diplomatic policy through the Security Council or, in the alternative, to deal with something that we have to deal with.

I thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Iowa, Mr. Leach.

Mr. LEACH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As all Members know, this resolution involves a difficult set of decisions that neither the Congress nor the executive can duck. And anyone who is not conflicted in their judgments isn't thinking seriously.

For myself, I have enormous regard for the President and great respect for his foreign policy advisors, but I have come to the conclusion that this resolution misfits the times and the circumstances. There may be a case for regime change, but not for war against Iraq and its people.

Because time is brief, I would like to emphasize three points. First, given the events of 9/11, a doctrine of preemption has a modicum of legitimacy. But the greater our power, the more important it is to use it with restraint. Otherwise, it will be seen as hubristic, with a strong prospect of counterproductive ramifications. Engaging in war the wrong way can too easily jeopardize the underlying conflict against terrorism and undercut core American values and leadership around the world.

Two, there are many so-called end-game elements that have not been adequately addressed. They range from the dilemma of street combat, to problems of postwar government governance, to worldwide Muslim reaction.

Three and most profoundly, this resolution is based on a misunderstanding of modern science as it applies to weapons of war. The assumption is that there is a compelling case to preempt a nuclear weapons program. But what is underestimated is the volume and the danger of the biological agents Saddam possesses and the nature of his likely response to outside intervention.

The tactical assumption is that Saddam will be on the defensive with an American-British attack. But, the likelihood is that, as troubling as end-game problems are, the beginning conflict issues may be the most difficult ever confronted in the region and possibly in all of modern warfare.

When a cornered tyrant is confronted with a use-or-lose option with weapons of mass destruction and is isolated in the Arab world unless he launches a jihad against Israel, it is not hard to imagine what he will choose. Israel has never faced a greater challenge to its survival. The likelihood is that weapons of mass destruction, including biological agents, will be immediately unleashed in the event of Western intervention in Iraq.

In the Gulf War, Saddam launched some 40 SCUD missiles against Israel, none with biological agents. Today, he has mobile labs, tons of such agents, and an assortment of means to deliver them.

It is true that his stockpiles could be larger in years to come. But Members must understand that the difference between a few and a few hundred tons of anthrax or plagues may not be quantum. These are living organisms that can multiply; they endanger the region and, potentially, the planet.

We used to have a doctrine of MAD, mutually assured destruction, between the United States and the USSR. No one seriously

contemplated aggression because of the consequences. Today, for the first time in human history, we have a doctrine of mutually assured destruction between two smaller countries, Iraq and Israel, one with biological weapons, the other nuclear.

The problem is that British and American intervention could easily trigger an Iraqi biological attack on Israel, which could be met by a nuclear response. Not only would we be the potential precipitating actor, but our troops could be caught in crosswinds and cross fire.

This is a circumstance we should pack from. Thank you.

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Ackerman, the gentleman from New York. Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Chairman, on the subject of Iraq, there is really no question about any of the facts the President has cited in making the case for urgent action against the threat posed by the current Iraqi regime. Only the deliberately obtuse can doubt that Saddam Hussein is a murderous, rapacious dictator with an addiction to aggression and a long record of gross miscalculations. Since seizing power and killing all of his domestic rivals, Saddam has spent the entirety of his rule committing acts of gross, unproved aggression, preparing for war, or brutalizing his own countrymen.

There is also no question about Iraq's appetite for weapons of mass destruction. The single question we must answer, the single decision from which all other decisions will naturally descend is, what to do about this threat. It is grave, it is immediate, and it will not satisfactorily resolve itself without action.

We cannot simply hope that Saddam Hussein will be deterred. He has shown himself to be in inveterate and dangerous gambler. We cannot simply hope that Saddam will not share weapons of mass destruction technology with terrorists. We all know al-Qaeda elements have already been at work soliciting Iraqi aid in this field. We cannot simply hope that U.N. inspectors will root out Saddam's weapons of terror. We know he has defeated inspections for 10 years and is prepared to risk his regime to preserve them. Mr. Chairman, hope is not a plan, nor is hope a method that we can depend upon to ensure our national security. I believe that we all want a nonviolent resolution to this problem, and I believe that authorizing the President to use force, if necessary, is the best way to preserve that option. But if we must use force, then the central issue, to my mind, is how to secure the greatest and broadest international endorsement for our proposed course of action.

