this is because its causal problems are in general more complex and harder to solve than those of the sciences which were earlier able to attain their intellectual majority, and because it was obliged to wait for the development of those antecedent sciences which explain the kinds of phenomena which biology must use as terms in its more complex explanations. But even physics and chemistry had to make a similar transition from explanation by reference to supposed "forces" or "principles" and imaginary "substances" to actual scientific analysis and synthesis; concerning chemistry, with its "phlogiston" and "caloric," an authority in that science writes: "Until comparatively recent times the principles of metaphysical philosophy were not recognized as distinct from those of chemistry." And sociology has not yet made the transition. Notwithstanding that Comte who first pointed out the nature and necessity of the transition from the metaphysical to the scientific stage is called the first sociologist, and all other sociologists are familiar with his views upon this point, yet not all sociologists are even yet convinced that sociology can hope to pass from the metaphysical to the scientific stage in the sense of ceasing to talk of social forces, and exchanging that futile substitute for explanation for an actual statement of the conditions under which social phenomena arise, made in terms of logically antecedent phe nomena. For example, in the last Proceedings of the American Sociological Society (p. 195, note) Professor Ward asserts that the "social forces are the true causes of all social phenomena," and that all who deny this form of expression thereby deny has expressed it, the arch-heretic-is Hans Driesch. It is interesting to notice that Driesch, while attempting to show that "entelechy" (a recondite name for vital force) presides over the building of hereditary traits into an organism, remarks that "of the organization, chemistry, and physics of reproductive cells scarcely anything is known at present" (The Science and Philosophy of the Organism, 236). The obvious reply is that if we knew more "of the chemistry and physics" of reproduction he might not feel any need to imagine this mysterious addition to the explanation which that knowledge would afford, and that in the present state of knowledge it is much too soon to give up the quest for explanation in terms of the observable and remand us to the outgrown doctrine of "vitalism." I notice also that Driesch welcomes, as the most incontrovertible confirmation of his teaching from any other writer, Noll's doctrine of "morphaesthesia," or feeling for shape, which he attributes to vegetation, as what causes the branches of a tree "to resume their proper angle with regard to their orientation on the main axis, if this orientation has been disturbed" (ibid., 146 and 157). that sociology can be a true science. I would say rather that only by denying this can they successfully assert the claim of sociology to be a true science. In that connection Professor Ward referred to some statements of mine, one of which is as follows: It seems probable that a large part of the divergence and uncertainty concerning the scope of sociology has been due to a reluctance to treat the problems of human life and activity by strictly scientific methods. . . . . Sociology has nothing to do with any metaphysical concepts that may be thought to underlie social phenomena. Sociology has to do only with phenomena and with relations among phenomena. . . In order to secure agreement as to the scope of a science, it is first necessary to agree as to what phenomena the science is to describe and explain, but it is no less necessary to agree as to what is meant by explanation. . . . . It is only by explaining how things are caused that we acquire ability to cause anything desirable; by such enlightenment we are enabled to discern the courses of action that lead to good and those that lead to evil, and are supplied with motives to pursue the one and shun the other. .... I wish to protest against the idea that we can explain social phenomena by referring them to various "social forces." The habit, almost universal among sociologists, of referring frequently to "social forces" I believe is a bad one that ought to be broken. The temptation to use it lies in its metaphysical quality of drugging the mind's hunger for explanation with a false satisfaction by yielding the complaisance of understanding without the labor of obstinate analysis. . . . . Explanation of the phenomenon ☛ (in the case of sociology oftenest a prevalent mode of activity) consists in showing the phenomenon in its relations to the conditioning phenomena a, b, c, etc., in the presence of which emerges, by the increase of which ☛ increases, and by the diminution of which diminishes. . . . . Sociological explanation can relate prevalent modes of activity to the conditions by virtue of which they become prevalent at one place and time and not at another, with the increase of which, in passing to another place or time, they increase in prevalence, and with the diminution of which they diminish in prevalence. We may never be able to predict which individual will become a drunkard, but we can tell that with variation in certain conditions of climate, diet, domicile, employment, social approvals, and beliefs, the prevalence of drunkenness will vary. We may not be able to predict which individuals will act in a certain way, any more than the actuary can predict which man out of a thousand will die within a year, though he does know that the average death rate for a year will fall within certain limits; or any more than the student of physiology and hygiene can predict which indi vidual in a neighborhood will die of typhoid fever, although he does know that the prevalence of typhoid fever in that neighborhood is due to certain conditions, and that the abatement of such conditions would diminish its prevalence or stamp it out entirely. The importance both practical and scientific of similar knowledge with reference to social phenomena is not to be disparaged. Does not an adequate basis for a working agreement among sociologists require concurrence as to these two