that we are unshakeably resolved to do so, then there can be no security for us, no safety to be purchased, no refuge to be found. In the name of those brave souls, both living and departed, who purchased our freedom, let us now act.

[The prepared statement of Chairman Hyde follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE HENRY J. HYDE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS_FROM THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, AND CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

The United States is once again confronted with the specter of Saddam Hussein armed with an arsenal of chemical, biological, and possibly even nuclear weapons. This is a sobering prospect, but we should not focus our attention solely on his instruments of destruction. Instead, we must recognize that the threat lies in Saddam himself.

We need not make a case against Saddam Hussein. He has condemned himself with a clarity far more stark than his most bitter opponent could pronounce.

In 1980, he attacked Iran and initiated a decade of warfare that killed and wounded over one million people, a conflict that included his use of chemical weapons on Iranian troops. In 1990, he invaded Kuwait and imposed a brutal occupation on that country, laying waste to everything within reach when his forces were finally driven out. He has indiscriminately used chemical weapons on unarmed civilians in his own country, and he has slaughtered any who have opposed him.

Given this record, there can be no doubt that, once armed with weapons of even greater destructive power, he will have little reluctance to use them.

The threat to U.S. interests is obvious, but we are not the only target. The entire world should understand the danger that Saddam poses to everyone and should welcome any opportunity to end it before he is ready to strike. Despite the extensive criticism that has been directed at the Administration, I believe that the President and his advisers have gone to extraordinary lengths to enlist the cooperation of the world community, including that of our allies and the United Nations.

The response, however, has been a disappointing one. Many of our critics apparently refuse to recognize the danger for what it is.

We can see this attitude in the eager reaction to Saddam's latest promise of cooperation which has, at least initially, accomplished its purpose of undermining the fragile beginnings of a consensus that at long last something must be done.

But we would be fools indeed if we believed that Saddam can be trusted.

He has cynically broken all of his previous promises of cooperation, and there is no reason to believe that his latest statement is anything more than an attempt to delay and divide us. He will only use the time the world grants him to further his plans and preparations.

This is hardly an unprecedented situation. Is it really necessary to remind ourselves that the world watched as Hitler boldly proclaimed his objectives and openly armed his forces? Willfully blinded and seduced by hope, his intended targets only guaranteed the catastrophe they so greatly feared would descend upon them.

This is an undeniable reality, but we are confronted with an even greater danger than that posed by Saddam. Despite clear and repeated warnings, it appears that much of the world does not understand that we have entered a wholly new and increasingly perilous era, one with new and harsher rules.

Through repeated usage, the term, "Weapons of Mass Destruction," has become almost banal, but the unimaginable destructive power these represent requires our constant focus and a determination to do what we must to defend ourselves.

The problem is not merely that a murderous tyrant such as Saddam may be in possession of these weapons. In the aftermath of September 11th, we must_accept that he has been joined by many others of an even more fanatical purpose. Terrorists willing to commit suicide in order to kill large numbers of innocents cannot be stopped by the familiar conventions of deterrence. Their possession of weapons of mass destruction must be equated with a certainty that these will be used against

us.

To assume that these terrorists and others will remain unarmed by Saddam is an assumption with a deadly potential. A first strike could well be the last strike. We cannot shield ourselves with hope. We must not guess the world into annihilation.

What then must we do?

The President has demonstrated his determination to act to remove this threat and has asked the Congress for an authorizing resolution. But we have yet to reach unanimity on that resolution.

It is reasonable to ask for proof that Saddam is planning to attack us. The temptation to deny the boundless dimensions of the menace he poses to us is a strong one, but this must be abandoned in the recognition that he himself has broadcast his intentions.

It is a matter of record that his relentless pursuit of weapons of terror and of mass slaughter is decades-old. But it was only in the aftermath of the Gulf War in 1991 that we were able to directly measure the intensity of that determination. The revelation that he was within six months of possessing an operational nuclear device, a fact that our best intelligence had been unable to uncover, was riveting in its implications.

He is restrained in his efforts to do us harm only by the limits of his ability to do so, and he is racing to free himself from those limits. With every day, the onslaught that he is preparing for us approaches ever closer.

For those convinced of Saddam's murderous intentions, the debate has centered on whether or not we should focus our efforts on assembling a coalition of friends and allies and seek the enhanced legitimacy that approval by the United Nations might render to our actions.

But I believe that is the wrong debate. We all agree that these are desirable things and that we should do all in our power to secure them. I believe the President and his Administration have done and are doing just that.

But the real question, the one which should occupy us, is one of far greater consequence: On whom does the final responsibility for protecting ourselves rest? Is it ours or do we share it with others? Are decisions regarding our fate to be made in common with others?

I believe the answer is unavoidable.

