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were filled with persons who were eagerly watching to catch up and transmit every item of information that might aid the Confederates, or thwart the Government. Under such circumstances, the Executive was driven to proceedings very different from those which were recognized in time of peace. The prompt and vigorous arrest of all suspected persons was, under these circumstances, necessary for present safety, and as a means of intimidating those disposed to oppose the Government. In some of these proceedings it was admitted that he had overstepped his authority; but it was believed that the exigencies of the case, and the support of public opinion at the North, fully justified such possible infractions of the organic law of the country, as necessary to the public safety.

During the year a number of citizens were arrested and imprisoned, by order of the Federal Government, for alleged treasonable conduct, without the usual process of law, and whenever the bodies of these prisoners were demanded under a writ of habeas corpus, their delivery was refused. The writ was suspended by the President, and the question was raised, whether, under the Constitution, the power to suspend it pertained to the President or to Congress. In the case of John Merryman, a citizen of Maryland, arrested on the 25th of May, the application for a writ of habeas corpus was made to Roger B. Taney, Chief-Justice of the United States, who issued it. General Cadwallader, to whom the writ was directed, refused to obey, alleging that the President had authorized him in such cases to suspend the writ. The Chief-Justice then ordered an attachment to issue against General Cadwallader, but the officer who went to Fort McHenry to serve it was not admitted. The Chief-Justice then prepared and sent to the President an opinion, in which he took ground adverse to his power to suspend the writ. The President referred the question to the Attorney-General, Hon. Edward Bates, as the constitutional adviser and law officer of the Government. Mr. Bates, on the 5th of July, rendered an elaborate opinion on the questions at issue, which were, whether the President had the right to arrest persons on suspicion of intercourse with the insurgents, and if he was justified in refusing to obey a writ of habeas corpus, sued out to ascertain whether the alleged suspicions were just. The answer was in the affirmative. The opinion of the Attorney-General was :

"Unity of power is the great principle recognized in Europe; but a plan of 'checks and balances,' forming separate departments of Government, and giving to each department separate and limited powers, has been adopted here. These departments are coordinate and coequal; that is, neither being sovereign, each is independent in its sphere, and not subordinate to the others, either of them or both of them together. If one of the three is allowed to determine the extent of its own powers, and that of the other two, that one can, in fact, control the whole Government, and has become Sovereign. The same identical question may come up legitimately before each one of the three departments, and be determined in three different ways, and each decision stand irrevocable, binding upon the parties to each case, for the simple reason that the departments are co-ordinate, and there is no ordained legal superior with power to revise and reverse their decision. To say that the departments of our Government are co-ordinate, is to say that the judgment of one of them is not binding upon the other two, as to the arguments and principles involved in the judgment. This independence of the departments being proved, and the Executive being the active one, bound by

oath to perform certain duties, he must be therefore of necessity the sole judge both of the exigency which requires him to act, and of the manner in which it is most pru dent for him to employ the powers intrusted to him, to enable him to discharge his constitutional and legal duties."

Hon. Reverdy Johnson, of Maryland, a constitutional lawyer of note, also published an opinion on the subject, in which he reviewed the opinion of Chief-Justice Taney, and demonstrated its error. The power of the suspension of the writ he showed to have been intended, by the very terms in which it was authorized in the Constitution, to inhere in the Executive and the Executive only, and that the ChiefJustice had himself so decided in the case of Luther and Borden, in 7 Howard, 1. He also showed that Alexander Hamilton, one of the framers of the Constitution, had, in his essays on that document, expressly assigned the power to the President, to which Mr. Madison, another of the framers, in his review of those essays, had tacitly assented; and that President Jackson had exercised it without objection.

The persons thus arrested and imprisoned by the Executive being for the most part those who had sought to overthrow the Government, little public sympathy was manifested in their behalf; and even if mistakes were made in individual cases, it was considered that these were inevitable under such complicated circumstances.

The Judges of the United States Courts expressed their opinions very decidedly in regard to these aiders and abettors of treason. Judge Betts, of the United States District Court at New York, in a charge to the Grand Jury, thus defined treasonable acts, and pointed out what constituted misprision of treason:

"Giving aid or comfort to the enemies of the country consists in furnishing them military supplies, food, clothing, harbor or concealment, or communicating information to them, helping their hostilities against the country and its Government.

