To conclude this essay, I have taken the liberty to copy a paragraph from the report of the military commission to Europe in 1855 and 1856:

"By means of the facilities afforded for theoretical attainments, and of the continual practical exercises in every department required for the instruction of the new levies, the officers of the Prussian army, formerly remarkable chiefly for attention to the minutiae of military service, have become highly accomplished in their profession, and have made most creditable progress in the art of engineering, in artillery, and in military science and literature."

DRILL AND DISCIPLINE.

WE have always been ready to bear testimony to the admirable fighting and praiseworthy fortitude of the great armies, which, having achieved the salvation of our nationality, have now been mustered out of the service, and returned, full of glory and honor, to the peaceful pursuits of private life. They were brought into the field patriots, but not soldiers, and many of those recruited in the latter days had no time to become soldiers, although, without instruction, they did "yeomen's duty" on the final fields of the war. From first to last, they were men who abandoned, for the time, their workshops, ploughs, counters, and benches, to strike a blow for their country. They would have done better, and the war would have been sooner brought to a conclusion, had they been trained and tried soldiers when they took up their weapons; had they received that "baptism of the flag, that baptism which puts in the heart of the soldier virtues of which the citizen is ignorant-a baptism not of fire, but of discipline."

Foreign nations have twitted us with this want of armies, in the proper understanding of the word; and we have been told, by our own officers, that men have frequently been taken into battle who had never before fired a musket. We have no reproach or censure for the past; it is of our military future that we now speak. Without offering hints at a new organization, which is now receiving the undivided attention of our most distinguished and experienced military men, we wish to say a single word with regard to the troops returned, or whatever military establishment the Government shall ordain.

Let a strict system of DRILL be at once established in all arms; let us imitate the Roman system in daily drills of all kinds, for veterans and recruits alike; let the men be posted in sufficient numbers to practise continually at evolutions of the line, with a combination of the three arms; let there be artillery schools of practice and cavalry camps, commanded by our very best generals, whose duty shall be no sinecure, but constant labor of instruction and manoeuvre; and let there be no delay in this. Now, for the first time, this may be done; and while

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the still unsettled state of portions of the country renders the presence of troops necessary, we may at once accomplish the preservation of order, the instruction and veteranizing of our men, and the perfection of a nucleus, around which hundreds of thousands of men could be aggregated in a moment at a new call of the Republic.

And akin to this is a tightening of the reins of DISCIPLINE. Conquering armies are usually not remarkable for this. War creates license, and the component parts are kept together more by a muscular, articulation than by a solid osseous anatomy. Practices obtain; offences are overlooked; slight departures from discipline ignored-especially with volunteer armiesuntil at times it is difficult to secure prompt obedience to orders which are distasteful to the men, flushed with success which they have achieved. Now, also, is the time to remedy this. Let us come back to strict army government: it will make men machines indeed, but machines which, inspired by intelligence, will work immediately, vigorously, and harmoniously-machines which will crush with iron force through the ranks of any new enemy.

Large or small, we must have a permanent army, and not always depend upon an improvised one.

We

These desultory remarks have some peculiar value, when we remember that there may be other wars, and that soon. have made a magnificent stride among the military nations of the world, and we must be ready not simply to deal with them, but to dictate to them, in the great war congresses of future years. Every thing, material, men, military traditions, and a strong military system, should be ready for any new emergency; and, if our people are alive to the principle of economy, let them be assured that, in this respect, preparation, instruction, and discipline, will save us vast sums in the end. In the words of Baron Ambert:-"Improvised armies, having less consistence than permanent ones, are necessarily more numerous: then organization interrupts the entire economic system of the State; agriculture, industry, and commerce are suspended in their course, and wealth disappears."

RETALIATION IN WAR.

WE presume that many of our readers noticed, some time ago, the debate in the Congress of the United States on the subject of retaliation upon rebel prisoners of war in our hand, for the treatment ours received from the rebel authorities; and we think not a few must have been surprised at the course of that discussion. That opinions on this subject should differ is very natural; but so very wide a difference, or rather a direct conflict of opinion, on fundamental principles, would suggest that either the law itself was unsettled, or that the speakers did not well understand it. Indeed, on these questions of the laws and usages of war, there is great want of information, not only among our people generally, but also among our legislators, courts, lawyers, military officers, and other public men. Nor is this to be wondered at. Prior to the present war, the people of the United States made no claim to be a military people; on the contrary, they prided themselves as being civil, in the strict sense of that word, and disclaimed and discountenanced all knowledge of the military art, or acquaintance with the science of war. Indeed, a profound peace of more than three-quarters of a century could scarcely be said to be interrupted by the insignificant contest of 1812, or the short war with the weak and demoralized Republic of Mexico. During this long period our pursuits as a nation have been, not of arms, but of agriculture, manufactures, and commerce. Moreover, our very astute politicians and legislators have assured us, time and again, that there was no necessity for any military organization or military knowledge in the United States, for our untrained militia were more than sufficient for any contingency that could possibly arise. It is true that Washington and his contemporaries, who achieved our independence and founded the Republic, took a different view of this question; but who would presume to compare their opinions with those of the sages who lead our modern Congressional debates!