Mr. Chairman, since World War II, the United States on the basis of broad, bipartisan consensus has been leading the world through the creation of a system of international security based on shared norms and institutions. The international order our Nation has established and sustained since the Presidencies of Roosevelt, Truman and Eisenhower, the so-called Pax Americana, has succeeded for decades because it has been perceived internationally as legitimate and not just self-interested, the peace of the Americans, not the peace for the Americans.

The idea that we are all in this together has enabled our country to lead for decades without any significant backlash. The key questions that remain are about the international order and our relationship with the rest of the world. The President's speech to the

U.N. seemed to be the first public step in our effort to build a coalition. I hope it will not be the last.

A preventive war devoid of any sort of international consensus is not a precedent that we want to establish. Our Nation used to refer to that kind of project as aggression. Like it or not, we will need the international community, when and if the time comes for the reconstruction of Iraq. Beyond Iraq, we will continue to need international support for the war on terror. We cannot scorn international concerns and reservations without lasting harm to our larger and longer-term objectives.

While I am prepared to endorse the President's request for authorization to use force to respond to the threat posed by Iraq, I continue to have grave reservations about the Administration's complete failure to explain what an unsupported war on Iraq will do to our efforts to establish a stable global order. I continue to have grave concerns about the Administration's complete failure to explain how an unsupported war in Iraq will advance international cooperation in the war on terror. And I continue to have grave concerns about the Administration's complete failure to explain how we will have help restore a post-Saddam Iraq to the family of nations.

I have grave concerns about those who claim the flag which enwraps them as their exclusive province, seeking to hold patriotism and nationalism as theirs alone in an attempt to inoculate themselves against criticism and to stifle debate. These are tactics and tools of Saddam Hussein. And if we adopt them, he wins.

Mr. Chairman, I will support the resolution. But I fear that defeating Iraq and deposing Saddam are likely easier than repairing a potential breach in the international perceptions about our Nation's intentions and values.

Chairman HYDE. Thank you.

The gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Burton.

Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I don't think anybody in the Congress wants war. But, you know, if history doesn't teach us anything, it teaches us that an appeasement, as Mr. Lantos said, simply doesn't work.

Winston Churchill, prior to World War II, was a lone voice in the wilderness talking about the threats that faced them; and nobody listened. And as a result, war ensued, Hitler wasn't stopped short of moving into Poland and moving throughout Europe, and 50 million people died.

Now, I don't know that that is going to be the case in this particular situation, but the fact of the matter is, you know, Saddam Hussein does have chemical and biological weapons, maybe not as many as he will have in a few years, but he has them.

How many does it take? How much does it take to kill a bunch of people? How much does it take to kill more people than September 11th did? Do we wait?

What if we wait, and he does develop a nuclear weapon shortly, and he does use it, and he does kill a lot of people-50,000, 10,000, 5,000 or he uses biological and chemical weapons. What do we say to our kids and grandkids after those things have happened? Why didn't you do something, Dad? Grandpa, why didn't you do something before that happened?

In my opinion, we have to preempt this sort of thing from happening.

We have to send a very strong message to Saddam Hussein and to all of the terrorists and would-be terrorists in the world that there is going to be a terrible price to pay if you start using terrorist tactics throughout this world. And I think that that is a signal that we have to send very quickly.

Now, when we talk about Israel, as one of my colleagues just did I just got back from Israel. I talked to Shimon Perez, the Foreign Minister. I talked to Benjamin Netanyahu and others, as members of our CODEL did. And the Likud and Labor Parties all agree that they have to do something now.

