It was an evident object of this memorandum to convince the President that its author was thoroughly familiar with the topography and geography of the Peninsula. Among his statements in support of the Peninsula route was that "The roads in that region are passable at all seasons of the year"; that "the country is much more favorable for offensive operations than that in front of Washington, much more level, more cleared land, the woods less dense, the soil more sandy, and the spring some two or three weeks earlier."

1

I am able to say that though the President did not consider the argument of this incidental reply to his direct communication satisfactory before rejecting it, he consulted officers of largest experience and highest repute, and after hearing their views adhered to his own plan. But apart from general plans of campaign, and preliminary to the execution of either of them, two points demanded prompt and successful action. They were the destruction of the rebel batteries on the Potomac, and the release of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, in the neighborhood of Harper's Ferry, from the control of the

enemy.

The propriety of this demand was so obvious that it opened no ground for cavil. Washington was, and had for months been, a beleaguered city, notwithstanding the fact which, with the official records of both armies now before us, we know, that with the army under McClellan, magnificent alike in numbers and appointments beyond parallel in modern times, its commander had but to exhibit a determined purpose to free both river and railroad, and the enemy must have retired before the sound of the tread of his advancing legions. Indeed it is undisputed

1 Vol. V., p. 44, "Records, War of the Rebellion."

history that General Jos. E. Johnston, whose force numbered not one third of McClellan's, which it had so long held in check, abandoned Centreville March 7th-9th, in pursuance of a conclusion arrived at on or about the 20th of February,' because it was known to be inadequate to resist the advance of the Union Army which the Confederate generals believed the impatience of the people would compel as soon as the roads would admit of the movement of troops. The Potomac batteries went with Johnston's retiring army.

But the release of the railroad was another matter. Harper's Ferry and Winchester were not distinctly covered by any of the general movements ordered by the President. They must therefore be specially dealt with, and Mr. Lincoln, knowing not the powers with which he contended, gave his tardy general a new plea for procrastination when he made this demand for a service so simple and, to so great an army, so easy of execution.

Procrastination was, however, but one of the minor consequences of this order. The delay consequent upon the failure of a promised surprise humiliated the President, and thus endangered the General's position, to save which became the pretext for the cabal to be referred to.'

1

The relative strength of the two armies for the month of February, 1862, as shown by the official reports, was as follows:

Army of the Potomac, commanded by McClellan-present for duty, 185420 officers and men, with 534 pieces of artillery. (See page 732, Vol. V., Series I., "Record, War of the Rebellion.") And in the Army of Northern Virginia, commanded by Johnston, the aggregate present and absent was 84,222, and the effective total present for duty was 47.617, of whom but 2,976 were in the artillery service. The guns so small a number of men could handle would not have been able to present much resistance to McClellan's 534 pieces of field and heavy artillery. (See page 1086, Vol. V., Series I., Records, War of the Rebellion.")

46

* See page 29.

Though the General now complains of the "Government's great impatience" in regard to the opening of the road and destruction of the batteries, on the receipt of that order he for once seemed to enter upon an aggressive duty with earnestness and alacrity. A great strategetical movement, so he had confidently advised Lincoln and Stanton, was to be made for the release of the railroad and the capture of Winchester and the rebel forces in the vicinity.

The enemy, he said, was to be beguiled by the construction of a light pontoon bridge which would not, as it crossed a river so liable to freshets and which afforded such poor holding ground as the Upper Potomac, excite the apprehension of the rebels by threatening any serious danger. His real and effective plan involved a bridge of canal boats so thoroughly constructed that it would carry masses of troops, including artillery and supplies. Without letting any of his friends know where or when the movement was to occur, the President said confidentially that a grateful surprise was preparing for the country, the success of which would restore McClellan to popular confidence. When on one occasion the statement was received with incredulity, he said, with a good-natured smile: "But McClellan has, in this case, left himself without a loop-hole through which to escape, for he has said to both Stanton and myself: 'If this move fails, I will have nobody to blame but myself.'"

What is here said about the pontoon bridge and the character of the river, must not be understood as implying that I then knew the field from which the country was to expect so inspiring an event as a surprise of any part of the enemy's forces. I refer to the matter here simply to show how gladly the President and Mr. Stanton welcomed

any promise of successful action on the part of him who now ascribes his want of success to their machinations.

The day came on which the promised surprise was to be executed. Scott had commended McClellan as an exceptionally gifted organizer and engineer, and he had been for weeks engaged in organizing a minor expedition, which was to avoid the effusion of blood by surprising a relatively feeble force.

The width of the canal and lift-lock had always been open to measurement by him and his engineer staff. Neither the quartermaster nor any other representative of the President or Secretary of War had controlled him in the selection of boats. Boats and all other necessary material of his own selection had, under his supervision, been concentrated near the lift-lock, and the President had been advised that his promised surprise would be executed on the morning of the 27th, the next day. I have always thought that McClellan, in that hour of enthusiasm, believed that it would be, for he telegraphed Stanton, at 10:20 P.M. of the 26th, saying: "The bridge was splendidly thrown by Captain Duane, assisted by Lieutenants Babcock, Reese, and Cross"; that he regarded it as "one of the most difficult operations of the kind ever performed”; that "he recommended Captain Duane to be made a major by brevet, and Lieutenants Babcock, Reese, and Cross, all of the Corps of Engineers, to be brevetted to captaincies." "Eight thousand five hundred infantry, eighteen guns, and two squadrons of cavalry" had crossed it, he said, and were well posted on the Virginia side, and “ready to resist any attack." "It had," he continued, "enabled us already "to occupy Loudoun and Bolivar heights, as well as the Maryland heights." "Burns' brigade," he said, "will be here in a couple of hours, and will cross it at day

break. Four more squadrons of cavalry and several more guns pass here." Then came the ominous announcement that he had "reports that G. W. Smith, with fifteen thousand men, is expected at Winchester." But his spirits seem not to have been depressed by so improbable a report, for he added: "We will attempt the canal-boat bridge tomorrow. The spirit of the troops is most excellent. They are in the mood to fight any thing." The tone and manner of this dispatch convinced the Administration that at length McClellan had determined to restore himself and it to popular confidence.

The President knew that the report that General G. W. Smith and fifteen thousand men could be withdrawn from Centreville and Manassas was preposterous, and did not allow it to mar his happiness; nor could he see any reason why the regulars and the forces of Hooker and Keyes that had been ordered to strengthen McClellan, and some of whom were already on the road, should not continue their march into Virginia, over the pontoon bridge, should they arrive before the canal-boat bridge had been completed. The day, the 27th, was advancing, why did not the General advise him or the Department of the progress of affairs? He was probably too much absorbed by duty to permit him to communicate-at least so thought Mr. Lincoln. That he was absorbed was true. He had assumed responsibilities which involved many orders and other communications. Though too much engrossed to telegraph for advice or consent from, or to disclose his purpose to, the President or the Secretary of War, he had found time to send three dispatches to General Marcy, Chief of Staff. They were as follows:

"Do not send the regular infantry until further orders. Give Hooker orders not to move until further orders." 1

1 Page 728, Vol. V., Series I., "Records, War of the Rebellion."