coated? Because I understand you condemn the "Warrior" for not being coated all round. I Capt. HALSTED. — I intend to say everything I can about the "Warrior." approve of the "Warrior" not being so, because she condemns that condemnation. Capt. FORD.-I approve of it in this instance as a sailor. I say that you cannot otherwise get the speed which is so desirable. You want more classes of iron-coated ships than one. Now, you will never get anything in speed to equal the "Warrior," and that class which simply carry their weights in the centre, as she does, with the two ends unloaded; for I believe you might just as soon put a weight on a race-horse's neck and tail as load the two ends of a ship of that sort. In consequence of the two ends of the "Warrior" being light, she will have a greater speed than anything you can oppose to her if you load the two ends. Monday, April 8th, 1861. Captain E. G. FISHBOURNE, R.N. C.B. in the Chair. IRON-CASED SHIPS-continued. THE EXPERIMENTS ON "THE TRUSTY" 1859 AND 1860- In the first naval campaign of the late Russian war, and up to the year 1855, the French and English force of Screw-ships-of-the-line in the Baltic and Black Seas together stood respectively at eighteen English to five French, or, if we except our four Block-ships, at fourteen to five, being in the proportion of three to one nearly. But by the end of 1858, up to which time the relative strengths were ascertained and presented to Parliament by Lord Derby's Committee, it was found that the two Navies had become of equal force in Screw liners, while that of France was superior in Frigates by a proportion of one-third; besides the four " Iron-cased Ships" then building by her, while England's first one was not yet begun. By the opening of this present year, however, and by great and creditable efforts, the parity of strength of 1859 has again been brought, or nearly so, to those proportions in favour of England on the maintenance of which her Maritime Security has always, until lately, been held to depend; and in respect to Screw line-of-battle ships, as the special exponents of Naval Power, England's force now nearly doubles once more that of her great maritime Neighbour. But it is important to remember that the restoration of these proportions has been effected by purely accidental circumstances, which have helped us out of our critical position this once, but which can never do so again. The discovery of 1859 fortunately found this Country with a far larger remainder of the former fleet of Sailing line-of-battle ships in sound condition than was the case in France; and, but for the ready means which was thus afforded of converting these into Screws, the difference in the strength of the two Navies in this principal arm must have been so slight, even at the present day, that the addition of the fourteen sail of Russian Screw-liners to those of France would have placed England in the Channel and Mediterranean in a position of numerical inferiority, even if her whole Fleet had been confined to those waters. And, indeed, when the Italian campaign and the Baltic navigation opened simultaneously in 1859, and a strong rumour was current of a secret treaty between France and Russia, there were many minds to whom was known the true state of unpreparedness we then were in, which were by no means free from deep anxiety as to what that year might bring forth on scenes much closer to our own hearths and homes than the plains of Lombardy. Thus, the year 1855 seems to mark the commencement of a period when the traditional policy of England in respect to the international strength of her Fleet underwent some great and deliberate change; and the circumstances connected with the present international position in respect to our force in that new Engine of naval war which is to supersede the wooden Screw liner seems also to point to the same conclusion. There were always sufficient signs to show that the official faith of England and that of France in the competency of the "Floating Batteries" of 1855 for their proposed work were of very different degrees of strength: there was always a tone of depreciation as to the efficiency of the proof sustained by the French vessels before Kinburn; there was much indecision and reluctance in subjecting any one of our own vessels to effective shot-proof; even when so subjected, but little interest was shown in the remarkable powers of resistance displayed, which, when spoken of, seemed to excite annoyance and disappointment, rather than any other feelings. Allusion to these powers was always met by pointing to the entirely different results necessarily produced by placing in armour the decrepid Portsmouth veterans, and then firing at frames which were never equal nor intended, even when young, to bear treatment half so severe as that under which they necessarily succumbed in their old age; and, lastly, it is not until now, when the demand has been made by the one loud and unanimous cry of the Country, that the construction of "Iron-cased Ships," as a necessity, is reluctantly conceded. And whether there be any true earnest at this moment to place England in respect to her Fleet of this description in the same position of numerical superiority to France which by long tradition her security has been held to depend upon, may well be doubted by others as well as myself, who have but the signs they see around them whereby to guide their judgment. That "tradition" of now some 150 years of practical proof has ever based England's maritime, and therefore essential, security on her possession of a Navy of double the force to that of France, in whatever might be the description of ship regarded as the representative of Naval power. And as throughout that period such representation has been vested, as the title