returned by France to this proposition of his majesty, casts off at once the thin disguise which had been assumed for a momentary purpose, and displays with less than ordinary reserve the arrogance and injustice of that government. The universal Spanish nation is described by the degrading appellation of the Spanish insurgents;' and the demand for the admission of the government of Spain as a party to any negotiation, is rejected as inadmissible and insulting. With astonishment, as well as with grief, his majesty has received from the emperor of Russia a reply similar in effect, though less indecorous in tone and manner. The emperor of Russia also stigmatizes as insurrection' the glorious efforts of the Spanish people in behalf of their legitimate sovereign, and in defence of the independence of their country; thus giving the sanction of his imperial majesty's authority to an usurpation which has no parallel in the history of the world.

"The king would readily have embraced an opportunity of negotiation which might have afforded any hopes or prospect of a peace compatible with justice and with honour. His majesty deeply laments an issue, by which the sufferings of Europe are aggravated and prolonged. But neither the honour of his majesty, nor the gererosity of the British nation, would admit of his majesty's consenting to commence à negotiation by the abandonment of a brave and loyal people, who are contending for the preservation of all that is dear to man; and whose exertions in a cause so unquestionably just, his majesty has solemnly pledged himself to sustain."

On

While the intercourse was carrying on between our court and the two emperors, Bonaparte was by no means idle, or inattentive to the means of prosecuting the war in Spain with his utmost strength and energy. Before he left Paris for Erfurth, the march of his troops towards that country had begun; and it was continued without intermission during his absence. his return he addressed the legislative body in a speech filled with his plans and expectations. He made known to them the perfect union of sentiment between him and the emperor of Russia, with respect both to peace and war, and that they had determined to make some sacrifice, in order to enable the hundred millions of men whom they represented, the sooner to enjoy the commerce of the seas. That the relinquishment of his designs upon Spain was not one of the sacrifices which he intended to make, in order to procure peace, was announced in his resolution to depart in a few days, in order to put himself at the head of his armies; and by their means to crown the king of Spain in Madrid, and plant his eagles on the forts of Lisbon. The greater part of the troops intended to act against the patriots having arrived on the frontiers of Spain, and the imperial guard having also begun its route in the same direction, Bonaparte left Paris, and on the 3d of November he arrived at Bayonne. Here his impatience to put himself at the head of his army allowed him to stay but a few hours; and by the 8th of the month he arrived at Vittoria, bringing along with him a reinforcement of 12,000

men.

3

CHAP

T the beginning of the month Af November the centre army of Spain, commanded by Castanos, quitted its position on the line of the Ebro, and concentrated itself on the left bank of the smaller river Alagon, occupying a line from Villafranca to Sanguessa, The advantages of this new position were great: he was thus enabled to interpose between the French army in Navarre, and the troops they had in the citadel of Barcelona; to cover the important province of Arragon, and to present a formidable barrier to any attempt which the enemy might make to penetrate to Madrid. His new position still enabled him to rest his right wing on the left wing of the army of Palafox; and their joint armies occupied a position on the left wing of the French. The army of Blake in Biscay was stationed on the right wing of the French. The army of Estramadura, with the expected assistance from generals sir John Moore and Baird, opposed itself to the front of the French. The army of Blake, was estimated, before the junction of the marquis de Romana, at 1808.

23,000 men: the conjunct army of Castanos and Palafox, at nearly 60,000 men; and the army of Estramadura at 20,000 men.

At the beginning of the same. month, or, to speak more accuratei, at the end of October, the head quarters of the French army were at Vittoria. The corps of the duke of Cornegliano was posted at Ra falla; the left wing of his army having its position along the banks of the Arragon and the Ebro. The division of the duke of Echlingen was at Guardia. The duke of Istria was at Muanda, while part of his corps formed the garrison of fort Pancuba, The heights of Durango were occupied by the division of general Merlin, and guarded the heights of Mondragon from the threatened attack of the Spaniards. As the army which was commanded by general Blakewas at some distance from the united armies of Palafox and Castanos, the first offensive operation of the French was to interpose, their whole force between the Spa nish armies, and, if possible, to break into pieces the army of Blake.) This manœuvre was performed bus Y

too

too successfully on the 31st of October, and within the first fortnight of the ensuing month.