Before entering upon a general discussion of this subject, it may be well to refer, in regard to definitions and principles, to professional writers on the laws of war.

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In the Instructions for the Government of the Armies of the United States in the Field," prepared by Dr. Lieber and General Hitchcock, it is said :

"The law of war can no more wholly dispense with retaliation than can the law of nations, of which it is a breach. Yet civilized nations acknowledge retaliation as the sternest feature of war. A reckless enemy often leaves to his opponent no other means of securing himself against the repetition of barbarous outrage.

"Retaliation will, therefore, never be resorted to as a measure of mere revenge, but only as a means of protective retribution, and, moreover, cautiously and unavoidably; that is to say, retaliation shall only be resorted to after careful inquiry into the real occurrence, and the character of the misdeeds that may demand retribution.

"Unjust or inconsiderate retaliation removes the belligerents farther and farther from the mitigating rules of a regular war, and by rapid steps leads them nearer to the internecine wars of savages."

Professor Woolsey, in his "Elements of International Law,' says: "If one belligerent treats prisoners of war harshly, the other may do the same; or if one squeezes the expenses of the war out of an invaded territory, the other may follow in his steps. It thus becomes a measure of self-protection, and secures the greatest amount of humanity from unfeeling military officers. But there is a limit to the rule. If one general kills in cold blood some hundreds of prisoners who embarrass his motions, his antagonist may not be justified in staining himself by similar crime, nor may he break his word or oath because the other has done so before."

General Halleck, in his work on "International Law and Laws of War," in speaking of the rule of reciprocity, says: "If the enemy refuses to shape his conduct by the milder usages of war, and adopts the extreme and rigorous principles of former ages, we may do the same; but if he exceed these extreme rights, and becomes barbarous and cruel in his conduct, we cannot, as a general thing, follow retort upon his subjects by treating them in like manner. We cannot go beyond the limits prescribed by international law to the rights of belligerents." And, after giving several examples of justifiable retaliation, he adds: "But suppose an enemy should massacre all prisoners of war, this would not afford a sufficient justification for the opposing belligerent to do the same. Suppose our enemy should use poisoned weapons, or poison springs and food, the rule of reciprocity would not justify us in resorting to the same means of retaliation. A savage enemy might kill alike old men, women, and children, but no civilized power would resort to similar measures of cruelty and barbarism, under the plea that they were justified by the law of retaliation."

In February, 1862, Major-General Curtis reported that fortytwo of our officers and men of one regiment had been poisoned by eating provisions at Mudtown, in Arkansas, which the retreating rebels had poisoned and left behind; whereupon the commanding general of the Department issued an order, from which we make the following extract:

"We cannot retaliate by adopting the same barbarous mode of warfare; nor can we retaliate by punishing the innocent for the acts of the guilty. The laws of war forbid this. But the same code authorizes us to retaliate upon the guilty parties. Any person guilty of such acts, when captured, will not be treated as ordinary prisoners of war; they will not be shot, but will suffer the ignominious punishment of being hung as felons. Moreover, all officers are, in a measure,

responsible for the acts of the troops under their command. Officers of troops guilty of such acts, although not themselves the advisers or abettors of crime, will, therefore, when captured, be put in irons, and conveyed as criminals to these headquarters. The laws of war make it their duty to prevent such barbarities; if they neglect that duty, they must suffer the consequences."

These authorities are fully sustained by older writers on the laws and usages of war. From them we draw the following

conclusions:

1. That retaliation is a well-settled principle of the modern law of war, and is resorted to by the most civilized and Christian people.

2. It must not be applied in a spirit of revenge, nor unnecessarily as a punishment; the object of its use being to prevent a repetition of the offence or crime which is retaliated on the

enemy.

3. Retaliation may be, as the word indicates, literally in kind, that is, "an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth," or in a more general sense, other countervailing measures being adopted by way of retaliation.

4. The law of retaliation in war has its limits, as well as criminal law in time of peace, the object of both being, not revenge, but prevention; not primarily the punishment of the individual offender, but to deter others from a like crime.

5. As in time of peace we generally punish only the guilty party, so in time of war we generally retaliate only on the individual offender. But there are exceptions in both cases. Thus, all the members of a town or corporation are held responsible in damages for the neglect or carelessness of their agents; se, in war, a city, an army, or an entire community, is sometimes punished for the illegal acts of its rulers or individual members.

6. Retaliation is limited in extent by the same rule which limits punishment in all civilized governments and among all Christian people-it must never degenerate into savage or barbarous cruelty.

To illustrate and discuss the foregoing rules, we will now apply them to the question of retaliation for the treatment of our prisoners of war by the rebel authorities. In regard to this treatment, we think that documentary evidence recently laid before Congress fully sustains the statement of the official report of the General-in-chief, submitted to Congress in 1863, viz.: "Our soldiers, who, by the casualties of war, have been captured by them, have been stripped of their blankets, clothing, and shoes, even in the winter season, and then confined in damp and loathsome prisons, and only half fed on damaged provisions, or actually starved to death: while hundreds have terminated their existence, loaded with irons, in filthy prisons; not a few, after a semblance of trial by some military tribunal,