These principles declared in Norris v. Jackson, 125:
(a) The special finding of the facts mentioned in that statute is not
a mere report of the evidence, but a finding of those ultimate
facts on which the law must determine the rights of the parties.
(b) If the finding of facts be general, only such rulings of the court,
in the progress of the trial, can be reversed as are presented by
a bill of exception
(c) In such cases a bill of exceptions cannot be used to bring up
the whole testimony for review, any more than in a trial by
jury.
(d) Objections to the admission or rejection of evidence, or to such
rulings or propositions of law as may be submitted to the
court, must be shown by bill of exceptions.
(e) If the parties desire a review of the law of the case, they must
ask the court to make a special finding which raises the ques-
tion, or get the court to rule on the legal propositions which
they present.
17. Some allowance made in a case from Louisiana, where the rules of
the common law do not prevail, for an imperfect understanding of
the proper practice under the act. Flanders v. Tweed, 425.
18. An appellant has a right to have his appeal dismissed notwithstanding
the opposition of the other side. Latham and Deming's Appeal, 145.
19. Though not to have it dismissed for want of a citation when the appellee
is in court represented by counsel, and makes no objection to the want
of one. Pierce v. Cox, 786.
20. The rules stated which regulate rehearing of a case, and the practice
proper to be pursued where a rehearing is desired. Public Schools v.
Walker, 603.
21. Where an appellant becomes bankrupt after his appeal taken, his
assignee in bankruptcy, upon the production of the deed of assign-
ment of the register in bankruptcy, duly certified by the clerk of the
proper court, may, on motion, be substituted as appellant. Herndon
v. Howard, 664.
II. IN CIRCUIT AND DISTRICT COURTS. See Appeal; Jury; Practice,
2, 5, 7, 9, 14, 16, 18; Recognizance of Bail.
22. A judgment of conviction on confession may for good cause be set
aside, at the same term at which it was rendered, though the defend-
ant had entered upon the imprisonment ordered by the sentence.
Basset v. United States, 38.
23. In such case the original indictment is still pending, and a bail bond
given after this, for the prisoner's appearance from day to day, is
valid. Ib.
24. Where there is evidence before the jury-be it weak or strong-which
so much as tends to prove the issue on the part of either side, it is error
if the court refuse to submit it to the jury. Hickman v. Jones, 197;
Barney v. Schmeider, 248.
25. An entry, omitted at the proper time by inadvertence, in the journal
record of the clerk, of the issue of a writ of peremptory mandamus;
and an amendment by the marshal to his return, so as to show that
he had exhibited the original writ to the party served, allowed nunc
pro tunc, as amendments of common practice. Supervisors v. Durant,
736.
26. The Federal courts will enforce, for the furtherance of justice, the
same rules in the adjustment of claims against ancillary executors,
that the local courts would do in favor of their own citizens. Walker
v. Walker, 744.
27. Where a defendant pleads in bar inconsistent pleas, the plaintiff's
remedy is not by demurrer but by motion to strike out one plea, or
for the defendant to elect. Noonan v. Bradley, 394.
28. In taking an account, the master is not limited to the date of entering
the decree-he can extend it down to the time of the hearing before
him. Rubber Company v. Goodyear, 788.
29. Amendment to bill allowed upon fair terms, after a cause had been
heard, and a case for relief made out, though not the precise case dis-
closed by the bill. Neale v. Neales, 1.
30. Where a bill is dismissed for want of jurisdiction apparent on its face,
the general rule is not to allow costs. Hornthall v. The Collector, 560
31. Where there is a fund in court to be distributed among different claim-
ants, a decree of distribution will not preclude a claimant not em-
braced in its provisions, but, having rights similar to those of other
claimants who are thus embraced, from asserting by bill or petition,
previous to the distribution, his right to share in the fund; and in the
prosecution of his suit, he is entitled, upon a proper showing, to all
the remedies by injunction, or order, which a court of equity usually
exercises to prevent the relief sought from being defeated. In the
matters of Howard, 175.
