Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq

use military force, if necessary, against the regime of Saddam Hussein-and to use such force preemptively has served a very salutary, even necessary, purpose. As a former counter-intelligence officer and a member of the House Intelligence Committee, I hate security leaks. The massive leaking of sharp internal disagreements within the Executive Branch, especially the Pentagon, unfortunately preceded the necessary international diplomacy, essential consultation with at least key committees in Congress, and any concerted effort to inform the American public as to why an Iraqi regime-change is needed. It also seems clear that the discussions of U.S. military action for a regime change in Iraq had gotten ahead of the planning and decision-making for such possible action.

Many of my colleagues and I, in both houses of Congress on a bipartisan basis, with a sufficient number of voices from the American public, helped make it clear to the Bush Administration that a congressional resolution authorizing the use of force was an essential step before any pre-emptive military action against Iraq could be launched. Despite an earlier White House counsel's advisory opinion that a congressional resolution was not required, in a September 4th meeting with elected congressional leaders President Bush advisedly agreed that his Administration would first seek such a resolution. Thus, we are here today embarked on this gravely important duty.

Another very positive result of the leaking and resultantly intense controversy over the issue of military action on Iraq is what likely will be the outcome of the international communities' furor about a potential unilateral and pre-emptive American strike against Iraq. That strenuous opposition is especially the case among our traditional European allies and the Arab states. As was the case in the Gulf War, the Administration sought international support for action on Iraq through the United Nations. As a result of President Bush's exceptional speech to the U.N. General Assembly, the international community has become serious about demanding the re-introduction of United Nations weapon inspectors in Iraq with the unfettered access demanded to search out production and storage sites of chemical, biological, and possible nuclear weapons. The U.S. is right to insist upon an unconditional, time-certain demand for any new inspection regime to begin and to insist upon full compliance with unfettered access for U.N. inspectors. The international community now has this forceful proposition before it: either we have an effective U.N. weapons inspection program resume and continue in Iraq now, or the U.S. has established more forcefully the legitimacy of military action for regime-change-with the reasonable expectation of a supportive international coalition for military action against Iraq and for the perhaps more difficult task of Iraq reformation in its aftermath. Because of an intensive public debate on the necessity of military action against Iraq and especially the involvement of Congress, the resolution Congress has before it today has evolved into a far more acceptable one, and the legislative process has not been yet completed. The broad language extending the authorization for the use of military force "to secure peace and stability in the Middle East" has been narrowed to "Iraq." The War Powers Act requirements, with reporting requirements to Congress are now included. A limited notification to Congress by the President about the intent to use or the use of the authorization for military force is now included. Also importantly, the requirement is now included to report to Congress under Section 7 of P.L. 105-338 about the U.S. planning and actions taken by America in Iraq after "the Saddam Hussein regime is removed from power"-humanitarian assistance, democracy transition assistance, and methodology for Iraq to repay its debts are all elements explicitly required. Before using military force, the President, now under the procedures specified in this resolution must make available to Congress his determination that “reliance on further diplomatic or other peaceful means alone either (A) will not adequately protect the national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq is not likely to lead to enforcement of all relevant U.N. Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq,” and (B) that military action is consistent with the U.S. and international war against terrorism. These are among the important changes to a proposed congressional resolution that has evolved to the one before us today. It may well evolve further before the House and Senate vote on it.

What is the case against Saddam Hussein? Especially important, what is it that justifies the pre-emptive use of military force? We recall, of course, that without provocation he attacked and occupied Kuwait with the intent to annex it. Crucially, however, as we consider pre-emptive force, we must recognize that he has used weapons of mass destruction (WMD)-chemical weapons against Iran and against the Kurdish population in his own country. Is there any legitimate doubt that he would be willing to use them again? There also is no legitimate reason to doubt that he has a significant stock of both chemical and biological weapons. We recovered SCUD unused warheads with traces of both such types of chemical and biological

agents in 1991, and I can simply say that he now has developed further ways to deploy such chemical and biological agents against his enemies.

The evidence is clear too, obtained from numerous verifiable sources, that Saddam attempted to develop nuclear weapons in the past. On-going attempts to acquire dual use technology for use in a nuclear development program continue-notwithstanding the controversy about the intended use of one such attempted acquisition. Should any of us have any doubt that he has and is attempting to procure plutonium to substantially shorten the time for developing nuclear weapons?