They are passing out gas masks, and they have asked us to give them inoculations against the kinds of diseases that they might face. So they know what the threat is; they are right next door. But the one thing that they say that they can't wait on is for Iraq and Saddam Hussein to develop nuclear weapons, because once he does that, they have no defense, and they will be destroyed if he launches them with a nuclear device.

So Israel is on board. They are the ones that are threatened first, as my colleague just said. They know what the threat is; they know what has to be done. It is my opinion that if we want to stop the terrorist activity in this world, if we want to send a very strong signal, then we must act and we must act quickly.

These centrifuges-according to the intelligence people I talked to in Israel, the centrifuges that they use to develop nuclear weapons are no larger than a refrigerator. Iraq is a big country. You can hide these things all over the place. And so, if you send these inspectors in there, they will never find them if they get there and do have the ability to look around.

Saddam Hussein has used chemical weapons on his people in his own country, on the people in countries right next to him, and he will use anything at his disposal if we let him.

It is my opinion that we have to act and act quickly. That is why I support this resolution.

Chairman HYDE. The gentleman from American Samoa, Mr. Faleomavaega.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, thank you for calling this meeting or hearing to mark up the proposed resolution, to determine whether the Congress will grant the President the authority to utilize military forces, if necessary, to protect our national security as well as the security of the Middle Eastern region.

I admit, the proposal or revised resolution now before our Committee for consideration is indeed an improvement from that proposed previously by the Administration. And I certainly want to thank the gentleman from California, Mr. Lantos, for making_emphasis of the fact that each one of us here as a Member of the Committee is never to question the integrity and the patriotism of each other in terms of whatever decisions that we will make as a Member of this Committee regarding this resolution. But-out of our own personal consciences we will make that decision, but never question the patriotism of anyone here in this Committee.

Mr. Chairman, when Secretary Powell appeared before our Committee about a weak ago, I raised a couple of questions with Secretary Powell.

One, if and when the time comes, if the United States will declare war against Saddam Hussein, will the President or the Administration take all necessary military action to win this war and nothing less?

Secretary Powell's response was a firm "yes."

Mr. Chairman, for those of us who served in Vietnam, I don't want another Vietnam, with half-baked plans and policies where enemy soldiers can shoot at you, but you can't shoot back.

I also asked Secretary Powell if our Nation is prepared to take up additional responsibility with the consequences of a post-Iraq takeover, where millions of refugees from Iraq are going to severely impact the social and economic conditions of other Arab nations, let alone the tremendous costs that will be borne, presumably primarily by our own Nation.

Secretary Powell's response was, again, "yes."

Mr. Chairman, the gentleman from Iowa has just shared with us the same concerns that I also have. I do not believe that our ability to have a preemptive strike capability is going to prevent Saddam Hussein from releasing the horrors of all of the biological and chemical-tons of biological and chemical agents that he has in his possession.

I am torn about what we did in Vietnam, and I am torn again of what we are going to do—we are about to do, if we do it—against Iraq. I am torn of what will happen to the good citizens of Israel. And again, as the gentleman from Iowa has shared with us this afternoon, the losers of this war are going to be Israel and Iraq, the people of Israel and Iraq.

I want to say that I do support the resolution. Reluctantly, I support the resolution. I feel that we need to move forward with this action in this Committee, but at the same time, I want to share with the Members of this Committee my concerns. I sincerely hope to God that we will be able to resolve those problems that I have raised.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman HYDE. Thank you.

The gentleman from California, Mr. Gallegly.

Mr. GALLEGLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I support this resolution. I want to commend Speaker Hastert and Minority Leader Gephardt for working in a bipartisan manner with the White House to develop what I believe to be a very strong and balanced resolution.

I also want to commend you and Mr. Lantos for scheduling this markup, which will allow this Committee to carry out its rightful role in shaping United States foreign policy.

September 11th has tragically taught us the price of not acting when faced with a clear and present danger; and there should be no doubt that today we face a clear and present danger in the form of weapons of mass destruction in the possession of Saddam Hus

sein.

We know, after the 1991 liberation of Kuwait, Iraq unequivocally agreed to eliminate its nuclear, biological and chemical weapons