32. The three months allowed by the 69th of the Rules in Equity, for the
taking of testimony, has reference to the taking of testimony by both
parties. But the court may enlarge the time. Its action herein is
hardly matter for review here. Ingle v. Jones, 486.
33. A bill of review will not be granted either where the party has been
guilty of laches; or where the court is satisfied that upon the case
offered to be made ont, the decree ought to be the same as has been
already given. Rubber Company v. Goodyear, 805.
34. Where, on a bill by several for infringement and an account, the court
decree damages, a bill cannot be regarded as a cross-bill, which sets
up a judgment in another suit against one of the complainants, and
asks that the conjoined defendants in the principal suit discover what
share of the damages they claim respectively, so that the defendant in
that suit may set off his judgment as respects the one against whom
it is. Rubber Company v. Goodyear, 807.
35 As an original bill it cannot be sustained, if it have either been filed
before the decree for damages was rendered in the principal suit, or
have been a judgment in attachment only, and where there was no
service on the person of the defendant. Ib.
36. A bill which is in no wise auxiliary to an original suit, nor in contin-
uation of that proceeding, does not present a case proper for substi-
tuted service.
37. Where certain heirs at law seek to set aside a sale of their ancestor's
realty made under a decree of a competent court ordering, at a cred-
itor's instance, such sale for the payment of a debt due him, they
should make the creditor on whose application the sale was made a
party. All the heirs also should be parties. Hoe et al. v. Wilson, 501.
38. This court will reverse and remand a case thus defective as to parties,
although this deficieney have not been made a point at the bar below.
Ib.
39. Where a collision between two vessels results from the fault of both of
them, a party injured may recover against both vessels, and they may
be proceeded against in the same libel. The Washington and the
Gregory, 513.
40. The damages so recovered may be apportioned by the decree equally
between the two vessels; and at the same time the right be reserved
to the libellant to collect the entire amount of either of them in case
of the inability of the other to respond for her portion. Ib.
PRE-EMPTION. See Public Lands.
The Acts of September 4th, 1841, 12, May 29th, 1830, and January 23d,
1832, relate to pre-emptive rights conferred upon actual settlers, and
do not apply to a case where the entry has not been made under any
of them. Irvine v. Irvine, 618.
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT. See Agency; Public Law, 3; Rebellion, 12.
Where an instrument, executed by an agent, shows on its face the names
of the contracting parties, the agent may sign his own name first and
add to it, "agent for his principal," or he may sign the name of his
principal first, and add, by himself as agent. Smith v. Morse, 77.
PROVISIONAL COURTS. See Constitutional Law, 2.
PUBLIC LANDS. See Pre-emption.
1. Occupation and improvement on the public lands with a view to pre-
emption, do not confer a vested right in the land so occupied. Frisbie
v. Whitney, 187.
2. It does confer a preference over others in the purchase of such land by
the bona fide settler, which will enable him to protect his possession
against other individuals, and which the land officers are bound to re-
spect. Ib.
3. This inchoate right may be protected by the courts against the claims
of other persons who have not an equal or superior right, but it is not
valid against the United States. Ib.
4. The power of Congress over the public lands, as conferred by the Con-
stitution, can only be restrained by the courts, in cases where the land
PUBLIC LANDS (continued).
has ceased to be government property by reason of a right vested in
some person or corporation. Ib.
5. Such a vested right, under the pre-emption laws, is only obtained when
the purchase-money has been paid, and the receipt of the proper land
officer given to the purchaser. Ib.
6. Until this is done, it is within the legal and constitutional competency
of Congress to withdraw the land from entry or sale, though this may
defeat the imperfect right of the settler. Ib.
1. The principle of relation, which as respects the rights of either govern-
ment, regards a treaty as concluded from the date of its signature,
does not apply to private rights under it. As affects these, it is not
considered as concluded but from the exchange of ratification. Ha-
ver v. Yaker, 32.
2. Intercourse during war with an enemy is unlawful to parties standing
in the relation of debtor and creditor as much as to those who do not.
United States v. Grossmayer, 72.
3. Conceding that a creditor may have an agent in an enemy's country to
whom his debtor there may pay a debt contracted before the war, yet
the agent must be one who was appointed before the war. Ib.
