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tical effects of that event if it should be accomplished. There would at once be a prevailing desire to obliterate painful recollections and win back the good will of the South. What bribe should be spared for an object of such importance? Spain has given grave offence; the Munroe doctrine may be easily extended to St. Domingo. Cuba would be a very convenient peace-offering -gratifying to the ambition of all-something to divert the thoughts from brooding on the debt incurred. The extension of slavery would probably be one of the first-fruits of a restored Union; and this in addition to various measures for its increased protection. The Abolitionists are now in favour, they are useful, they give an impetus, they work in the common direction; but the moment they ceased to be needed, they would be cast aside and thrust back to the position they have hitherto occupied in the esteem of Northern politicians.

A still more important consequence would be far from improbable. There would be within the Union 500,000 men to disband and cast adrift. The republic, as we know, had a narrow escape from destruction, when at the end of the revolutionary war the small force then existing was disbanded. On reflection there will appear a most formidable danger, in suddenly turning loose upon the country half a million of armed men, part elated with victory, part embittered with defeat. For some of these employment would be desirable. The conquest of Canada has been twice seriously

attempted, and the fact is remarkable that it should have been one of the first efforts of the revolted colonies. The desire for its possession rarely seems to have been long absent, and but a few months ago was plainly expressed by the Prime Minister of the Northern government. When a victory was recently supposed to be won, the first thought of triumphant ardour seems to have been to invade Canada. The Western States after rescuing the Mississippi, would re-assert the inconvenience of leaving the St. Lawrence in the hands of a foreign power. Those who appear to shudder at the idea of such a war may well consider the serious probability that this would result from a triumphant restoration of the Union.

Its effect on the politics of the country may readily be imagined. Already the machinery of government has been several times on the point of arriving at a dead stop. In the session of 1859, no less than forty-four ballots were required before a speaker of the House of Representatives could be chosen, legislative action remaining in suspense. In 1855, nine weeks were wasted in the unseemly spectacle of party contests for the speakership. And if this has already occurred, what is likely to be the working of the machine when part of the members are inflamed with victory and the rest actuated by former hatred now rendered more intense by the humiliation of defeat.

A question would immediately present itself,

calculated to rouse animosity to the highest pitch. After conquering the South, it would be infatuation to withdraw the troops entirely, and leave behind the arms and munitions of the defeated party. All history teaches how arduous is the task of extinguishing the last embers of civil war -the pertinacity with which when trampled down they continue to smoulder and struggle to revive. The craving for revenge becomes in many minds a stronger stimulus than the first impulse to action, and those are seldom wanting who have suffered enough in fortunes or affections to feel the full power of this passion. Ordinary prudence would require that the country should be disarmed and held down by garrisons, till all this had leisure slowly to disappear. The cost of such garrisons would be enormous; the West would be impatient of taxation for such an object-customs duties could yield no surplus to meet it, and but one course would remain-that the South should defray the expenditure resulting from its own act. Here, then, high-spirited men, stung with humiliation, would be assembled in Congress to discuss and vote the taxing of themselves, to pay for their own subjugation and to support the garrisons required to maintain their own subjection.

It would appear, therefore, that even were it possible to effect the present object of the Northsuch a victory would prove in the end more disastrous than defeat. It would probably be followed by a foreign war-free institutions would

cease to be practicable-a military hero would take, as a dictator, the seat that Washington filled as father of the country-the former evils incidental to the Union would return with redoubled force and the prospect of the future would be that of a fresh outbreak at no distant period, to repeat all the present calamities.

What then will be the probable results of a separation into two powers? To those great advantages it would afford to the South which may be inferred from the previous inquiries, there would be added some collateral benefits. Hitherto the South, practically, has been deprived of a metropolis-thrown back to the outskirts of civilization, as a huge assemblage of limbs without a head. The existence of a distinct metropolis of its own, would draw together men of eminence in science and art-form a literary society-concentrate the feeble rays of scattered intelligence-and act as a centre from which would radiate a refining influence of learning and taste.

The change would also lead to a great extension of minor manufactures, existing at present on a comparatively narrow scale. This would afford that employment to the poorer white class, so deplorably needed. But the great and certain advantages are those which would come at once into force. The people of the South would cease to be tributary. The cost of their government would be expended on their own soil. They would be liberated from the trammels now imposed

on their industry. They would escape from a sense of injustice. It would no longer be necessary to struggle for territory or plunge into barbarism, in order to maintain the balance of political power. Slavery, ceasing to be an affair of embittered politics, would come within the reach of reason's voice, and stand out face to face with that great power-public opinion-against which it cannot ultimately prevail.

To the Northern power, though there might be no apparent gain, there would not be less real advantage. Before considering the nature and extent of this, it may be well to weigh the difficulties which the supporters of the Union hold to be insuperable. Unquestionably there will be serious inconveniences, for what change, however beneficial, can be effected that will injure no interest or be liable to no drawback? But the evils commonly alleged appear greatly exaggerated by excited apprehensions. It has been contended that to live in peace will be impossible with only a river, the Ohio, as the boundary between two independent powers. But between the United States and Canada the boundary is for some distance simply an imaginary air line; from this no difficulty ensues.

Again, we hear in strong terms that the Western States will never permit the mouth of the Mississippi, the outlet of their products, to remain in the hands of a foreign power. But the Western States will soon be reconciled to that which they

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