might be crowned with the recovery of their liberty as a people, and the assertion of their independence as a nation and in thus expressing his own, he felt assured that he spoke the wishes of that house and the country.

Lord Castlereagh said, that upon. a recent occasion, when the present subject was brought before the consideration of the house, he had felt it his painful duty to express his disapprobation of the tone and manner in which the hon. gentleman had thought fit to comment on certain circumstances, the recapitulation of which could not have been attended with any good consequences; it now, however, gave him considerable pleasure, that the grateful task had devolved to him of expressing his complete coincidence in the feelings manifested by the hon. gentleman, as to the issue of the great and glorious struggle in which the Spanish people were at present engaged. The reason why the government had not thought it necessary was, simply, that the provision already made by parliament had been so liberal, that the government were not without the means of giving to the cause of freedom and independence, by as sisting the Spaniards, that aid which the public voice, and the wishes of every friend to liberty throughout the world, demanded should be promptly and unconditionally offered. He could assure the hon. gentleman and the house, that no means would be left untried, that no exertion would be wanting on their parts, to make all the resources which they had it in their power to apply, subservient to the great object, as much wished for by them as by his majesty, by the parliament, and by the country. It was not for him at present to an

ticipate the opinion of that house upon the manner in which the ministry should acquit themelves of the great and solemn obligations by which they might be said to stand bound to their country and to Europe: how far ministers upon this great occasion had done what they could do, and ought to do, parlia ment upon a future occasion would have an opportunity of deliberately judging and determining.

Mr. Wilberforce confessed that the sentiments he felt on this great subject were very similar to those of the hon. gentleman opposite. He could not avoid expressing his concern that no communication had been made to parliament, in order that a proper opportunity night have been afforded of giving a sort of authoritative publicity to the unanimous feeling of the nation, that all that England could do for Spain and her cause should be done with equal zeal, promptitude, and disinterestedness; and to show to Spain, and to the world, our generous sympathy in her sufferings, our anxious interest in her struggles, and our hearty and undivided wishes for her complete success. And he was at the same time particularly anxious that Spain should be satis. fied, that whatever means we should resort to, to second her efforts, were not the result of any narrow self-consulting policy, any cold and interested speculation, but that they were the spontaneous effusions of British sympathy in the cause of that freedom and independence Britons valued beyond their lives: the cause of Spain was the cause of all those who, from enjoying, knew how to value liberty. But he was particularly anxious that the Spaniards should not be furnished with the slightest pretence to believe, that because of the state

of hostility which had but recently terminated between the two countries, there still lurked in the breasts of Englishmen any hostile disposition towards that country; and above all, it was desirable that the Spaniards should have good reason to confide in our assistance, and not distrust the manner of it, or ques- tion the motives that occasioned it: every possible means should be resorted to to convince them that, at such a crisis, we were not base enough to avail ourselves of their difficulty and danger, in order ultimately to render their noble efforts subservient to our own interests; and he could not but confess, that he thought an unanimous vote of that house to that effect would have materially contributed to the confirmation of such a disavowal on our part. But there was some consolation in reflecting that, though this vote had not been called for, the feeling in favour of Spain was so unanimous, zealous and decisive, that it was next to an impossibility that it could be mistaken; it was so

notorious that every Briton joined in enthusiastic prayers to the great Ruler of events, to bless with its merited success the struggle of a gallant people in behalf of every thing dear to the Christian, the ci tizen, and the man; and indeed, the notoriety itself had been so extensive, as perhaps to supersede the necessity of any formal annunciation on the part of that house upon a subject concerning which the population of the empire entertained but one sentiment, great and generous as the glorious cause that gave it birth.

The deputy usher of the black rod then summoned the house to the house of peers. The speaker and all the members attended forthwith. On their return, the speaker read a copy of his majesty's speech from the chair at the table to the members assembled round him; after which they severally bowed and retired.

This speech will be found among the Public Papers in another part of the volume.

A

T the end of the year 1807, the continent of Europe pre

sented scarcely a single spot, on which the friends of independence

and

and freedom could rest with the smallest satisfaction or hope. With the solitary exception of Sweden, every state had fallen before the arms, or yielded itself up to the influence, of France. The war between that power and Russia, from which, at one stage of its progress, a favourable result was expected, had, by its final termination, not only extended and confirmed the empire of Bonaparte, but had also been succeeded by the most blind and complete devotion of Alexander to the interest and plans of his conqueror. The emperor of the French could thus, after the treaty of Tilsit, boast of having achieved much more than even entered the flattered imagination of Lewis the XIVth in the zenith of his conquests and glory. And not only was his power more extensive than any former European conqueror had ever possessed, but it had every appearance of being more solid and durable. In France itself, every thing answered his expectations and was devoted to his interest. Even when he had withdrawn all his forces against Russia, and was at a great distance from his capital, engaged in a doubtful contest, there was not the slightest appearance of discontent or intrigue. Wearied out with change, sick of rapine and bloodshed, or watched with such minute vigilance and care, that no plans could be formed inimical to the interest of Bonaparte, the people of France submitted to his civil government as peaceably and completely during the absence of himself and his armies, as they had done when guarded and oppressed by their presence. In his armies he had the most full and firm reliance: their interest and fate were interwoven with his own. By

their very nature and constitution, they presented the most powerful motives that could draw forth ta lent, courage and skill. To the man of superior mind and views, the army held out the encouraging prospect of rising to the first power and honours of the state. Bonaparte and his generals had risen by means of it from the lowest origin; and the path by which they had arrived at their eminence, was still wisely left completely open for future candidates. The government of France thus secured a constant and regular supply of military skill, by the only effectual mode of securing it. To such as looked not so far or so high, the life cf a soldier presented motives more level to the capacities and désires of the multitude; while they were engaged in actual warfare, an unchecked or encouraged liberty to gratify every passion, bound them to their officers and to their mode of life, and spurred them on to victory and carnage: while they remained in their own country, they were gratified by the superiority over the mere citizen, which the laws of France and the policy of Bonaparte allowed them.

