.

Those, therefore, who have been throughout not only the consistent advocates for Iron-cased Ships, but who, from their knowledge or study of the properties of iron, have also advocated that such iron-casing could best be carried upon iron hulls, have never for a moment contemplated, and much less would they admit, that such ships should be less complete in any degree whatever-either in their powers of offence or of protection-than if such iron-casing were to be carried upon hulls of wood. On the contrary, without demanding any superiority for iron in this respect, beyond its properties already specified, it has been felt as sufficient for the time to maintain, that gun for gun, plate for plate, from one extremity to the other, whatever any ship of wood could carry, that, the ship of iron could, and ought to, carry likewise, leaving all other superior properties of the one material over the other to develop themselves in actual practice. And it is in proof that this conviction has been entertained and exhibited throughout these Lectures, that I have opened this present one by quotations from its predecessors; but which I have also done for the further purpose of fixing the sense in which I now proceed to treat item by item on all the more important points as yet developed in the construction of the "Warrior" and her sisters, as British exponents or exemplars of Ironcased Ships-of-War.

Proportionate Dimensions and Form.

It is now more that sixteen years since our great northern engineer, Mr. Robert Napier, announced his intention to make machinery for no private ship the proportionate dimensions of which were less than six times her breadth to her length; the experience of even that day having determined that a form for speed was not producible on lower proportions, and that any attempt to do so could only embroil the Naval Architect with the Engineer in dispute over the inevitable loss and disappointment to the Owners of a ship of inferior speed. The sharp competition for command of markets; for preference in mail contracts; together with public demands