The earl of Galloway rose to move an address of thanks to his majesty. He took an extensive and able review of all the topics alluded to in the speech, and, having gone over every material point, he concluded by saying, "But, my lords, our chief concern is with France, with whom some individuals would make a peace. I have taken the liberty, my lords, to write down some of her sentiments upon this subject, as described in what we may call her official paper, and wherein she informs you, conformably to her practice since the earliest periods of her revolution, of the conduct she means to pursue, and from which she has never varied but from necessity alone. She proclaims, my lords, that she will not only not lay down her arms, but will augment her force, until she has conquered the liberties of the seas, the first right of all nations. In recommending to us an armed truce, which she calls a peace, she says, It shall endure until she chooses to proclaim anew the principles of her armed neutrality, when she permits you to proclaim your principles of maritime law. Now, my lords, is this that which you are willing to accept as your peace? Have we already forgotten the peace of Amiens? Do we wish to see her seamen all restored, and the pendants of her ships going up, when ours will necessarily be coming down? Never will I believe that the good sense of this country will entertain the idea of peace until moderation marks the conduct of this enemy, for his professions are not worthy of reflection. I am glad to see a great commercial city think like me, and I hope her opinions and example will be imitated by others. My lords, although the arms of Europe may appear on the side of France, I cannot believe their hearts are against this country. If we remain firm and unappalled, as recommended by his majesty, and exemplified by himself, some balance may yet be preserved in Europe; if we yield, no man can see the consequences. Having now, my lords, though in a very madequate manner, animadverted upon the prominent features of the speech, I shall conclude my address to your lordships in what may be termed a trite and common manner; but it is neither, on that account, the less appropriate nor required. I allude, my lords, to my hopes that I may receive the unanimous concurrence of your lordships to the address I am abonɛ to propose. Parliament was never assembled, my lords, at a period when the example of unanimity would be so beneficial; I therefore solicit it: to mark to the enemy, that we are unanimous in our opposition to him; to manifest to the people of this country that we are unanimous when their first and most essential interests are concerned; and to show to his majesty that undiminished respect and attachment, so much his due: to do our duty, my lords, in imitation of him, who, through a long, arduous, but a glorious reign, has so conspicuously done his." His lordship concluded by moving an address to his majesty, which, as usual, re-echoed the sentiments of the speech. Lord Kenyon seconded the address. He touched on the topics of the speech, as had been done by the noble mover; but he dwelt chiefly on that passage which related to the emigration of the court of Portugal to the Brazils, which he considered as a measure likely to produce the most beneficial effects to this country. He also adverted to our dispute with America, and applauded the spirit with which ministers conducted themselves in not surrendering the naval rights of the country to the claims of those people; and he concluded by hoping that the house, by unanimously voting the address, would show to the common enemy that they could hope nothing from a disunion in our domestic opinions. The question on the address being put, The duke of Norfolk rose, and said, that he completely agreed with the noble lord who had moved the address, in thinking that there never was a more momentous period in the history of this country, nor one where it was more desirable that the most perfect unanimity should be preserved. Satisfied, however, as he was, of this, he was sorry that it would be impossible for him to give his unqualified as sent to the address as it stood. one paragraph in it which he regretted it should have been deemed necessary to introduce. It was that which regarded Denmark. The speech declared, that it was with the deepest reluctance that his majesty had found himself compelled to resort to the extremity of force against this power, but that he had the greatest satisfaction in congratulating their lordships upon the successful execation of this painful bat necessary service. The noble lord who moved the address had introduced a para graph joining in these congratulations, expressive, however, of the painful sensations which accompanied the adoption of the measures alluded to, and his conviction of the necessity of recurring to such measures. Now, from looking in the most careful manner to the speech, his grace did not perceive that it was in the contemplation of his majesty's servants to afford to the house any such information on the subject as should enable them to say, that they saw reason for concurring in the necessity of the measure. Without the production of a single paper, his grace thought it was going too far to expect of him, or of that house, that they should not only declare their con viction of the necessity of employing the fleets and armies of this country in seizing on the fleet of a friendly power, while laid up within the walls of their city, but should even congratulate government on the