With an immense army thus constituted and disposed, animated and skilled by the defeat of all the powers on the continent of Europe, Bonaparte would have had no reason to doubt the solidity and permanency of his power, even if the governments to whom he had still left the name and shadow of freedom had been inclined or able to attack him. But there was not one, from whom, after the treaty of Tilsit, he had any thing to dread. A short sketch of their state and their views at the conclusion of the year 1807, will convince us how unable or unwilling they were to 03 oppose

oppose the power and the plans of Bonaparte. The emperor of Austria may justly be regarded as the least induced of all those whom he has conquered, to enter into his views. But he was under the necessity of complying with the mandates of the conqueror. Weakened by a bloody, an ill-managed and unfortunate war; surrounded by states which owed their existence to France, and who from their position as well as from interest would defend her from attack, it would have been madness in Austria to have gone to war with France, either for the purpose of asserting her independence and resisting the commands of Bonaparte, or with a view to regain her lost territories. The internal state of Austria was as little favourable to hostile designs: her government had not been taught by the misfortunes she had suffered, to remove the causes which had produced them; intrigue, cabal and interest still influenced the determinations of her cabinets; her armies had been beaten by the armies of France, because the latter were commanded and led on by men, who had gained their ap. pointments by their talents and skill; and yet Austria still persevered in the old system of giving officers to her armies from among such men only as could boast of a pure descent or of ill-gotten interest at court. The losses she had suffered rendered the cordial cooperation of all ranks necessary to her welfare; and yet her peasantry still groaned under such bondage as made them indolent, and indifferent under the misfortunes of their government. Her paper money forced into circulation, not called for by the extension of her commerce, пог supported by

mutual confidence and credit, necessarily lost great part of its value on the mere rumour of a war with France. Besides these cir. cumstances, which of themselves would be sufficient to render her country a matter of indifference to Bonaparte, the emperor of Austria had sufficient wisdom to perceive, that the only chance he possessed of regaining any part of his lost territories, was by husbanding his resources, and by re-establishing his finances and armies, by such slow and gradual methods as should not attract the notice and arouse the jealousy of Bonaparte.

The emperor of Russia, after the peace of Tilsit, was less disposed, and probably not more able, than the emperor of Austria, to oppose the plans of Bonaparte. The perfidy he discovered in agreeing to accept part of the territory of that power, in whose defence he had entered into the war, the ease with which, by the intrigues and flattery of Bonaparte, he had been converted from an enemy to a friend, proved at once how little he could be depended upon for the freedom of Europe, and how well he was suited to become the willing instrument of his conqueror. In the vain and delusive hope of extending an empire already too large and unwieldy, and which required in the person who govern. ed it rather the legislator than the warrior; he gave himself com. pletely up to that system of policy which, by engaging him in a war with Great Britain and Sweden, fully answered the purposes of Bonaparte, by blocking up the sources of his wealth, and weaken ing the strength of his armies. His immense empire, destitute of manufactures, and covered with the raw materials necessary to carry

them on, obviously required an open and friendly communication with such a country as Britain: yet with her, at the instigation of Bonaparte, he engaged in war; and moreover undertook to prohibit the importation of her manufactures; forgetting that if he did succeed, he must at the same time put a stop to the importation of the produce of his own country, which was either given in exchange for those manufactures, or actually supplied them.

The situation and character of the minor states of Europe, at the period we are now considering, were in every respect favourable to the views of Bonaparte. In Spain it was probable that he meant to overturn the Bourbon family, and to place one of his own creatures; though from our imperfect know ledge of what was actually passing there, and of the precise means by which he intended to bring about his object, there appeared at one time reason to suppose that the royal family would be continued on the throne. He had driven, either designedly or by a premature disclosure of his hostile intentions, the house of Braganza from Portugal, and occupied it with his armies: the final destiny which awaited it, seemed to depend on the successful termination of his schemes with regard to Spain. It is superfluous to speak individually of Holland, Switzerland, Italy, Prussia, or Germany. They were all either occupied by his troops or governed by his obedient vassals. Prussia had severely atoned for her former perfidy and rashness, The king and queen were obliged to live in the most humble and retired manner, and to witness withcut a murmur, or even tle expression of pity, the exactions that were

wrested from their impoverished subjects by the French soldiers. Denmark, exasperated by our attack on Copenhagen, had thrown herself completely into the arms of France. Sweden alone, of all the powers on the continent, remained firmly opposed to Bonaparte, unseduced by his promises of a share in the spoil, and unsubdued by his menaces. The peculiar situation of her territories rendered them inaccessible to the power of France; and the ardour and heroism of the king was seconded by the zeal and affection of his subjects, now that the war threatened the provinces of Sweden, and that they again beheld their monarch in the midst of them. The possession of Sweden however, separated as it is from the rest of Europe, would not have been the object of Bonaparte's ambition, had he not been actuated by a personal hatred against its monarch, and by the wish to exclude Britain from the shores of the Baltic. For towards the destruction of this island his ambition and resentment were directed with more undivided thought, now that he had brought the whole contineat under his power. Here however he found his talents and formidable armies of no avail. France and Britain had no point of contact in the common mode of warfare. Every fleet which the former had sent to sea had only increased the marine and added to the glory of England; while our armies, shut out from the continent, had no opportunity of meeting those of France. Bonaparte therefore had recourse to a new mode of warfare: his object was to annihilate the commerce of Britain, by shutting out her manufactures from the continent. Accustomed to find every obstacle give way to