The army of Blake was attacked by 25,000 French on the 31st of October, at Lornosa. After a very obstinate, long, and well-contested action, the Spanish general was obliged to fall back, with the intention, if possible, of forming a junction with the Asturian army, and with that under the command of the marquis de Romana. The retreat was conducted in the best order, without the loss of cannon, colours, or prisoners. As the town of Bilboa lay in the line of his proposed retreat, he halted there on the night of the 1st of November. While he was there, the general altered his first intention of retreat ing upon the army of the marquis de Romana, and resolved to take post at Valmaseda. In his march thither he was joined by the Astu. rians, the troops of the north, and the fourth division of Gallicia. The French pursued him with great speed, and on the 3d of November they took possession of Bilboa; the few Spanish troops who were there having evacuated it in good order, and fallen back on Valmaseda.

General Blake had scarcely taken up his position and concentrated his army at Valmaseda, when he received information that a division of the French army, amounting to 10,000 men, were proceeding along the heights of Ontara, in order, if possible, to take by surprise, and cut off, a part of his army which occupied that place. In order to protect this body, and to turn the manœuvre of the French against themselves, he left his posttion at Valmaseda at break of day on the 5th of November, and by one o'clock came up with and attacked the enemy. The battle, which

equalled in obstinacy and perseverrance that of the 31st of October, lasted till dark. It ended, however, in the complete defeat of the French, who were routed with great slaughter, and lost a considerable number of prisoners. Blake pursued them a considerable way beyond Urutea.

On the 7th he

again attacked the French division, and succeeded in turning their left wing; but his centre being too weak to advance, he thought it prudent to re-occupy his position at Valmaseda. On the 8th the rear of his army was attacked by the French; but the engagement did not become general; nor was it, as far as it extended, of long duration, or a decisive nature. On the 10th, however, the enemy having ang mented their force to nearly double the amount of general Blake's army, attacked the Spaniards at Espinosa. On that day they gained no advantage, though the fighting continued without intermission from one o'clock till it was completely dark; the advantage, if any, resting with the Spaniards. On the 11th the battle was renewed; when, unfortunately, the left wing of general Blake's army, which was composed of the Asturians, was routed; and a general retreat became unavoidable. This would have been effected in good order, and with little loss, had not the French got possession of a height, which commanded the road along which they were obliged to conduct their retreat: the consequence was very fatal to the Spanish army; they were thrown into great confusion, and a part of the army began to disperse. On the subsequent day general Blake fell back on Reynossa, one of the strongest positions in the chain of mountains which stretch from east

to

to west, along the boundary of the province of Biscay. There he intended to have concentrated his forces, and to have made a stand against the enemy. But it was the plan of the French to allow him no respite or intermission, until they had succeeded in rendering his army ineffectual, by dispersion or slaughter. Accordingly, scarcely had Blake reached Reynossa, before he was attacked by fresh troops, who poured in with superior force, and in rapid succession:-a French column, at the same time, appeared on the road from Burgos; under these circumstances the Spanish general was again obliged to retreat. His first object was to gain St. Andero; but he afterwards altered his plan, and retreated to St. Vincente, a town situated near the former, on the shores of the bay of Biscay.