"It is most probable that complaints will be laid before you under this branch and definition of the crime. Within it will be included acts of building, manning, or in any way fitting out or victualling vessels to aid the hostilities of our enemies; sending provisions, arms, or other supplies to them; raising funds, or obtaining credit for their service; indeed, every traitorous purpose manifested by acts, committed in this district by persons owing allegiance to the country, will be acts of treason. It is not necessary that the accused should have raised or created war by his own acts; he levies war by acting with those who have set it on foot, or by seizing or holding ports, or like acts of hostile aggression. The kindred crime of misprision of treason is this: If any person owing allegiance to the Government, has knowledge of acts of treason, committed by others within the jurisdiction of the court, and does not make it known to the President of the United States, or one of the judges of the United States, or the Governor of the State, or a judge or magistrate thereof, he becomes guilty of misprision of treason, and subject to seven years' imprisonment, and a fine of one thousand dollars for the offence; and it is the duty of the Grand Jury to present for trial therefor such offender, whatever may be his individual connection or relationship with the offender."

In the Circuit Court of the United States for New York, Judge Nelson, at a later day, thus defined the overt act of treason:

"There is more difficulty in determining what constitutes the overt act under the second clause of the Constitution-namely, adhering to the enemy, giving him aid and comfort. Questions arising under this clause must depend very much upon the facts and circumstances of each particular case. There are some acts of the citizen, in his relations with the enemy, which leave no room for doubt-such as giving intelligence

with intent to aid him in his act of hostility; sending him provisions or money; furnishing arms, or troops, or munitions of war; surrendering a military post, &c., all with a like intent. These and kindred facts are overt acts of treason, by adhering to the enemy. Words, oral, written, or printed, however treasonable, seditious, or criminal of themselves, do not constitute an overt act of treason within the definition of the crime. When spoken, written, or printed in relation to an act or acts which, if committed with a treasonable design, might constitute such overt act, they are admissible as evidence, tending to characterize it, and show the intent with which the aet was committed. They may also furnish some evidence of the act itself against the accused. This is the extent to which such publications may be used, either in finding a bill of indictment or on the trial of it."

The sympathy of the masses of the people with the Government, and their hostility to those who advocated treason or sought to justify the acts of the conspirators against the Union, was manifested in the very commencement of the rebellion. In New York City the offices of the Herald, Journal of Commerce, Daily News, Day Book, and Express, were visited, on the 16th and 17th of April, 1861, by excited crowds, and compelled to raise the American flag. Some of these papers required only this hint to lead them to change their course, which had been opposed to the suppression of rebellion by force of arms; others, and among them the Journal of Commerce, the News, the Day Book, and the Freeman's Journal, continued to attack the Government, and were at length seized and forbidden to be circulated in the mails or by express. The Journal of Commerce changed editors, and was then allowed to circulate through the mails. The News and Day Book were stopped, and the Freeman's Journal appeared under a new name and with moderated tone. In several instances grand juries presented papers of this description, and this generally proved sufficient to lead them to change their course. In six instances, the offices were assailed and destroyed by mobs, viz.: the Democratic Standard of Concord, N. H.; the Democrat of Bangor, Me.; the Essex County Democrat, at Haverhill, Mass.; the Bridgeport Farmer, at Bridgeport, Conn.; the Jeffersonian, at West Chester, Penn.; and the Sentinel, at Easton, Penn.; and in one instance only, that of the Essex County Democrat, the editor was taken from his house and subjected to personal indignities. The rioters in this case were arrested and punished. This exercise of mob authority was opposed by good citizens, and was speedily repressed. At the same time the feeling was very general that the authority of Government should be exercised to control, and if needful suppress those public prints which thus openly aided the rebellion. In a few instances of the most aggravated character, not exceeding ten, the Government did interfere for the suppression of such papers; and singularly enough, in four instances these were professedly religious periodicals. The papers thus suppressed were the Christian Observer of Philadelphia, which was principally owned in Richmond, Va.; the Christian Advocate of St. Louis; the True Presbyterian and the Western Recorder of Louisville, which were suffered to go on again after a short period on promise of better behavior, a promise which was subsequently violated; the War Bulletin, Missourian, and Evening News, of St. Louis; the True American, of Trenton, N. J.; the Franklin Gazette,

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of Franklin, N. Y.; and possibly one or two other papers of small circu ation.

The repeated and determined efforts of the Confederate Government to send agents and ministers to the European courts to advocate their cause, a measure difficult of execution in consequence of the blockade; as also the frequent arrival of those who had been engaged in political or financial negotiations abroad for the benefit of the Southern Confederacy, led the Government to keep a watchful eye on the movements of passengers, and finally to organize a passport system for those who desired to vi-it Europe, as well as for tho e returning thence to this country. This at first occasioned some uneasiness, as it had always been our boast that the e were no restrictions upon the freedom of transit to or from the United States; but the good effect of the measure was apparent in the arrest by its means of persons who would other wise have been of great service to the Southern Confederacy.