We have no choice but to act as a sovereign country prepared to defend ourselves, with our friends and allies if possible, but alone if necessary. There can be no safety if we tie our fate to the cooperation of others, only a hope that all will be well, a hope that eventually must fail.

For more than half a century, whatever safety and security has existed in this world has been there largely because America has been unafraid to act against threats, and to act alone if necessary. The perception that we are resolved to do so has prevented many assaults on that security and continues to do so today.

On many occasions we have been joined in our efforts by our friends and allies and, more rarely, have enjoyed the world's approval. But often we have not, and still we acted.

If we are to have a chance of averting conflict in Iraq, a simple resolve on our part will not be sufficient to the task. For the great danger we face with Saddam is ambiguity.

Saddam has often miscalculated in the past. His flawed judgements have resulted in wars that have killed hundreds of thousands of people. For that reason, any ambiguity regarding our course of action and our determination to act alone if need be risks yet another miscalculation on his part and a false grant of safety to call our bluff.

Vigorous debate in our deliberations is not only permissible-it is essential. The question before us and our country is too great to demand acquiescence. But the result of that debate cannot be to condition our actions on the approval of others, for we might wait for an approval that may never come. Far more important is that we cannot even appear to be waiting for others. For to do so would be to fatally convince Saddam that we might wait forever.

The sight of dissension, of irresolution, in the Congress cannot but contribute to the potential for miscalculation.

However desirable the cooperation of our friends and allies may be, the merest hint of any doubt that we will act alone if necessary cannot but reinforce Saddam's calculation that we will not act at all. To risk giving him even the faintest hope that we can be restrained or delayed by others in our search for consensus, may well be a deadly one, for his gamble might bring ruin upon us all.

I speak of the sight of dissension, for we must remember that our debate is not for ourselves alone, and that our audience is not confined to this room. The world is watching us. Our allies are watching us.

Our enemies are watching us. Saddam is watching us. They are looking for signs of indecision in our resolve, searching for the fatal sign of weakness that will come from binding ourselves to act only in concert with others. The voice of indecision would cut through any wording in which we might attempt to secret it, however artfully phrased and cleverly contrived we might render it.

We do not have the luxury of pretending not to see the danger confronting us. All of our choices are difficult ones, but our only real option is to act.

Over a century ago, in another conflict, Lincoln said that "we cannot escape history. We of this Congress and this administration, will be remembered in spite of ourselves. No personal significance, or insignificance, can spare one or another of us. The fiery trial through which we pass, will light us down, in honor or dishonor, to the latest generation.'

Those same words apply to us here today.

A century ago, Britain stood majestically at the height of her power. Within 40 years, the knife was at her throat, and she survived only because we were there to rescue her. But there is no one to rescue us.

We cannot entrust our fate to others, for others may never come. If we are not prepared to defend ourselves, and to defend ourselves alone if need be, if we cannot convince the world that we are unshakably resolved to do so, then there can be no security for us, no safety to be purchased, no refuge to be found.

In the name of those brave souls, both living and departed, who purchased our freedom, let us now act.

Chairman HYDE. The gentleman from Kansas, Mr. Bereuter.

Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Chairman, may I be permitted just to say a word before you recognize my friend from Nebraska?

Chairman HYDE. Surely.

Mr. LANTOS. I want to commend you for a powerful and eloquent statement, and I want to identify myself with your statement. I think you have laid out the case in a statesmanlike fashion and I want to congratulate you. Thank you.

Chairman HYDE. I thank you very much.

Mr. Bereuter.

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman, I was involved for 51⁄2 hours yesterday afternoon in the Intelligence Committee deliberations. I could not miss those. I heard only perhaps two-thirds of the statements. I stayed until the end. I think that my colleagues gave a thorough explanation of the background of Saddam Hussein, Iraq, and the abuses against his own people, and presented their own points of view on the resolution before us.

It is the kind of debate that I think we should have in this Committee and in the Congress. It parallels the kind of extraordinary debate we had on the Gulf War resolution.

After what I would say is a little bit of a shaky start, I think the Administration has proceeded on the right track. As a preparatory comment, I am a former counterintelligence officer and serve on the Intelligence Committee, and I absolutely hate security leaks. But I think that what happened with leaks coming from the Administration, particularly the Pentagon, about the controversy regarding the use of force and the method in which it would be employed against Saddam Hussein, provoked a wide national debate about that subject, which was very salutary. It took place in this body, it took place when Members were back in their districts in August, and, despite the fact that earlier a White House counsel had said the President need not come to Congress for a resolution authorizing the use of force, in fact, he on September 4th agreed that seeking a congressional resolution was the proper course.

Within a week, he had gone to the United Nations and made the point to them that if the institution was going to be relevantsomething other than a League of Nations, it could not avoid examining the fact that Saddam Hussein had violated repeatedly, continuously in some cases, 12 Security Council resolutions, and the President asked the U.N. if it was going to continue to be relevant, particularly worthy of the name "Security Council."

