ville, in the direction of the Little Holston, and drove the remainder of the force into Knoxville.

On learning this result, General Saunders, commanding a cavalry brigade, advanced to give the enemy fight, but finding them too strong for him, he withdrew his force in line of battle three miles from Knoxville. This position, after an ineffectual struggle, was abandoned. From this point, this portion of the enemy's force advanced on Rockville, eight miles from Knoxville, driving the Union outposts before them close up to the latter place. While these operations were proceeding on the line indicated, the main force of the enemy, under Longstreet, Cheatham, and Pegram, advanced by way of Loudon and Lenoir-the passage of the river at the former place being made on Saturday, November 14th, and the Union troops falling back before them in good order. During all the 15th brisk skirmishing was going on, and on the 16th the enemy was held in check all day at Campbell Sta tion, twelve miles from Knoxville, on the Lenoir road. Burnside was, during this action, personally in command. His loss amounted to two hundred and fifty men: rebel loss unknown. During the 16th our army fell back on Knoxville, and early on Tuesday morning (17th) the line of battle was formed around the city. At noon the rebels appeared on the Lenoir road, two miles from the town, and heavy skir mishing immediately commenced-Saunders holding the line gallantly and stubbornly until nightfall. Late in the evening our troops charged the rebels, and drove them from their ground, but fell back to the original line. On Wednesday, 18th, heavy skirmishing was resumed, both parties losing severely. General Saunders, a brave and excellent officer, was among the wounded, and died of his wounds on the following day. Thursday and Friday, 19th and 20th instants, witnessed a continuation of the struggle, with the element of heavy artillery firing added, and on the 23d we find the following dispatch from General Bragg:

"To General COOPER:

"MISSIONARY RIDGE, November 23.

"We hold all the railroads leading into Knoxville, except the one between Holston and French Broad Rivers. General Jones's cavalry might close that. The enemy's cavalry is most broken up. Wheeler cut off his train between Cumberland Gap and Knoxville.

(Signed)

"BRAXTON BRAGG."

The siege of Knoxville proceeded without any occurrence of special interest until the 28th, when an attack was made against a small fort mounting six guns, on a hill near the town, and commanding the approaches to it on that side of the river. The fort was occupied by the Twenty-ninth Massachusetts, the Seventy-ninth New York, and two companies of the Second and one of the Twentieth Michigan. On its front and flanks was once a field of pines, which had been cut down with the tops falling in all directions, making an almost impassable mass of brush and timber. A space around the fort was cleared. The ditch in front was about ten feet deep, and the parapet nearly twenty feet high. The assault was made near daylight, on the 29th, by the brigades of Bryan and Humphrey, with a party from Wolford's. The

enemy advanced in three lines and made the attack fiercely, but all attempts to scale the sides of the fort failed, and they were finally repulsed with a loss of two hundred killed and wounded, and several hundred made prisoners. Meantime the force of Burnside was closely pressed, and provisions became so scarce that his troops were put on half rations of bread.

By the movement of Longstreet, however, Bragg was weakened, and Grant therefore determined to attack the latter, and if possible separate him from Longstreet. The forces of Bragg held Missionary Ridge, the Chattanooga Valley, and Lookout Mountain, with their left resting on the latter, and their right on the ridge near the tunnel of the Knoxville and Chattanooga Railroad. Their pickets occupied the south bank of the Tennessee River for miles above, and their supplies were brought by the railroad from Atlanta and Dalton. The principal rebel force was in the Chattanooga Valley, between Lookout Mountain and Missionary Ridge, and on that slope of Lookout, thus being very nearly on his centre. The ridge was heavily posted with artillery.