implies, with the Line-of-battle ship, so it follows, that, if it be that description of ship which is to be superseded by the new engine, then England's security must depend on her possession of an Iron-cased Fleet of double the numerical force of that of France; unless, indeed, any facts or circumstances can be pointed to which justify the conclusion that in the present day such security may wisely be entrusted to lower international proportions. Now the two main considerations which ever determined the larger proportions were-First, the number and value of those distant Possessions, our vital commerce with which made it requisite for us to place them under the defence of detached portions of our Fleet; and, if the necessity for that defence is still to be measured by the value of the property to be defended, then, whether it be our Columbian or our Australian "nuggets," our Chinese trade, or our Indian Empire, it is hard to say that such necessity is less now than it has ever been in times past. Secondly; while so much of our force is thus necessarily detached, there is the consideration of our having to meet, nearer home, a combination of more than one, or even of all other Navies together, added to that of France. And, if we regard the enormous floating wealth which England now exposes to "war risk" in her ever-increasing Ocean trade, there are circumstances of to-day offering as great a temptation as ever,-and assuring our complete humiliation as certainly as ever, if by means of any such combination our Colonies and Commerce should be made a prey of by even a two months' supercession of our Maritime Supremacy. But, if anything could be wanting to prove how perfectly our great Naval rival herself regards our security as depending on at least our traditional amount of superiority, it is to be seen in the frank, open, and systematic determination, with which since 1849 she has studied and applied the purposed means of wresting our supremacy from us, even though it be based on such acknowledged superiority; and as year by year, and step by step, she matures her plans, it may be well and wise to note the confidence with which she relies, even single-handed, on effecting our humiliation by her Naval success within the first period of any possible war between us. For the unmistakeable evidence of all this, and for a description of the truly formidable counsels and efforts by which she is steadily advancing in preparations for her avowed object-and in nothing more evidently so than in her determination to keep that "lead" we have openly surrendered to her in the construction of an Iron-cased Fleet-I venture earnestly to invite all who hear or read these Lectures, to the thoughtful perusal of those truly patriotic pages which, under the title of "The Faults and the Defaults of the Naval Administration," have recently been put before us all; and of those pages none seem to be to me more valuable than those few introductory ones wherein the writer points so forcibly to the popular error, "that England is safe while uninvaded;" while in reality, from the very nature of her existence, the destruction of her Power may be accomplished by the loss of her Naval Supremacy alone, without even an attempt at her invasion, and without its being practicable to fire even one volunteer rifle in its defence. The construction and maintenance of a fleet of the new description of ship, double in numerical force to that of France, is therefore as essential to our safety to-day as has been that same scale of superiority throughout the long reign of the wooden line-of-battle ship; and if it be true that France has now, built or building, fifteen "Iron-cased Ships," while England certainly has but seven even in contemplation,-then is this most serious fact forced on our consideration, that the traditional proportions of relative superiority between the two Navies in that engine which is the special exponent of Naval Force are actually reversed; and the alarm created by the discovery of our relative equality in 1859 has yet a more formidable foundation in the recent official announcement to the Country of our actual inferiority as involved in the above relative numbers. Nor is it that this humiliating position is limited to the fact that for the first time in our international histories our Rival has been allowed to take advantage of our deep absorption in party strifes for Place and Power, to sap the foundation of our National security; but, for the first time in the history of the two Navies, that of France can now show nearly a twelvemonth's practical knowledge and experience in the properties and management of the special Engine of naval war, while not an Officer or Seaman in the Navy of England can show now,-nor for months to come will be able to show, the experience of a day. Nor does the difference in our relative positions end even here. The seven "Iron-cased Ships," now building or to be built in England, are of three several plans and descriptions, all so distinct that each will demand their own separate experience, and, until the relative values of these be compared and determined, our path must still be perplexed and dark before us; with the chance even then, that neither of the three pair of present specimens may supply us with more than the negative light of avoiding to build any more like them; while it is evident, from the decided measures of our great Neighbour, that his year of practical knowledge in advance of us, has afforded him light enough to mature his first stage of experience, and give confidence as to the requisite modifications to be embodied into his second stage. Is it not well then to inquire, Is this relative position of the two Countries in naval matters the result on our part of mere blind inadvertence, or is