And yet, after all, it may be that the maintenance of a Constitution, which was framed by slave-owners, will afford slender hope of advantage to the slave; and, indeed, it seems possible that the chances of his escape might be better in breaking the walls of his prison, than in rebuilding them. It may prove that the Southern rebels and pirates may be simply following, and for similar reasons, the example of those who have been extolled for the very conduct so reprobated, in others, now. Indeed, we may possibly find that the prosperity of the United States, so dazzling to the eye-their rapid progress and sudden wealth -may arise from causes widely apart from the merits of the Union, which may have been silently working out effects in the highest degree prejudicial, whilst the vigorous energy of the race, and the glare of apparent success, may have confused our judgment, and diverted attention from the real facts. govern In endeavouring to form an opinion of the real value of the Union, one of the first questions that arises in the mind is whether this form of ment-that of a Federal Republic-be really permanent in its nature. Were the Union in its former condition, there would be little interest in this inquiry; but now when severed, and when so costly an effort is being made to restore it, we naturally ask whether durability may be expected in the future. All experience seems to teach that this form of government can never permanently endure, except on a very small scale, and under rare and peculiar circumstances. There have been already two Federal Republics in the United States, or, rather, the Union has existed under two Constitutions that bearing the title of "Articles of Confederation," under which the revolutionary war was terminated, and that which followed it, and now exists. The history of Greece affords an example of two Federations, strikingly similar in their principles to the two Constitutions of the Union. Under the Amphyctionic Council the States of Greece were united in a league, precisely similar to that of the American States under the old Congress. The Grecian republics also retained their individual sovereignty-had equal votes-and the Council was invested with power to declare war and make peace-to decide controversies between the States-to admit new ones into the league, and to promote its general welfare-in short, with all the chief attributes of the Congress in the first Confederation. This was followed in another portion of Greece by the Achæan league, the type of the present Federal Republic. Its members retained their local power and jurisdiction under a Senate, or Federal government, to which was allotted the rights of war and peace, the duty of receiving and sending ambassadors, of making treaties, and of appointing a prætor or president, who administered the federal affairs under the advice of the Senate. The same laws, customs, measures, and coin were ordained; strangers were admitted to citizenship on equal terms; and the effective nature of the Union may be seen in the fact, that when Sparta joined it she had to alter the laws of Lycurgus for the purpose. In spite of all this, both these Federations failed to endure; and it may be held that they proved of fatal injury to Greece, by sustaining the small States in a separate yet ineffective existence; whilst but for this they might have been incorporated with the larger, and so have prevented the civil wars that proved so fatal to the country. If it be held that the mercurial character of the Greek rendered his government unstable, we have another instance in modern times amongst a people, of all in Europe, the least open to that charge. The united provinces of Holland formed a Federal Republic, under a president, bearing the title of Stadtholder. The confederation had an assembly or congress for general affairs, each province or State having its own legislature for provincial purposes, and enjoying a theoretical sovereignty. The history of this Republic presents on some points a striking analogy to that of the United States. The Dutch not only made a similar commercial progress, but displayed an energy, both in commerce and war, without any parallel in modern history, if the small dimensions of the country, and its many disadvantages, be considered. The same features are found in all these cases-great activity in the people, constant intestine commo tions, and the eventual extinction of the system of government. But there are instances much nearer at hand. Mexico, Central America, Columbia, and the Argentine Republic all copied the example of the United States. It has been argued that the system has failed in these cases, not from demerit in itself, but from the faults of race. But if any government succeed with one race, and fail with all others, it would appear that the whole merit of the success must lie in the race, and not with the system. Certainly, in every other instance on record, federal republicanism, when the component States have had the dimensions of powers, and not of provinces, has proved a signal failure. If its merits are to be tested by experience, it would appear that results have invariably disproved it, not only in remote times, but in the present age, in the immediate neighbourhood of the Union, and under the most favourable auspices. In the case of Mexico, it is capable of very clear demonstration, that the political ruin of that unhappy country has mainly resulted from evils arising in a Federal system, copied from that of the United States. In their war of independence, the Mexicans proved themselves to be men equal to the Brazilians; and yet now that time has developed the effects of political institutions, how inferior is their condition! On one side of the Andes the Federal system exists in the Argentine Republic, a scene of incessant strife, oscillating between anarchy and despotism, with intermittent fits of civil war; whilst on the other side of that range, there is a Republic-that of Chili-free from the Federal principle; a people of the same race, much less favourably situated, yet steadily prosperous to the present day. Thus the general experience of the New World, as well as of the Old, teaches us that the peace and welfare of any people, under a Federal system or Union, would seem to be only a temporary exception to an invariable rule. We say temporary, for the present disruption of the American Union is clearly another proof of the rule. It has long been predicted on theoretical grounds. Whenever a Federal Republic is formed of States large enough to exist as independent powers, or which, as in this case, have already existed as independent communities, two opposite forces come at once into action. There is the original attraction, or the compression, that brought them, and holds them together, and there is a disruptive force in the jealousy, ambition, and conflicting interests that come into existence. So long as the former exceed the latter they continue united, but whenever the disruptive power overcomes that of cohesion, they fall asunder, unless restrained by force; and to apply force is to abandon the principle of the system. It will be seen that time tells upon these influences with a twofold effect. The States originally unite because they are weak, because their population is small, |