rendered in the field. He was essentially a military scholar, having devoted his life to studies, researches, and writings, of such a nature and quality as to mark him unmistakably as the man of men to supply Mr. Lincoln's technical and other deficiencies. On the 11th of July, 1862, General Halleck was appointed General-in-Chief of all the armies of the United States, and reached Washington in the latter part of the month to assume control. It was not an unimportant consideration that thenceforth generals of armies in the field would receive their orders from a professional soldier, ranking them, and not from a "civilian" of any grade whatever.

It is easy to overlook or belittle the practical statesmanship displayed in the creation of such an office as that to which General Halleck was appointed. The "statute laws" of the land made no mention of it, and the appointment carried with it no permanent promotion or increase of pay. The "Generalin-Chief" had a thankless task before him: almost as much so as had the Secretary of War. Victories won would surely give all their glory to the generals in immediate command of the forces winning them. Sore-hearted men in search of scapegoats for the blame of defeats and failures would continually have one prepared and named for them at the right hand of the President at Washington. He would receive small credit for good advice, and his powers for preventing mischief were limited on every side in spite of his sounding title. This was strikingly exemplified by the results of the Fredericksburg campaign, undertaken against his counsel, lost as he expected, and much of the blame of it cast upon his head by a host of uninformed faultfinders.

It was of the last importance to the stability of the Administration that the tides of sure disappointment and discontent should rise and dash and be dissipated against such breakwaters as Stanton and Halleck and not be permitted to assail injuriously the one man whose personal hold upon the popular heart and confidence was vital to the existence of the nation. Stu

dents of the Constitution of the British Empire may possibly find an analogy there by looking for it.

It may fairly be said that the close of the summer of 1862 found Mr. Lincoln's official staff, for the first time, fully prepared to deal with the work before him and them. Surely a year and a half was no excessive length of time for the accomplishment of so great a feat of wisdom in selection. He had done well with such materials as he had within his reach in the beginning. It is not easy to see how he could have done better. Now, at last, he was efficiently provided, but before him opened gloomily "the dark days" of the war. The prospect or hope of a speedy collapse of the Rebellion had disappeared, and, for the moment, the Nation stood upon the defensive.

CHAPTER XL.

DRAWN BATTLES.

The Fighting under Pope-News from the Army-The Changes of Commanders-Lee in Maryland-The Antietam-Exhausted PatienceRemoval of McClellan-A Great Misunderstanding.

THE position of the Army of the Potomac during the last week of August, 1862, and the days next following, called for the exercise of uncommon firmness and discretion.

General McClellan arrived from Harrison's Landing on the 24th of August, and reported to General Halleck for orders. On the 27th he removed his quarters from Acquia Creek to Alexandria, and was assigned to the duty of forwarding troops to General Pope. It was a time of universal gloom and deep excitement. The tongues of rumor, detraction, of every kind of bitterness, were so busy with all the questions of the hour that it was impossible to sift the true from the false of even what purported to be "evidence." This difficulty was seriously complicated by the practical untrustworthiness of any dispatches. The general in command had done his duty and knew it, and his despatches expressed his indomitable courage and confidence much more accurately than they did the condition of the army or the results of recent battles.

On the 30th of August was fought the battle of Manassas (commonly called the Second Battle of Bull Run); and the Battle of Chantilly, which followed, may be regarded as part of it so far as the effect upon the army or people is concerned. A part of the army had behaved badly and was demoralized, but only a part. It was unfortunate that the country at large and the soldiers out of the fight obtained a first and lasting impres

sion of the fighting under Pope from stragglers of broken regiments reporting to newspaper correspondents. More was lost in this way than could easily be remedied. General Pope himself reported of the Bull Run affair: "The troops are in good heart and marched off the field without the least hurry or confusion. Their conduct was very fine. . . . The enemy is badly whipped, and we shall do well enough. I think this army entitled to the gratitude of the country."

General Halleck was inclined to take the same view of the matter, and said to General Pope, "You have done nobly."

So he had. And the more carefully the records of that short campaign are searched, the better is the figure cut by its general, with some reservations as to his use of the pen. He seems to have been unaware of the feeling and opinion existing among some of his subordinates. So was General Halleck, for a few days. But no such blindness troubled Mr. Lincoln. The President had heard from the Army in many ways, and even from an informal council of war of its corps and division commanders.

There was something almost dramatic about that "council" and its consequences. Immediately after the Second Battle of Buil Run, a call was made upon the civil employees of the Washington Departments for volunteers to go over into Virginia and aid in caring for the wounded. Many went; and among them was a brother of one of the President's secretaries. This young man was met upon the field by a corps commander whom he knew, and was at once taken to the headquarters of another corps commander. Other well-known officers were present or were sent for. They came, they remained a longer or shorter time, they conversed freely and went away. The young man was directed to note down every name and every statement of opinion given, but not to be understood as doing anything of the kind. It was a strictly confidential interchange of military views of the situation, and some of the expressions were quite strong and marked by individualities. At

the close, the corps commander remarked to his young friend: "We could not send all that in a dispatch to Washington; but the quicker it is repeated to the President, the better for the army and the country."

Means of rapid transportation were at once provided, and the next morning the weary, muddy, and, from his services among the wounded, somewhat bloodstained young man was closeted first with Mr. Lincoln and then with General Halleck and Mr. Stanton. The details of his report were never made public: but Mr. Lincoln had heard from the army. He had the unanimous though unofficial and entirely free opinion of a dozen of its best officers, perhaps of a score, that it could no longer be successfully handled by General Pope, with the added assurance that these men spoke for large numbers of their companions of all grades and arms. Of the officers who constituted that informal but important council of war, some knew not at all that they were members of it, but more spoke with a full understanding and spoke directly for the purposes in hand. The greater number of them are dead, and so is their messenger, and so are all the men to whom he delivered his message. The effect was instantaneous, as may be seen by a comparison of dates. The President obviously had but one duty to perform, and he performed it without hesitation. General Pope was not formally removed, but he literally drifted out of the command as General McClellan drifted back into it. The Army of Virginia quietly ceased to be, and the Army of the Potomac set out at once for the battle-fields of South Mountain and the Antietam. Glad enough would Mr. Lincoln have been, and well would it have been for the country, if he could on many another emergency have listened to a full and unreserved expression of the views of men holding corresponding positions in that and other armies; but the rules of the service, and the rigid requirements of military etiquette, and the impossibility of providing ways of access to himself, were all prohibitory.