points? First, the phenomena studied by sociology are explicable; that is, a sociological phenomenon-as really as any-is conditioned by other phenomena; second, to enable us to see the sociological phenomena in their relations to the conditioning phenomena is to afford the explanation sought, etc.1 The dependence upon "social forces" for the explanation of social phenomena is carried throughout the works of Professor Ward; as he himself puts it, this doctrine "underlies his entire philosophy." Indeed in his view ... .... the principal characteristic of a true science is that it is a domain of natural phenomena produced by a special class of forces. The forces producing social phenomena are the social forces, and taken together they constitute the dynamic agent. . . . The dynamic agent consists wholly in feeling.. The social forces are wants seeking satisfaction through efforts. . . They are all primarily physical or physiological, even those classed as spiritual, for the organism is the only source from which they can emanate. . . . . All the social forces represent the innate interests of mankind, and whatever interests prompt to action. . . . . The fact which it is important to note just at this point is that feeling constitutes the dynamic agent. . . . . Now feeling is a true cosmic force." .... Professor Ward agrees with all that was said above about the One Force, except that instead of saying a new class of phenomena which rises as a result of the combination of previous phenomena is in turn added to its predecessors to form with them the conditions necessary to the appearance of yet higher manifestations of the One Force, he would say that the properties or behavior of a new class of phenomena although only a new "modality of the one universal force" may not only with convenience but with practical correctness be treated as a new force, and that the new and "distinct" forces thus coming into operation cause the phenomena which are to be studied by the distinct sciences, and that there cannot be a distinct science which is not devoted to the field of operation of a "distinct force." Further, he says that above the "vibration" of ether there are four of these distinct forces, "chemism, bathmism, zoism, and psychism"; these are the demiurges of this mythology. But feeling is the fundamental form of psychism and the only one which is a "true force" and "the feelings had a much earlier origin than the intellect," belonging "to all creatures above the protozoa certainly, and perhaps to these also," so that "during a prolonged period they constituted the only psychic manifestations, and do so still throughout practically the entire animal world." Feeling, we are thus told, is the force which underlies the animal consciousness that so long preceded intellect, which underlies all psychology, and also sociology. Where, then, is that "distinct" force which is to underlie a distinct science of sociology, defined as the study of "human achievement"? If there are but five cosmic forces, where does he obtain a distinct force to underlie each of all the sciences? Especially if feeling is the only psychic force, where does he get a distinct force to underlie sociology as distinguished from psychology? This is answered by saying that as the one cosmic force manifests itself in five cosmic forces, so also the psychic force or feeling manifests itself in various ways, a part of which are the social forces, so that it is "practically correct" not only to speak of a "social force" but of "a plurality of social forces." The "distinct" force upon which the science of sociology is based is a portion of the operation of feelings, and this "distinct" force is itself divisible into as many distinct "forces" as there are modes of human feeling. This is the justification offered for the claim that sociology is a study of the sphere of operation of a distinct force, and for the declaration that those who deny that sociology studies the operations of a distinct force thereby deny the possibility of a science of sociology! No one is likely to submit to being "read out of the party" of sociologists on any such ground as that, but one is more likely to be enough of an "insurgent" to raise the question whether any foundation for a valid system of sociology can be afforded by a body of teaching, learned as it is and wise in many other respects, which is grounded upon the dogma that sociology can be a science if, and only if, its explanations are made to consist in ascribing its phenomena to socalled "distinct forces" thus conceived. 79 Let us observe more precisely what this is which we are asked to regard as the cause of social phenomena, reference to which is said to constitute adequate scientific explanation, in order that it may appear clearly whether it is well to call it the social force, or even force at all, and also whether the reference of social phenomena to it does constitute their scientific explanation. It is not "inducement or purpose,' not any specific desire or aim, it does not involve any thought of a definable good. Such motives-e.g., the desire to be governor, or to escape the penitentiary-are social products rather than social forces. The definite wants which move society are, in fact, among the most characteristic of the phenomena which are to be explained by sociology, rather than to be taken as data, or given terms from which explanation may set out. Says Professor Ward, the "desire" which is "social force" is "a psychic condition resulting primarily from restraint, exerted by the impinging environment, to motor activity, and when strong enough it overcomes these barriers and causes activity. It is a sensation, and it must be regarded as an unpleasant sensation."10 Thus he states the essence of his "philosophy of desire." This definition of the so-called "social force" includes reference to the following phenomena: (1) action caused when (2) a restraining environment impinges upon (3) motor activity occasioning (4) a "sensation" or "feeling," a more or less unpleasant accompanying state of consciousness. It is this fourth, this more or less unpleasant feeling or sensation, which is the social force, and to deny that it is the 'Ibid., 102. 10 Ibid., 103. |