more properly, that it could be safely established under the first alone, is a position not likely to be combated.

"If we try the constitution by its last relation, to the authority by which amendments are to be made, we find it neither wholly national, nor wholly federal. Were it wholly national, the supreme and ultimate authority would reside in the majority of the people of the union; and this authority would be competent at all times, like that of a majority of every national society, to alter or abolish its established government. Were it wholly federal on the other hand, the concurrence of each state in the union would be essential to every alteration that would be binding on all. The mode provided by the plan of the convention, is not founded on either of these principles. In requiring more than a majority, and particularly, in computing the proportion by states, not by citizens, it departs from the national, and advances towards the federal character. In rendering the concurrence of less than the whole number of states sufficient, it loses again the federal, and partakes of the national character.

"The proposed constitution, therefore, even when tested by the rules laid down by its antagonists, is, in strictness, neither a national nor a federal constitution; but a composition of both. In its foundation it is federal, not national; in the sources from which the ordinary powers of the government are drawn, it is partly federal, and partly national; in the operation of these powers, it is national, not federal; in the extent of them again, it is federal, not national; and finally in the authoritative mode of introducing amendments, it is neither wholly federal, nor wholly national."

NUMBER XL.
[Madison.]

"Will it be said, that the fundamental principles of the confederation were not within the purview of the convention, and ought not to have been varied? I ask, what are these principles? Do they require, that in the establishment of the constitution, the states should be regarded as distinct and independent sovereigns? They are so regarded by the constitution proposed. . . .'

NUMBER XLII.

[Madison.]

... The provision of the federal articles on the subject of piracy, extends no further than to the establishment of courts for the trial of these offences.

The necessity of a superintending authority over the reciprocal trade of confederated states has been illustrated by other examples as well as our own. . . .'

NUMBER XLV.

[Madison.]

"The number of individuals employed under the constitution of the United States, will be much smaller than the number employed under the particular states. There will consequently be less of personal influence on the side of the former than of the latter. The members of the legislative, executive, and judiciary departments of thirteen and more states; the justices of peace, officers of militia, ministerial officers of justice, with all the county, corpora

tion, and town officers, for three millions and more of people, intermixed, and having particular acquaintance with every class and circle of people, must exceed beyond all proportion, both in number and influence, those of every description who will be employed in the administration of the federal system.

"It is true that the confederacy is to possess, and may exercise the power of collecting internal as well as external taxes throughout the states: but it is probable that this power will not be resorted to, except for supplemental purposes of revenue.

The powers delegated by the proposed constitution to the federal government, are few and defined. Those which are to remain in the state governments, are numerous and indefinite. The former will be exercised principally on external objects, as war, peace, negotiation, and foreign commerce; with which last the power of taxation, will for the most part, be connected. The powers reserved to the several states will extend to all the objects, which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties, and properties of the people; and the internal order, improvement, and prosperity of the state. . . . "If the new constitution be examined with accuracy and candour, it will be found that the change which it proposes, consists much less in the addition of NEW POWERS to the union, than in the invigoration of its ORIGINAL POWERS. The regulation of commerce, it is true, is a new power; but that seems to be an addition which few oppose, and from which no apprehensions are entertained. The powers relating to war and peace, armies and fleets, treaties and finance, with the other more considerable powers, are all vested in the existing congress by the articles of confederation. The proposed change does not enlarge these powers; it only substitutes a more effectual mode of administering them. The change relating to taxation, may be regarded as the most important: and yet the present congress have as complete authority to REQUIRE of the states indefinite supplies of money for the common defence and general welfare, as the future congress will have to require them of individual citizens; and the latter will be no more bound than the states themselves have been, to pay the quotas respectively taxed on them. . . .

NUMBER XLVI.

[Madison.]

"The federal and state governments are in fact but different agents and trustees of the people, instituted with different powers, and designated for different purposes. The adversaries of the constitution seem to have lost sight of the people altogether, in their reasonings on this subject; and to have viewed these different establishments, not only as mutual rivals and enemies, but as uncontrolled by any common superior, in their efforts to usurp the authorities of each other. These gentlemen must here be reminded of their error. They must be told, that the ultimate authority, wherever the derivative may be found, resides in the people alone; . . .'

NUMBER LIV.
[Hamilton.]