it indeed the effect of some great and deliberate change in our traditional principles as before adverted to ? We have seen in these Lectures that from 1840 to 1845 it was anxiously endeavoured to secure for our Navy all the prospective improvements and advantages which the introduction of iron was throughout that period considered to hold out; and the traditional practice of England's Navy in taking and keeping "the lead" in all "naval improvements," to the obvious increase of its superiority over that of all others, was thus duly acted on up to that latter date. Again, it was in 1849 that the first finished Screw-liner the "Hogue was seen making her first sea-trip across to Ireland, and from that time to 1855 England's efforts in securing "the lead" in this great "naval improvement" also were such, as before stated, that when France could provide but five such ships for experience in actual war, England sent eighteen; so that, down to this latter year, our traditional doctrine was fully acted on still. But at that time we first heard, and since that time we nothing else have heard, on each annual presentation of the Estimates, but the antitraditional doctrine, "That it is not England's 'policy' to take the lead in Naval improvements;" and to this avowed "policy," therefore, which practically does make over, and actually has made over, to Maritime Power No. 2 that which theretofore Maritime Power No. 1 had jealously secured for her own essential defence, is unmistakeably due our position of equality in Screw-liners which was announced in 1858; and our yet more unparalleled position of inferiority in the substitutes for those Screw-liners, which was announced with equally unparalleled equanimity in this present 1861. England has but three appropriate docks in those Naval Arsenals of hers, which to eyes that cannot see across the Channel may still seem "great;" and if, as present signs seem to show, she should limit her efforts for the construction of her new Fleet to such "Warriors" as may be built in these three Public docks, then we may expect to see the twice thirty available building-places of our great Private iron yards, with all the superior skill of their long-experienced Establishments, fully occupied in the construction of the "Warrior" fleets for all other Countries than their own-probably for that of France itself—with a result which must make it hopeless ever to expect regaining the security of that traditional Maritime Supremacy which thus will have been so irretrievably surrendered. How far the actual supercession of wooden Screw-ships-of-the-line by Iron-cased Screw-Ships-at present of one deck only*—can be regarded as a reality, depends no doubt on the comparative liability to destruction in battle of the two descriptions of ship. This question as regards all "shellfire"-whether time-fuzed, concussion, or of molten iron-we have already seen to be determined, by Sir Howard Douglas himself, in favour not only of 4-inch plates, but even of §-plates as in the "Simoom" experiments of 1850,-confirmed by the adoption of those same plates for the batteries of the semi-" Simoom" "Warriors" of 1859-60. But as those experiments were made with spherical shells only, it may be well here to restate the "Conclusion" given in Article 446 of the Naval Gunnery as regards conical rifled shells also, and which is as follows: "Some interesting experiments have recently been made against iron plates by Sir William Armstrong's new 80-pound shells-against a target resembling the scantling of a 50-gun frigate, covered with plates of iron of various descriptions of 1, 2, 21, and 3 inches thick, bolted to the timber with wrought-iron screws and rivets. The Armstrong shell, fired with a charge of 10 pounds, pierced 14-inch and 2-inch plates without failure. When fired against the 3-inch plates, one-half only of the number fired penetrated the plates, but not the timber, driving pieces of the plates from 1 foot to 14 inches into the timber. An 8-inch spherical shell, fired with a charge of 16 pounds against the 24-inch plates, made only a circular crack around the point of impact. No shell penetrated in an unbroken state, and did not, therefore, show the effects that a live shell would have produced by bursting between the decks, or, what is still more destructive, lodging in the side and then bursting." To the which quotation I will only add that it seems most desirable to ascertain at once, by open and conclusive experiment, the thickness of plate which will so far exclude the molten contents of the Martin shell as to protect the timbering behind the plates from combustion, wherever timber is used. Having thus disposed, for the present, of all descriptions of "shell-fire," we have now arrived at the amount of protection afforded by the sides of "Iron-cased Ships" against penetration by shot, taking for our guide the effects of the several firings at the sides of the " Trusty" by Sir William Armstrong's 32-pounder, and 80-pounder, and Mr. Whitworth's 80-pounder; no other Guns than these having as yet proved their power against those sides, and those sides being the only ones of a real ship built of combined wood and iron expressly to afford such protection, which as yet have been fired at in England, with two partial exceptions to which I will hereafter refer. And, to prevent all misunderstanding as to ultimate conclusions, I will here state what I conceive to be the true practical question at issue between the "Iron-cased Ship " and the wooden "Ship-of-the-line;" and the sense, there * While these Lectures have been in progress, it has been ascertained, for the first time, that the French "Magenta " and "Solferino " are formidable Iron-cased Ships on two decks, and as such will be lauched before these Lectures are published. |