The confiscation act of Congress having authorized the seizure of the property of those who were in rebel ion against the Government, when that property was found within the loyal States, money and other personal property, and vessels, belonging to persons identified with the rebellion, were seized to a considerable amount. Ultimately, it having appeared to the Government that in many cases the information oa which seizures were based was the result of personal hostility or greed, and that in some cases the seizures had done injustice to parties rea ly loyal, they were discontinued. In no case were money, bonds, or promissory notes retained by Government where it was not evident that they were intended to be used directly for the rebellion; a course of conduct in marked contrast with that of the Confederate leaders, which we have already exhibited.


Modern Art of War.-Great Wars of Europe.-New Principles.-"Strategy.
"Tactics."-Formation of Soldiers.-Education of Officers.-Scientific Aspect of the
Present War.-McClellan's Order.-Restoration of Discipline.-Army Organization.
-Inactivity of the Enemy.-His Projects-Hatteras Occupied.—General Fremont
in Missouri.-Battle of Dug Springs.-Battle of Wilson's Creek -Death of Lyon.—
Retreat of the Army under Sigel-Martial Law.-Position of Forces.--Colonel
Blair's Charges.--Fremont's Proclamation.-Manumission.-Capture of Lexington.-
Advance of Fremont.-Retreat of Price.-Major Zagonyi.-Fremont Relieved.

THE modern art of war, as perfected by the great captain of the present century, may be said never to have been practise upon this continent previous to the pre-ent contest. The old colonies developed their independence after a protracted struggle, under the defensive military genius of the father of his co ntry, operating with rare judg ment on the old maxims of the art. The determined valor, endurance, and devotion of the men of the Revolutionary armies were important elements of success, and in the course of the struggle, much native

practical military capacity was evolved. Happily for the country, with the close of the struggle, peace brought with it other pursuits, and the military art fell, if not into disrepute, at least into disuse. The United States were too distant from the powers of Europe to be involved in those cabals, intrigues, and coalitions, which had there prolonged the struggle against Republican France through twenty years of bloodshed, and which were fatal to Poland, and to the independent action of most small powers. So completely isolated was the American Union, that, in accordance with the farewell advice of Washington, it had no "foreign policy." If the Academy at West Point educated a certain number of young men in the theory of war, there was never any field of action for the fruits of those studies to develop themselves. In Europe, on the other hand, during the quarter of a century which followed American independence, war on a grand scale was conducted under the greatest military genius of any age. That he was a graduate of a military academy may, in some degree, have aided his progress. But he was certainly not indebted to the teachings of professors for his wonderful success. On the contrary,› they had failed to discover any thing remarkable in the student. The general principles then taught may be said to have been by him reversed. Thus the broad rule that an army occupying a central position between two others, would necessarily be defeated, because exposed to simultaneous attacks on each flank, he demonstrated was only relatively true, and that in fact such a central army occupied the strongest position, if properly handled; concentrating a strong force at the decisive point, it could meet and assail one army, in time to return and overwhelm the other. Following the same principle, France, holding a central position in regard to Europe, instead of being weak in consequence, was strong, so long as her internal connections were open, and her force concentrated. A revolution was also produced in the old maxins in relation to fortified places. Their value fell immensely before the active movements of the French. It was ascertained that they were of themselves not formidable, unless they were the key or gateway to some important district. A mere fort that commanded no necessary route was found to be of little value, and the powerful combination of columns was much more effective than spadework, in the hands of an able commander. These ideas were novel, and he conquered Europe in illustrating them. When the Austrian power held Italy, and he, with forty thousand ill-clad, ill-armed, and ill-provided, but veteran troops, turned the Alps and made his attack at Montenotte, the chances were very far from being in his favor; but genius in conception, power of combination, rapidity of movement, and unparalleled vigor in execution soon did their work upon the legions of Austria, and the veteran marshals, retiring before the blows of the "sans culotte," exclaimed in disgust, "Who ever saw such tactics!"

Up to that time the difference between "strategy" and "tactics", was ill defined. The latter had been as old as the art of war itself. The former was the consequence of dealing in war on a large scale. The master-mind on the broad field of Europe, with numerous armies. to move, deduced broader, principles from more numerous and ex

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