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They also lost thirty-six guns, twenty caissons, and several thousand small-arms and infantry accoutrements, and captured over two thousand prisoners. The rebels suffered even more severely than their oppo nents, and their total loss, as stated by themselves, exceeded eighteen thousand.

It is now very well known that the rebels largely outnumbered the Union army in this battle. The following extract from a letter by General Rosecrans shows how great was their advantage in numbers:

"We have five independent ways of arriving at the fact that we fought against terrible odds there:

"1st. This was the opinion of the corps and division commanders, none of whom were bad judges.

"2d. The enemy reports a loss of eighteen thousand seven hundred (18,700) killed and wounded; and admits his loss to have been twenty per cent. of his entire command -a very large loss-which gave him ninety-three thousand five hundred at Chickamauga

3d. Bragg had thirty-two thousand troops when driven from his intrenched camp at Shelbyville and Tallahooma, across the mountains and the Tennessee. Buckner joined him with about ten thousand troops from East Tennessee, Johnston with about twenty-five thousand, and Longstreet with about twenty-five thousand more, giving again ninety-two thousand as his whole force.

"4th. General Grant and several of his subordinates estimate the force fought at Mission Ridge at from forty-five thousand to fifty thousand. Add twenty-five thousand for Longstreet's army, which had previously left, and was then in front of Knoxville, and eighteen thousand for those put hors de combat at Chickamauga, and it gives eightyeight thousand.

"5th. A Union merchant, of Chattanooga, who was at Marietta when the foe were advancing on us, tried to send me word, and subsequently saw and told me that the enemy had re-enforced Bragg with thirty thousand under Longstreet, and twenty-five thousand under Joe Johnston, in addition to which Governor Brown had fifteen thou sand Georgia militia; and so confident were they of overwhelming us, that the Kentucky and Tennessee rebel refugees at Marietta had hired conveyances and loaded their household goods, expecting to follow their victorious hosts back into Tennessee and Kentucky.

"I could add much more corroborative evidence to show that the brave and devoted Army of the Cumberland sustained and successfully resisted the utmost power of a veteran rebel ariny, filled with the spirit of emulation and hope, and more than onehalf larger than itself; inflicted on it much more damage than we received, and held the coveted objective point, Chattanooga.

"What we attempted we accomplished. We took Chattanooga from a force nearly as large as our own, and held it after our enemy had been re-enforced by as many men as we had in our whole command.

"W. S. ROSECRANS, Major-General.”

After Rosecrans's retreat to Chattanooga, the passes of Lookout Mountain, which covered his communication with Bridgeport, and were necessary to secure the transportation of supplies to the Union army, were occupied by the enemy, who also sent a force across the Tennessee River and captured McMinnville, thus almost completely isolating Rosecrans from his base.

This battle of Chickamauga, as it is called, was one of the most bloody of the war, and, without accomplishing any important results in relation to the great contest, was fatal to the commanders on both sides. The Federal commander lost a high reputation and the confidence of his Government, by the faulty dispositions which led to a defeat more signal than any other of the war, except the first Bull Run. The rebel commander lost an influence which had been waning since Murfreesboro, through his inexplicable inactivity on the Monday following his victory, whereby all the fruits of the contest were thrown away. On both sides, the public dissatisfaction caused by their conduct produced, ultimately, a change of commanders. It may be well, therefore, to look back at the career of each, and the circumstances of the campaign to which Chickamauga formed the termination.

The origin of the Army of the Cumberland was a small body of Kentucky volunteers, assembled under Colonel, afterwards General Rousseau, near Louisville, in the spring of 1861. In the succeeding summer, the military Department of the Ohio was organized, and given to General Robert Anderson, of Fort Sumter fame. On the 11th of August, it was extended over the whole State of Kentucky and the State of Tennessee, and was designated the Department of the Cumberland. In October, General W. T. Sherman took command, Anderson's health failing. In November, Sherman was relieved by Buell, and the limits and title of the Department were again changed to the Department of the Ohio. In November, 1862, there was a new arrangement of departments and of commanders. Tennessee, east of the Tennessee River, and Northern Alabama and Georgia, were made a department, under the revived name of the Department of the Cumberland, into which Kentucky was again transferred. The department remained the same under Rosecrans.

