The castle of Scylla, after being invested for seven weeks, and battered for six days by 14 pieces of heavy ordnance, was evacuated by the Calabrian and British troops. Our operations at sea were almost entirely confined to a long and unsuccessful search after a French squadron:-this squadron escaped from Rochefort about the middle of January. Sir Richard Strahan, partly from stress of weather and partly from the want of provisions, was obliged to leave this port for a few days: the French took advantage of this short relaxation of the blockade; and when sir Richard returned, they had escaped. As it was uncertain what was their object or destination, some alarm was at first excited. The Mediterranean or the West India islands appeared the most probable places to track their route: Sir Richard Strahaa accordingly entered the former; and sir T. Duckworth swept the whole of the West India islands and the coast of North America; but the pursuit of both was fruitless. No certain information could be obtained of their course; till at last, after hav. ing been out for several weeks, it was ascertained that they had got safe into Toulon. They had, how ever, accomplished nothing; and probably the exercise of the sailors, and the hope of picking up a few valuable merchantmen, were the sole reasons for their putting to sea. The circumstance, indeed, trifling as it was, of their having so long kept the sea, unattacked and undiscovered by the British fleets, formed a fine subject for the declamatory congratulation and triumph of the French. So low was their opinion of their own maritime skill and prowess, that it seems they scarcely indulged the

1808.

expectation that a single squadron, which had once left their own ports, would be able to find its way back to them.

The British empire in the East Indies remained, on the whole, very tranquil. Whatever plans or hopes of revolt or resistance the native princes might entertain, they had, from the fatal experience of divided and premature attempts to recover their conquered territories, been taught the necessity and the prudence of yiding to our superior power and unabated vigilance. On the other hand, the massacre at Vellore had taught our officers the impolicy and danger of rashly interfering with the strong and re verenced prejudices of the native troops: it was found that the power, which had successfully resisted or attacked the armies of the East, might find itself unequal to a conflict with opinions and practices, which, however trifling or minute in their object, had, after the lapse of more than 2000 years, become infinitely dearer to the natives than their liberty or their lives. One instance, however, oc-curred, towards the end of 1807, of an attempt to elude the vigilance and to resist the power of the British government in India. Doonden Klan, a zemindar in the district of Alyghur, (part of the conquered provinces,) had for a length of time betrayed an impla cable disposition towards the British government; and, trusting to the rapidity of his movements or the strength of his fort, irad committed many acts of violence, After being subdued by lord Lake, he had been pardoned for his cffences, and restored to his territory, on condition that he should discontinue his predatory excursions, destroy the ditch and the guns

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of the fort of Cumona, and disband his troops. These conditions, however, he seemed determined not to fulfil; nor did he refrain in the smallest degree from his attacks on the persons and property of those in the adjoining districts, who were under the government and protection of the British. On the contrary, he appeared emboldened by the comparative clemency that was shown him; manifested still greater ran cour and hostility towards the British; and made use of every means in his power, in order to harass and obstruct the operations and measures adopted by the magistrates for the peace and security of the inhabitants. Instead of demolishing his fort, according to his agreement, he proceeded to add to its strength, and to increase his army. In consequence of his violence, and of the perfidy he had discovered, it was determined to punish him in such a manner as would, at once, render him incapable of future mischief, and in spire terror into those chiefs who might feel any inclination to imi tate his conduct for this purpose a force supposed adequate to its object, without enabling him to make much resistance, was sent against him, under the command of major-general Duckens and colonel Husford. When the fort of Cumona was reconnoitred, it was nnexpectedly found to be so strong that the general thought it expedient and prudent to lay regular siege to it. The siege was continued from the 23d of October, 1807, the day on which our troops arrived before the fort, till the 11th of November, when, a breach having been effected, a vigorous assault was made. The resistance, however, proved so obstinate, and

the advantages the enemy pos sessed from their situation and the strength of the fort were found to be so great, that the attack was obliged to be discontinued, without having accomplished its object. Our troops retired to rally, and renew the attempt; when they were happily prevented, by the enemy evacuating the fort on the 18th. After this success, the general proceeded to invest the other strong holds of the rebellious chiefs. The carnage before Cumona was dreadful. Doonden had collected there his whole force, which more than trebled that of the British army: of the latter, nearly 500 were killed and wounded, while upwards of 1000 of the enemy were slain.

We should not have dwelt at such length and with such minuteness on this instance of petty warfare, had it not been, in the reflec tions to which it gives birth, of much more importance and interest. than when simply viewed as an insulated and subordinate fact. in the history of the British empire in India. It tends strongly to con. firm the unpleasing apprehension that must have forced itself on the mind of every reflecting and unbiassed reader of the details of our Indian warfare. Till within these very few years, the resistance of the native princes presented nothing formidable: provided our troops could bring them to an engagement, the victory was purchased after a short struggle, generally with little loss. They might harass our army by the ra pidity of their movements, or overwhelm detachments of it by the immense numbers of their troops but they seldom displayed much firmness and perseverance: and our army generally suffered more from the fatigue and length of the

march,

march, or from the flying attacks of the enemy's cavalry, than from the slaughter of a pitched battle. It was to have been expected, that as our power increased and our name became more formidable, and as the more disciplined and numerous forces of the greater Indian princes fell beneath our at tack, the remainder, inferior in strength, and spared because of their apparent insignificancy, would not have dared to have opposed even the wishes of our government. On the contrary, however, they seem to have become not only more bold and courageous, but to have opposed us with more skill, firmness, and success. It has not unfrequently happened, that the conquered, by frequent defeat, have at length been taught and enabled to overcome their former conquerors. This consequence, however, must result with much more difficulty, and after a much greater length of time, in India, than in most other countries. The difference in point of skill, discipline, firmness, and even personal courage, between the European and the Indian troops, is much greater than exists between the forces of any two European powers: the habits and manners of the Indian states; the state of society, and the strong hold which prejudice and habit possess over their minds, must not only widen the difference arising from the former causes, but preserve it, without being broken in upon or weakened, for a considerable length of time. As nearly, however, to the military qualities of the European troops as we have brought our Seapoys, so nearly, in the course of time, may we justly apprehend that the native princes, profiting by what they have seen and felt of

our armies, and urged on by the desire of revenge and the hope of regaining their territories, will bring their forces. It is to be hoped, that the effects of the disparity will not be weakened to our disadvantage, or the resemblance itself hastened, by the arrival and assistance of French troops.

Hitherto, the history of the year has presented nothing either interesting in itself, or which promised to be followed by important consequences. Bonaparte saw his plans succeeding on every side: in the North he had engaged the emperor of Russia in a tedious and protracted warfare with Sweden. Whatever ultimate or permanent consequence this produced to the two rival monarchs, he was certain of being a gainer by it. Sweden' might be conquered; at any rate she must be considerably weakened, and ren-" dered a more easy and secure prey for him to seize, whenever he had leisure, and it suited his plans to march his army against her. Whe ther Sweden was conquered or not, Russia was exhausting her forces, and rendering herself less able to oppose his designs, either on herself or on what remained of the freedom of Europe. In the south of Europe, he seemed to be proceeding with equal or more cer tainty of final success to the accom plishment of his wishes. In his attempt on the throne of Spain, he had, indeed, rather changed the' character of his means: contrary to his disposition and his former conduct, he proceeded with slow ness and caution, instead of rapidly and with open force. He seemed also unsteady and changeable in the policy he pursued. No doubt could be entertained that he meant to possess himself more completely than he had hitherto done of the Q2.

power