The movement projected by Grant was promptly executed. Orders were sent to Burnside to lure Longstreet as far away as possible, and fall back to a position where he could stand a siege and subsist from the country. A division of Sherman's troops was to be sent to Trenton, threatening the enemy's left flank. Under cover of this movement, Sherman's main body was to march up by Hooker's lines, crossing the Brown's Ferry bridge mostly at night, thence into a concealed camp on the north side of the river, opposite South Chickamauga Creek. One division was directed to encamp on the North Chickamauga; about one hundred and twenty pontoons were to be taken under cover of hills and woods, and launched into the North Chickamauga; these were to be filled with men, to be floated out into the Tennessee and down it, until opposite the South Chickamauga (about three miles below), to effect a landing on that bank, and throw up works; the remainder of the command were to be taken across in the same boats, or a portion of them; the Tennessee and South Chickamauga were to be bridged, and then the artillery crossed and moved at once to seize a foothold on the ridge, taking up a line facing the enemy's right flank near the tunnel. Howard's Corps of Hooker's command was to cross into the town by the two bridges, and fill the gap between Sherman's proposed position and the main body of Thomas's army. Hooker, with the remainder of his force and the division sent to Trenton, was to carry the point of Lookout, and then threaten the enemy's left, which would thus be thrown back, and forced to evacuate the mountain and take position on the ridge; and then the Federal troops, threatening the enemy's communications upon one flank, were to advance the whole line or turn the other flank, as the chances might dictate. Then a part of the force was to follow as far as possible, while Sherman destroyed the railroad from Cleveland to Dalton, and then pushed on to relieve Knoxville, and capture, disperse, or drive off Longstreet from before it.

General Smith, chief engineer, took personal charge of the preliminaries necessary for the move on the left flank. The pontoons were

put in the Chickamauga; the men encamped; the bridge trains ready to debouch at the proper point; and so completely was every thing arranged that no confusion whatever occurred. Artillery was posted on the side of the river to cross fire in front of the point of landing, and force the same, if necessary.

On Monday, November 24th, an armed reconnoissance was made by Thomas on his left, which developed the enemy's lines and gave the Union general a line of battle in advance of his picket lines, at the same time allowing the Eleventh Corps (Howard's) to come into the position assigned it. At midnight the men entered the pontoons, floated down, and effected a landing. At daylight the pontoniers were at work, and at noon the Tennessee River was bridged by a pontoon bridge fourteen hundred feet long, and the rest of Sherman's troops crossed with his artillery. He then pushed out to the ridge and took up his position, and Howard communicated with him, his force having marched to its place. Hooker's forces formed a line of battle running up and down the side of the mountain and sweeping around the point, and at night of the same day (the 24th) held what he had gained, and communicated with Thomas's right. That night the enemy evacuated Lookout Mountain top, and fell back from his front to the ridge. Thus, on Tuesday night, Bragg was threatened on both flanks, with a heavy line of battle in his front. It was difficult for him to determine what the Federal move would be. Ilis railroad must be held, at all hazards, from Sherman. The amount of Hooker's force he could distinctly see. He re-enforced his right very heavily, leaving enough to hold his left and front, as he supposed. On the 25th, Wednesday, Sherman commenced to move. Two hills were taken. From the third he was several times repulsed, and he moved around more force, as if to get in rear of Bragg's line, and the latter then commenced massing against him. The critical moment had now arrived. Hooker moved his columns along the Rossville road towards Bragg's left, and this drew still more force from the latter's centre.

Grant now ordered Thomas to advance and take the rifle-pits at the base of the mountain. The Army of the Cumberland, remembering Chickamauga, and impatient by reason of remaining spectators of the operations of Sherman and Hooker, for two days went forward with a will, drove the enemy in disorder from his lower works, and went on, heedless of the heavy artillery and musketry hurled against them from the crest of the ridge. Half-way up they seemed to falter, but it was only for breath. Without returning a shot they kept on, crowned the ridge, captured thirty-five out of the forty-four pieces of artillery on the hill, turned some of them against the masses in Sherman's front, and the rebel line fell back, while the rest of Bragg's army, including Bragg and Hardee, fled, routed and broken, towards Ringgold. Thousands of prisoners and small-arms and quantities of munitions of war were taken. Hooker took up the pursuit, and that night Mission Ridge blazed resplendent with Union camp-fires. The next day, Hooker pushed the enemy to Ringgold, where he made a show of stubborn resistance, but was forced to retire. Sherman and Howard pushed for the railroad, which they smashed completely. The Union loss in this battle,