It will be remembered that when Beauregard retreated silently and successfully, some time after the battle of Shiloh, from Corinth, leaving Halleck, who was then facing him, as ignorant of his movements as was the rest of the North, he fell back with what remained of his army to Tupelo, in Mississippi. Shortly afterwards Beauregard's health gave way, and Bragg took his place. Bragg found the

army, which had at one time been the finest force, numerically, which the Confederates ever had in the field, reduced to forty thousand men, in the worst possible condition of discipline, decimated by desertion consequent upon Beauregard's long inaction at Corinth, and swept by disease. It was an occasion for the display of many of the finest qualities of a general, as a promoter of discipline, and an organizer of imperfect or broken-down army departments; and everybody confessed that Bragg was equal to the occasion. He exhibited much of that firmness and indifference to popularity which are so rare among republican generals, took upon his own shoulders the odium of causing some twelve or fifteen men to be shot without court-martial; and finally, by the total expulsion of whiskey from his camp, and by divers other salutary measures, restored his army to a higher degree of discipline and efficiency than it had ever before attained. With this reorganized army he operated with great success against the Army of the Cumberland, under Buell, in the autumn of 1862, up to which time Bragg had not ceased to rise in reputation.

It was then, however, that General Rosecrans, having defeated Van Dorn and Price at Corinth, was transferred to the command of the Army of the Cumberland. The condition of that army was not unlike that of Beauregard's when Bragg succeeded to it. Its ranks had been thinned by disease, battle, and the nameless vicissitudes of war. In every respect it was largely overestimated. Nearly seven thousand of its number had deserted. More than twenty-six thousand were absent by authority. The consolidated semi-monthly reports for November 15th, two weeks subsequent to the change of commanders, show that a total of thirty-two thousand nine hundred and sixty-six officers and men-at least one-third of the whole army-were absent from their command! The army was composed in about equal proportions of veteran soldiers and raw recruits. The former were poorly clad and equipped, the latter were inexperienced in drill and discipline, with officers often ignorant, and sometimes incompetent. To sum up, briefly, the spirit of the army was broken, its confidence destroyed, its discipline relaxed, its courage weakened, and its hopes shattered. Such were the peculiar circumstances under which Rosecrans assumed command. The condition to which he soon brought it was well illustrated by its stubborn courage in the hard-fought battle of Stone River.

The two generals had been successful in reorganizing their armies, but lost their prestige when those armies were brought into contact. Rosecrans has been blamed for fighting this battle, and a review of the campaign will show that, even if he could not have avoided an engagement, he might have fought it under more favorable circum


When it was determined to cross the Tennessee River west of Chattanooga, it became necessary for the army, after effecting the passage of the river, to cross the Sand or Raccoon Mountain, which is the first range south of the Tennessee River. Lookout Mountain was then the great barrier between them and Chattanooga. This mountain is some sixteen hundred feet above the level of the surrounding country, is

fifty miles in length, and ends abruptly on the Tennessee, three or four miles west of Chattanooga. For forty miles it has but three passes practicable for the passage of an army, and those very difficult; one at the point of the mountain, near Chattanooga, one at Stevens's Gap, twenty-five miles south, and one at Winston's, forty miles from Chattanooga.

The plan of the campaign was, to hold the rebels in check at Chattanooga, by a small force, sent for the purpose, up the north side of the river, opposite the place where the main body of the army, crossing Lookout Mountain by Stevens's and Winston's Gaps, should get in their rear, destroy their lines of communication, and either besiege them in Chattanooga, or force a battle on advantageous ground. To prevent the rebels from sending a force from Chattanooga, by the pass around the point of Lookout Mountain, into Lookout Valley, to interrupt or destroy our lines of communication with our dépôts at Bridgeport and Stevenson, Crittenden's Corps was sent down Lookout Valley, to near the foot of Lookout Mountain, which latter was held by the enemy with infantry and artillery. The corps of Thomas and McCook were moved rapidly up Lookout Valley, and across Lookout Mountain, the former by Cooper's and Stevens's, the latter by Winston's Gap. As soon as this movement was known to Bragg, who, as yet, had not received the bulk of his expected re-enforcements, it became evident to him that if he remained in Chattanooga the army of Rosecrans would get between him and his expected re-enforcements, and whip them in detail, besides taking possession of his lines of communication, without which he could not subsist his army a week.