These WMD remain a grave threat to a widening circle of his neighbors and our own forces and facilities in the area. However, again what is also crucial and urgent is whether we have any doubt that he would provide such WMD-chemical and biological, and perhaps nuclear in the future-to terrorist groups who would use them against our citizens and those of our allies? I don't doubt it in the slightest, and it is a risk we cannot accept. In saying this, I do understand that the Administration cannot yet present incontrovertible evidence of a link between al Qaeda and Saddam. There are, of course, reasons for strong suspicion about such links.

That logically brings us to the question of why, at this time, we should authorize the future use of military action by the Administration. I believe it is clear that the threat Saddam poses will only intensify. The United States, the western democracies, and Iraq's neighbors should never have permitted Saddam to hamper and then bar the reentry of United Nations weapons inspectors. In the eleven years since the end of the Gulf War and certainly in the four-year absence of such inspections, we are now in more danger because of that collective lack of resolve to enforce WMD disarmament and because of the commercial and foreign policy goals of some of our European allies and Russia.

Now, of course, in a post 9/11 world, we know all too well that mass terrorism has been waged against civilians-in our country or abroad. It is a terrible part of the equation that the American President and the Congress must responsibly consider. Do we now have a reasonable basis to conclude that Saddam is not an imminent threat against the United States? Is there a clear justification for attempting to override the conclusion of the Commander in Chief? The answers, unfortunately, are "no." Delaying action is a greater risk to our national interests-the security of our citizens-than the uncertainties that always attend a war and its aftermath. The resolution authorizing the use of force (or one with reasonable additional amendments resulting from Executive-congressional negotiations or the legislative process) is an authorization this Congress should approve.

As we take this extraordinarily important step, fully mindful that we put members of our Armed Services in harm's way, and recognizing that no citizen in this country is assuredly safe now from related terrorist events either, this Committee and Congress has additional important responsibilities. We need to take every step to assure that the Executive Branch has given adequate consideration and provided contingency planning and resources on the following questions (beyond the adequacy of our military force and its combat deployment):

1. Has the U.S. taken adequate steps to broaden the international coalition for not only the military operations, but especially for the more difficult and long-term task of developing a democratic regime in Iraq that will not threaten the security and stability of the region?

2. Has the Administration prepared contingency plans to take into account that Saddam may use chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction, directly or through anonymous terrorists, against other nations in the region before or during the conflict which may ensue, e.g., used against Israel? Have we prepared for what could be a rather extraordinary Israeli response? 3. Has the Administration taken the steps to understand and prepare for the international consequences of such military action against Iraq in the region and elsewhere in the world? Will our action strengthen the influence of Iran in the region-even in Iraq? Will our military actions strengthen the demand for an independent Kurdish state in Iraq, including areas in neighboring countries? Will a victory in Iraq unleash a Shi'a Muslim bloodbath against the Sunni Muslim population or a large part of the Iraqi population that supported or are perceived to have supported Saddam? Are we ready to control it? Certainly, the Shi'a have suffered horrendous provocation for such retribution.

4. Has the Administration adequately considered the resources we will need in this Iraq war/peacekeeping scenario in order to successfully pursue the ongoing American war effort against al Qaeda and terrorism-including our far-from-finished military, peacekeeping, and broad reconstruction requirements in Afghanistan?

My colleagues, this list of questions is only illustrative; you know it could be much longer. The passage of H.J.Res. 114 today, momentous as it is, as necessary an action as it is, constitutes but the first step in the many important duties this Committee and Congress must pursue. We must be ready and fully committed to accomplishing them in a constructive, bipartisan effort with the Executive Branch.

Chairman HYDE. I thank the gentleman. The gentlewoman from California, Ms. Napolitano.

Ms. NAPOLITANO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Unfortunately, I had to leave yesterday afternoon before the completion of my colleague's points which have been stressed over and over again in regard to the issue we are facing today.

Now more than of our national security must be viewed as our primary consideration in our interactions with other nations. Specifically, our decade-long conflict with Iraq over the acts of aggression in Kuwait, the inhumane treatment of Saddam Hussein's own people, as we are hearing, the gassing of the Kurds, and most importantly, the unending efforts to develop various weapons of mass destruction-the chemical, biological, and nuclear.