success of a measure so subversive of the established laws of na tions. He was aware it would be said, that policy required that every species of discretion should be ob served in exposing matters of such delicacy. The principle of this, or the propriety of acting up to it, in most instances, he was far from dis puting; but he thought it was car rying the doctrine rather too far, to desire of that house to express their opinion of the necessity of a measure of so extreme a nature, without the most distant tittle of evidence to justify it. His grace concluded with moving that that clause be omitted. Viscount Sidmouth concurred most sincerely with the noble lord who had moved the address, and with the noble duke who had just sat down, as to the very great im portance of unanimity, and he found himself entitled to blame the conduct of ministers, who, by their mode of proceeding, had put it out of the power of the house to give a proof of their unanimity on the present occasion. When his lordship considered the mode, however, in which subjects calculated to create disunion were introduced; when The looked particularly to that clause of the speech which had been observed on by the noble duke, he found it impossible for him not to give his support to the amendment proposed. The speech referred to the fact of his majesty having been apprised of the intention of the enemy to combine the powers of the continent "in one general confederacy, to be directed, either to the entire subjugation of this kingdom, or to the imposing upon his majesty an insecure and inglorious peace.' That for this purpose states formerly neutral were to be forced into hostility, and compelled "to bring to bear against the different parts of his majesty's dominions the whole of the naval force of Europe, and specifically the fleets of Portugal and Denmark." If this were really the case, it would be a complete justification of the conduct of this country, not only in the eyes of ourselves, but of the whole world. For the moment a nation meditates hostility against you, that is to be regarded as a declaration of war. No persons can be bound to lie by till it be convenient for their enemies to attack them. But then, to give effect to this justification, some proof of the truth and existence of it must be adduced. It is not sufficient to say, We know we were correct; it is essential to the character of a country acting in this manner, not for its vindication merely in the eyes of foreign nations, but even to the maintenance of its respect at home, to show some one or other of the proofs on which it founds its justification. Where, he would ask, were the demonstrations of hostility manifested on the part of Denmark towards this country? Where were her armies? In Holstein. Where was her fleet? Lying in ordinary. Her armies, so far from being in hostile movement against us, were, to the number of 25,000 men, encamped in Holstein, guarding against the inroads of the French Had they been in Zealand, we might not so easily have been able to congratulate ourselves on the victory we obtained. Her navy, so far from meditating hostilities against us, was surprised, the greater part of it in a state of complete disrepair. It was said, however, that the French would have seized on Holstein, and might from thence easily have passed over to Zealand. This, his lordship understood, was by no means so easy as was imagined. Such a frost seldom occurred as to give a complete passage from the one place to the other; and even when it did so happen, the people of Zealand might break the ice nearest to their own side. Supposing, however, that the French might thus have got possession of the Danish navy, still it remained to be inquired what use they could make of it? For, in viewing a question of this kind, where we vindicated an outrage on our part, on the ground that we were apprehensive of a danger accruing theree to us, it became us to show that the injury we dreaded was imminent, and which we could only have averted from ourselves by the outrage we committed against our neighbour, which was comparatively of trifling import. On this principle, he would ask, what had we to dread from the addition to the French force of sixteen sail of the line, composed of such ships as those of Denmark? Even before the battle of Trafalgar, we could have had nothing. to dread from such an accession of strength a leading principle of the law of nations There wanted no greater proof of the inability of the Danish government to resist the power of France, and the determination of the latter power to compel it to join in hostilities against this country; than their joining the northern confederacy in 1801, and alleging as a reason for it, their inability to resist the power of Russia. It was in vain, therefore, to urge, that Denmark might have resisted the power of France, and thus draw an inference against the expedition, as it was evident she could not; added to which, she had repeatedly evinced hostility against this country. trength to our enemy, far less now. Previously to that glorious victory, when the greater part of our enemies' effective force was destroyed, at a time when all the northern powers were our declared enemies, did Britain shrink from the contest, or insinuate, that she entertained such fears for her existence, as our recent attack on the defenceless Danes seems to betray? Surely not. We then bravely met the storm, and prevailed, as we should have done on the present occasion had we confined ourselves to our usual mode of