From the above account it appears that the army of Gailicia, under the command of general Blake, was engaged eight times in the short space of a fortnight. Indeed the French opposing army did not quit the attack, or give up the pursuit, till they put it completely out of the power of general Blake to take any formidable share in the subsequent operations of the campaign. The more sanguine friends of Spain congratulated or consoled themselves with the idea, that from these incessant attacks, uniformly made by superior, and generally with fresh forces, there had resulted no surrender of large bodies; no shameful capitulations; no seizure of important posts; in short, no consequences similar to those which had been the usual result of Bonaparte's victories in Italy, Germany, and Poland. But, unfortunately, it did not by any means follow from thence, that

his victories over the Spaniards were less complete and decisive. The armies of Austria, Prussia, and Russia had been defeated with the loss of an immense number of prisoners: the army of Blake had been defeated and dispersed. A regular army-an army composed of men who have become habituated to a military life, and who have no home but the army-cannot, from its very nature and constitution, be dispersed: if defeated, it will keep together and surrender; or if it be put to flight, the greater part will collect again; for they have no motive, no temptation to quit their military profession. But it is otherwise with an army composed, like the greater part of Blake's, of men very lately come from their friends and their regu lar occupations: to them they naturally think of returning, if, in consequence of a battle, the corps to which they belong is routed and put to flight. The consequence, therefore, of the defeat of a regular army, composed of veterans, is the surrender of large bodies: the consequence of the defeat of an army composed of men who have voluntarily come forward to fight, and who have not forgot their former habits and occupations, is too frequently dispersion. It is even hardly to be expected that the enthusiasm which first brought them to the standard of their country, will remain in sufficient activity and strength to induce them to repair to it again when they have been once completely dispersed. These are melancholy truths: but that they are truths, the experience of a great part of the American war, and the result of the defeat of Blake's army, too plainly prove. When the marquis de Romana took the command of it, towards the

end of November, he complained that instead of a formidable and united army, he found only a comparatively trifling force, ill-provided, and dispersed. Certainly, if by any man it could have been brought back to the union, character, and strength of an useful or formidable army, it would have been by him; and yet his efforts were unavailing to raise a number even equal to that which he brought with him from the Baltic

At the same time that one part of the French army was attacking general Blake's forces in Biscay, another part of it directed its course towards the city of Burgos. This city was occupied by a division of the army of Estramadura, consisting of Walloons and Spanish guards, a few regiments of the line, and the students of the universities of Salamanca and Leon, under the command of count Belveder. The duke of Istria led on the cavalry, which Bonaparte dispatched to the attack of the Estraniaduran army, and the duke of Dalmatia the infantry. Three attacks were made on the city in the two first, the French were repulsed with considerable loss; at the third attack, on the 10th of November, the issue was for a long time doubtful: the Spanish forces bravely resisted and repelled the French for thirteen hours, but at last by great superiority of numbers, especially in point of cavalry, they were compelled to leave Burgos, and to retreat to Lerma. The enemy pursued them immediately, so that count Belveder found himself under the necessity of continuing his retreat to Aranda. The remains of the Estramaduran army, after undergoing many hardships, at last formed its head quarters at Segovia. Immediately on the capture of Burgos,

Bonaparte established his head quarters there.

Bonaparte, having thus succeeded against the patriotic armies in the north-west of Spain, suddenly and and unexpectedly directed his efforts against the forces under Castanos on the Ebro. For this purpose the divisions of Ney and Victor were dispatched with a celerity unusual even in the movements of the French army, from Burgos towards the Ebro. Bonaparte's plan evidently was, by means of these divisions, to have interposed between the Spanish army and Saragossa, whilst the principal attack was made upon it by the forces under the command of marshals Lasnes and Moncey. But, fortu nately for Castanos, the divisions of Victor and Ney did not reach their appointed stations in time; had they arrived, and executed the plan which was laid down for them by Bonaparte, Castanos' defeat must have been much more fatal and decisive than it actually was.

The first advances of the enemy against Castanos took place on the 21st of November, on the lines of Coma, with 12,000 infantry and 4,000 horse. In consequence of this movement, the Spanish general fell immediately back, and occupied a position extending from Tarragona to Tudela, the troops of the army of Arragon resting upon the latter place. The order to retreat was scarcely given, before the encmy was perceived to be in motion to attack. He had advanced against Calahorra, and taken a commanding position near that town, for the purpose of commencing the attack on the Spanish forces early the next morning. Although the retreat of Castanos was rendered hazardous by this movement of the French, and difficult and troublesc me

through