PUBLIC MONEYS. See Official Bond.
1. In suits against persons accountable for such moneys, it is not necessary
after introducing certified transcripts of the party's accounts, properly
adjusted by the Tasury officers, to show that the defendant had notice
of the adjustment, or of the balance found against him. Watkins v.
2. To allow the set-off a credit on the trial, it must be shown that the claim,
after being properly presented by items and with vouchers to the
proper accounting officers, had been refused. Ib.
PUBLIC POLICY. See Public Law, 2, 3.
QUARTERMASTER, ACTING ASSISTANT. See War Department.
RATIFICATION. See Municipal Bonds.
1. Cannot be made of an act unlawful in law and void. United States v.
Grossmayer, 72.
2. A suit on a covenant contained in a submission to arbitrators, is a rati-
fication of the act of a person who has undertaken as agent to make
the submission in behalf of the person bringing the suit. Smith v.
Morse, 76.
3. Ratification of an infant's deed will not be made by mere acquiescence,
but any positive act showing intent to ratify will ratify it. The prin-
ciple applied. Irvine v. Irvine, 618.
REBELLION, THE. See Abandoned and Captured Property Act; Evidence,
4; Seizure.
1. Is to be regarded, so far as respects rights under the above-mentioned
act, as having been "suppressed," August 20th, 1866. United States
v. Anderson, 56.
REBELLION, THE (continued).
2. The whole Confederate power must be regarded by the Federal courts
as a usurpation of unlawful authority, and its Congress as incapable
of passing any valid laws; whatever weight may be given under some
circumstances to its acts of force, on the ground of irresistible power,
or to the legislation of the States in domestic matters; as to which the
court decides nothing in the case. United States v. Keehler, 83.
3. A prosecution in a so-called "court of the Confederate States of Amer-
ica," for treason, in aiding the troops of the United States in the
prosecution of a military expedition against the said Confederate States,
is a nullity. Hickman v. Jones et al., 197.
4. A traitor against the United States may recover damages against other
traitors, for having maliciously arrested and imprisoned him before a
so-called court of the Confederate States, for being a traitor to these;
the alleged treason having consisted in his giving aid to the troops of
the United States while engaged in suppressing the rebellion. Ib.
5. A public debtor of the United States cannot defend against a suit on
his official bond by proving that he paid the money due the United
States to one of its creditors, under an order of the Confederate au-
thorities, where he shows no force or physical coercion which com-
pelled obedience to such order. United States v. Keehler, 83.
6. The doctrine declared in Hanger v. Abbott (6 Wallace, 532), that statutes
of limitations do not run during the rebellion against a party residing
out of the rebellious States, so as to preclude his remedy for a debt
against a person residing in one of them, held applicable to the Judi-
ciary Acts of 1789 and 1803, limiting the right of appeal from the
inferior Federal courts to this court, to five years from the time when
the decree complained of was rendered. The Protector, 687.
7. The first clause of the 4th section of the act of June 7th, 1862, "for the
collection of direct taxes," &c. (which act must be construed with the
act of August 5th, 1861, "to provide increased revenue, &c.") merely
declares the ground of forfeiture of the party's title to land on which
taxes are not paid, namely non-payment of the taxes, while the second
clause worls the actual investment of the title in the United States,
through a public sale. Bennett v. Hunter, 326.
8. Under the act of 1862, payment prior to the sale is sufficient; and it
may have been made through any person willing to act on behalf of
the owner, and whose act is not disavowed by him. Ib.
a. The act of March 23d, 1863, relating to habeas corpus, does not apply
to suits for matters after the rebellion nor to ejectments. Bigelow v.
Forrest, 339.
10. Under the act of July 17th, 1862 (which is to be construed with the
joint resolution of the same date), nothing beyond a life estate could
be sold. Ib.
11. A permit by a proper treasury agent, to purchase cotton, in a certain
region, raised a prima facie presumption of the region being within
the occupation of the military lines of the United States. Butler v.
Maples, 766.
12. Such a permit authorized purchases through an agent. Ib.
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