honourable warfare. We were told, however, that these hostile dispositions on the part of the northern powers, had begun to Lord Grenville agreed in the show themselves ever since the terms of the king's speech, that we peace of Tilsit. He would ask, were "in the crisis of the fate of then, why we had allowed a Rus- the country; and that the eyes of sian fleet since tha: time to pass the world were fixed upon the Brithrough the Mediterranean, and tish parliament;" for upon their three sail of the line belonging to wisdom depended the existence of that power to go unmolested at the British empire, which had stood the very time the Danish fleet was a thousand years, and of the British seized on. Would it not have been constitution, the pride and boast of more magnanimous to attack the human wisdom; both had ripened powerful than the weak? It was and grown together, and could only known that the minds of the inha- be maintained and preserved by the bitants of St. Petersburgh were fa- prudence of parliament. The points vourable to this country. By pre- alluded to in the speech were those senting itself at a proper season be on which parliament were called fore that capital, our fleet might upon to decide before any informahave gained possession of it, and tion was submitted to them that thus Sweden would have been could guide their decision. saved, and Denmark, who was as these points, the seizure of the much our friend as Russia was our Danish fleet, and the bombardally, would have been spared. This ment of Copenhagen, were far the mode of warfare his lordship par- most prominent. On the justice ticularly objected to, as going to and necessity of that measure it overturn the law of nations. It was difficult for him to pronounce, would have been more becoming because he was ignorant of the in Great Britain to oppose our ho- grounds upon which it was to be nour and good faith to our enemies' justified. He had first to complain, mode of warfare. that the assertions in the declaration and those contained in the speech of this day, were wholly at variance. Even that declaration The earl of Aberdeen defended the expedition to Copenhagen; and maintained that self-protection was Of was was not laid before the house. The declaration supposed the existence of secret articles entered into at Tilsit, by virtue of which a general confederacy was to be formed against this country. These articles are the acts of hostility that are set up as a justification of our conduct towards Denmark: Where are those secret articles? The enemy denies their existence, and calls on us to prove it. What does the speech say; we see nothing in it of those secret articles and arrangements it speaks only of information of the designs of the enemy to raise a confederacy against us. Was Den mark a party to the secret articles we complain of? Why not attack Russia on the same grounds? But the house has only the assertions of ministers that such were the sen timents of Denmark. It is not enough to prove that France meditated such hostile intentions against us; it should likewise be proved, that she had the means of execut. ing her designs. It is said, Denmark had not the means of resist ing France; and France once in possession of Holstein, must soon be in possession of Zealand; and therefore of Copenhagen, and of the Danish fleet. But is not Zealand an island? Is that island not secured by two branches of the sca, one of six miles broad, the other of sixteen miles? The channel that divides England from France is only five miles broader. God forbid it should therefore be said, that because the French were in possession of Calais, they would soon have possession of England. In heart and conscience we cannot justify the measure on the grounds laid before us. It were to be. wished that a better case were made out and if it can, let it be sub mitted to parliament. The noble lord disapproved of the 'rejection of the mediation of Russia. He never would admit the doctrine, that in order to be a proper mediator, the mediating power must be perfectly impartial. The language of the speech on the subject of peace was also inconsistent. In one place the speech said his majesty was ready to negotiate on safe and honourable terms; and immediately after, that peace could only be negotiated upon a footing of perfect equality. Never could he wish that England should proceed to negotiate but on the footing of equality: but this perfect equality might be too nicely weighed and in the present state of Europe, the door should not be shut against peace upon honourable terms. The noble lord next adverted to our dispute with America, and the orders in council restricting the trade of neutrals. He contended that the latter would involve us in a war with America: that France had assured America she would never put her decrees in force against American ships; and by that declaration we are placed in the light in which France would have stood, if the late orders in council had not been issued. France has not the means of putting in force her own decices; it is England that has now lent her the aid of the British navy to give them full effect, and thereby to annoy and distress Bri tish commerce. As to Portugal, what have we done? we are excluded from the two most impor tant ports in Europe: and the change is, that the Brazils are now governed by the prince regent of Portugal instead of being governed by his viceroy. Does that advantage compensate the great losses which we otherwise sustain by the fate that has fallen upon Portugal, and |