We also know that all previous efforts to rein in Iraq through various U.N. resolutions, sanctions, and inspections have not produced the results or the United Nations that we had hoped.

Iraq still poses a horrible significant regional and global threat, operating with impunity, and outside of the various resolutions adopted by the United Nations, the resolutions we supported. To us the fundamental issue before this body is the extent of the threat and how best to respond to it, keeping disarmament as a major focus. However, without the support of the other nations, it is going to be very chancey for me to vote.

I had considerable doubts about the original request. Our President asked us to provide him with any and all authority he deemed necessary to react to the Iraq threat. That authority was too broad and the case for a military action, either unilateral or in concert with our allies, had not been articulated clearly or conclusively. I still believe we need to quantify that threat more thoroughly.

I also believe our primary focus should be first and foremost on a diplomatic solution, working through the United Nations Security Council and with our allies to remove those weapons of mass destruction.

Our strongest ally, Prime Minister Tony Blair, at a Labor Party convention just a few days ago, agreed to a compromise resolution calling for Britain to obtain U.N. authority before taking military action. The resolution declares that British troops should participate in action against Iraq only after the exhaustion of all political and diplomatic means. This is the approach that is consistent with our national interests and it is one that the American public appears to support over unilateral action.

I must tell you, Mr. Chairman and Members, that I have had— as many of my colleagues had quite a number of telephone calls, faxes, e-mails and letters from the people that we represent. And, in my particular case, overwhelmingly veterans groups, individuals, residents, immigrants, are saying no war. Do the best you can to find out a diplomatic solution before we have to go and send our children and our grandchildren into war.

That being said, the resolution before us appears to have a more moderate and thoughtful attempt to address our concerns about

pursuing military action before we have exhausted all other options. My concern is that we have not allowed for any amendments, and hopefully we will be able to reach that agreement soon.

The resolution does not seek compliance through the U.N. Security Council, and recognizes that we want all relevant Security Council resolutions strictly enforced. It does limit the scope of the Presidential authorization to Iraq. It does require the President to submit to Congress a determination prior to using force, within 48 hours of using force, that we have exhausted all our efforts.

I have a problem with 48 hours. However, again, hopefully we will reach some kind of an agreement that will allow us to have a better option. It does require our President to comply with the War Powers Act in regular consultation and reporting to Congress.

In the end, if Saddam Hussein continues to thwart efforts to open all sites to U.N. inspectors, as he has so many times before, we may be left with no option other than military force. I hope, I trust, I pray that this is not the case.

Saddam Hussein_can act responsibly if he chooses to do so. He has chosen not to. But he can prevent destruction, remove current sanctions, and thereby improve the lives of his people and neighbors and the rest of the world. It is in his hands. But he must not misjudge our resolve to continue to ensure that he does not continue to develop or use weapons of mass destruction. There is not one person amongst us that wants war or would chose war without exhausting all other options.

I am pleased that the resolution before us provides a number of safeguards, rightly puts diplomacy first, and keeps Congress involved with the process. This is critical in all points.

Nonetheless, I continue to have doubts about the immediacy of the threat. Although there is no doubt that Saddam Hussein has developed some weapons of mass destruction and continues to further refine them, ultimately whatever action we take must be done deliberately and with broad support of our citizens, should not be viewed as a partisan issue, as we all know the consequences of war, and it is a heavy burden on each and every one of us. I trust God will guide our hands.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman HYDE. Thank you. I believe everyone has had an opportunity to make an opening statement, and so we will move to amendments.

Are there any amendments?

Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk. Chairman HYDE. Mr. Sherman. The Clerk will report the Sherman amendment.

Ms. RUSH. An amendment in the nature of a substitute.

Mr. SHERMAN. I actually have three amendments at the desk. The longest of those amendments is the one I would like to bring I believe that is identified as Sherman 3. If there is any procedural problem with that amendment, then I will introduce Sherman 1 and 2 in order.

up.

Please proceed.

Chairman HYDE. Do we have all three of his amendments?
Ms. RUSH. Yes.

Chairman HYDE. You want Sherman 3?