The evacuation of Chattanooga by the rebels was therefore a necessity. Bragg fell back rapidly, and evidently with the intention. of retreating on Rome. Crittenden, discovering the evacuation, moved his corps into Chattanooga by the pass around the point of Lookout, and moved out in pursuit of the enemy. Facts soon began to be discovered which led to the belief that the enemy had not retreated far. A cavalry reconnoissance on the extreme right, to Alpine, rendered it certain that they had not retreated on Rome, but were concentrating at Lafayette, and receiving re-enforcements, and that it was their intention to endeavor to retake Chattanooga.

Crittenden's Corps, at this juncture, holding a position on the Chickamauga, near Gordon's Mill, confronted the entire rebel army. Thomas's Corps was at the eastern foot of Lookout Mountain, and McCook was at Winston's Gap, the distance from Crittenden's position, at Gordon's Mill, to McCook's right, near Winston's, being upward of forty miles, while, from the best information gathered from all sources, it appeared that the enemy were rapidly concentrating, and might attack Crittenden before the remainder of the army could be brought within supporting distance. It was therefore necessary, in order to cover Chattanooga, for Rosecrans to concentrate his army rapidly, and in the face of the enemy. It was while this was being done that the rebels attempted to turn his left flank, and obtain possession of the roads in his rear leading to Chat

tanooga: in the attempt to prevent this the battle was brought on. It was absolutely necessary, under the circumstances, to secure the possession of Chattanooga, which, it is very evident, Bragg never intended to permit us to hold. It was a common matter of wonder, when the Union army first occupied the place, why Bragg left so many public buildings standing, all his hospital buildings and dépôts, and two steamboats at the landing, all of which he would naturally have destroyed in evacuating the place with the intention of leaving it for any considerable time in our possession.

Could General Rosecrans have concentrated his army at Chattanooga, avoiding a battle meanwhile, the contest would undoubtedly have taken place there, instead of on Chickamauga Creek. Whether the results of such a battle would have been more advantageous to our arms, or not, is a question difficult to answer.


Inaction of Bragg.-His Position.-His Indecision.-Rosecrans Recruiting.-Storms. Hooker Arrives.-Grant Ordered up.-He Supersedes Rosecrans.-Thomas in Command of Department.-Position of the Army.-Movement to open River.-Defeat of the Enemy.--Sherman's March.-Combat.-Change of Route.-Burnside's Position.-Longstreet Detached from Bragg.-Siege of Knoxvil'e.-Burnside Hard Pressed.-Bragg Weakened.-Grant Attacks.-The Movement Successful.-Sher man Relieves Burnside.-Retreat of Longstreet.

AFTER the battle of Chickamauga the opposing armies remained for a long time inactive. The enemy's forces continued before Chattanooga, where Rosecrans was, receiving re-enforcements. Bragg employed means to cut off supplies coming to the Federal army by the direct route, while his main army, strongly re-enforced on the 20th and 21st, held a line from Bridgeport to Cleveland. Longstreet occupied the extreme left on the Tennessee River, from Bridgeport to Trenton, Johnston the centre at Lafayette, holding Lookout Mountain, and Bragg the right at Dalton, with his right at Cleveland. His cavalry, under Wheeler, foraged in Rosecrans's rear, and captured the train of the Fourteenth Corps. Some eight hundred wagons and two thousand mules were captured and destroyed. Most of the supplies for the Army of the Cumberland were carried over the mountains by pack mules, on account of the difficult transportation. The trains were much annoyed by rebel sharpshooters between Bridgeport and Chattanooga, who daily picked off teamsters, mules, and horses, and so closely was the Union army pressed that rations began to fall short in Chattanooga.

The long inaction of Bragg greatly demoralized his army. Two days after the battle it was agreed, unanimously, by a council of war, that the Confederate army should strike en masse in the direction of Knoxville. But scarcely had the division generals commenced the execution of this resolve, when Bragg announced that he had changed his plan, and the army sat down, and continued for nearly three weeks

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