As a result, I think it is much more likely that we will have greater international support for intervention in Iraq and, more important perhaps, for a coalition of forces in the aftermath of a victory in Iraq. That very difficult task remains ahead, and we should not underestimate it.

Given the background my colleagues have gone into, I think I can cut my remarks a bit and focus on what I think is the case for the justifiable preemptive use of military force. The case has been laid out about Saddam Hussein.

We recall, of course, that without provocation he attacked and occupied Kuwait. Crucially, however, as we consider preemptive force, we must recognize that Saddam has used weapons of mass destruction, chemical weapons, against Iran and the Kurdish population of his own country. Is there any legitimate doubt he would be willing to use them again?

There also is, I think, no legitimate reason to doubt that he has a significant stock of both chemical and biological weapons. We recovered skewed warheads with traces of both such agents of weapons of mass destruction in 1991, and I can simply say in this forum that Saddam now has further ways to deploy such chemical and biological agents against his enemies.

The evidence is clear, too, obtained from numerous verifiable sources, that Saddam Hussein has attempted to develop nuclear weapons in the past. Ongoing attempts to acquire dual-use technology for use in a nuclear development program continues, notwithstanding the controversy about the intended use of one such attempted acquisition that you have all heard about.

Should any of us have any doubt that he attempts to procure plutonium to substantially shorten the time for developing nuclear weapons? These weapons of mass destruction remain a grave threat to a widening circle of his neighbors and our own forces and facilities in the area. However, again, what is crucial is whether we have any doubt that he would provide such weapons of mass destruction, chemical and biological-and perhaps nuclear in the future to terrorist groups who would use them against our citizens and those of our allies. I don't doubt it in the slightest, and it is a risk we cannot accept.

In saying this, I do understand that the Administration cannot yet provide incontrovertible evidence of a link between al-Qaeda and Saddam. There are, of course, reasons for strong suspicion about such links. But that logically brings us I think to the question of why should we push for military action now?

Now, of course, in a post-9/11 world, we know all too well that mass terrorism against civilians in any country, in our country or abroad, is part of the equation that American Presidents and the Congress must responsibly consider. Do we now have a reasonable basis to conclude that Saddam is not an imminent threat against the United States? Is there a clear justification for attempting to override the conclusion of a Commander in Chief?

The answer is, unfortunately, no. Delaying action is a greater risk to our national interests, the security of our citizens, than are the uncertainties that always attend a war and its aftermath. The authorization of the use of force, or with reasonable adaptations from the executive/congressional negotiations that are ongoing in

this legislative process, such as this resolution-or in other words an adaptation of it-I think is an authorization that Congress should approve.

As we take this extraordinarily important step, fully mindful that we put members of our Armed Services in harm's way, and that now no citizen in this country is assuredly safe from related terrorist events either, this Committee and the Congress have important following responsibilities.

We need to take every step to assure that the Executive Branch has given adequate consideration and contingency planning and resources on the following questions beyond the adequacy of our military force and its combat deployment.

Question one: Has the U.S. taken adequate steps to broaden the international coalition for not only the military operations but especially for the more difficult and long-term task of developing a democratic regime in Iraq that won't threaten the security and stability of the region? We are giving encouragement in this resolution to the President to pursue that kind of international support through the United Nations and the other ways.

Two: Has adequate consideration been given to the fact that the use of weapons of mass destruction could be launched before or during a conflict by Saddam Hussein, directly or indirectly through terrorists, against nations in the area-against Israel, for example-and are we prepared to fully take into consideration and act accordingly for what might be an extraordinary response from Israel?

Three: Has the Administration taken steps to understand and prepare for the institutional and international consequences of such military action against Iraq in the region and elsewhere in the world? Will our actions strengthen the influence of Iran in the region, even in Iraq? Will our military action strengthen the demand for an independent Kurdish state in Iraq, including areas in neighboring countries like Turkey? Will a victory in Iraq unleash a Shiite bloodbath against the Sunni, or a large part of the Iraqi population that was perceived to have supported Saddam Hussein, and are we able to cope and control that kind of bloodshed? Has the Administration adequately considered the resources we will need in the war/peacekeeping scenario with Iraq to successfully pursue the ongoing American war effort against al-Qaeda and terrorism, including our far-from-finished peacekeeping and broad construction requirements in Afghanistan?

My colleagues, this list of questions is only illustrative. You know it could be much longer. The passage of H.J. Res. 114 today, momentous as it is, as necessary an action as it is, constitutes but the first step in the many important duties of this Committee and the Congress. We must pursue them. We must be ready and fully committed to accomplish them in a constructive, bipartisan effort with the Executive Branch.

I thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Bereuter follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DOUG BEREUTER, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEBRASKA

The intense national debate that has developed in Congress, by the American public, and internationally since August about whether the United States should