33

"It is not probable, that the richest state in the confederacy, will ever influence the choice of a single representative, in any other state. Nor will the representatives of the larger and richer states, possess any other advantage in

the federal legislature, over the representatives of other states, than what may result from their superior number alone; as far, therefore, as their superior wealth and weight may justly entitle them to any advantage, it ought to be secured to them by a superior share of representation. The new constitution is, in this respect, materially different from the existing confederation, as well as from that of the United Netherlands, and other similar confederacies. In each of the latter, the efficacy of the federal resolutions, depends on the subsequent and voluntary resolutions of the states composing the union. Hence the states, though possessing an equal vote in the public councils, have an unequal influence, corresponding with the unequal importance of these subsequent and voluntary resolutions. Under the proposed constitution, the federal acts will take effect without the necessary intervention of the individual states. They will depend merely on the majority of votes in the federal legislature, and consequently each vote, whether proceeding from a larger or smaller state, or a state more or less wealthy or powerful, will have an equal weight and efficacy."

NUMBER LXXX.

[Hamilton.]

"To judge with accuracy of the due extent of the federal judicature, it will be necessary to consider in the first place what are its proper objects.

"It seems scarcely to admit of controversy, that the judiciary authority of the union ought to extend to these several descriptions of cases: 1st. To all those which arise out of the laws of the united states, passed in pursuance of their just and constitutional powers of legislation; 2nd. To all those which concern the execution of the provisions expressly contained in the articles of union; 3d. To all those in which the united states are a party; 4th. To all those which involve the PEACE of the CONFEDERACY, whether they relate to the intercourse between the united states and foreign nations, or to that between the states themselves; 5th. To all those which originate on the high seas, and are of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction; and lastly to all those in which the state tribunals cannot be supposed to be impartial and unbiassed.

NUMBER LXXXV.

[Hamilton.]

"I never expect to see a perfect work from imperfect man. The result of the deliberations of all collective bodies, must necessarily be a compound as well of the errors and prejudices, as of the good sense and wisdom of the individuals of whom they are composed. The compacts which are to embrace thirteen distinct states, in a common bond of amity and union, must as necessarily be a compromise of as many dissimilar interests and inclinations. How can perfection spring from such materials? ...

"Every constitution for the United States must inevitably consist of a great variety of particulars, in which thirteen independent states are to be accommodated in their interests or opinions of interest. We may of course expect to see, in any body of men charged with its original formation, very different combinations of the parts upon different points. Many of those who form the majority on one question, may become the minority on a second, and, an association dissimilar to either, may constitute the majority on a third. Hence the necessity of moulding and arranging all the particulars which are to compose the whole, in such a manner as to satisfy all the parties to the compact. . .

APPENDIX E.

No 1.

DECLARATIONS, BILLS OF RIGHTS &c. INCLUDING THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE.

a

As in the great argument between federalization and nationalization misuse is made of the Declaration of Independence I beg leave to present with it some of its antecedents, especially the acts of some of the nascent states, which authorized their delegations in congress to make for them the said declaration, while reserving to themselves absolutely the entire subject of establishing government. All the people were distinct states, and they associated as such, in declaring and achieving independence; and they afterwards acted as such in confederating, and all their acts and declarations, without exception, are on the basis of voluntary union and co-operation of 'free sovereign and independent states."

PROCLAMATION OF MASSACHUSETTS Jan'y 22, 1776.

By the great and general Court of the colony of Massachusetts Bay: A PROCLAMATION The frailty of human nature, the wants of individuals, and the numerous dangers which surround them through the course of life, have, in all ages and in every country, impelled them to form societies and establish governments.

As the happiness of the people is the sole end of government, so the consent of the people is the only foundation of it, in reason, morality, and the natural fitness of things. And therefore every act of government, every exercise of sovereignty against or without the consent of the people, is injustice, usurpation and tyranny.

It is a maxim that in every government there must exist somewhere a supreme, sovereign, absolute and uncontrollable power; but this power resides always in the body of the people, and it never was or can be delegated to one man or a few; the great Creator having never given to men a right to vest others with authority over them, unlimited either in duration or degree.

When kings, ministers, governors, or legislators, therefore, instead of exercising the powers entrusted with them, according to the principles forms and proportions stated by the constitution, and established by the original compact prostitute those powers to the purposes of oppression; to subvert instead of supporting a free constitution; - to destroy instead of preserving the lives, liberties and properties of the people; they are no longer to be deemed magistrates, vested with a sacred character, but become public enemies and ought to be resisted.

The administration of Great Britain, despising equally the justice humanity and magnanimity of their ancestors, and the rights, liberties, and courage of AMERICANS, have, for a course of years, labored to establish a sovereignty in America, not founded on the consent of the people, but in the mere will of persons a thousand leagues from us, whom we know not; and have endeavored to establish this sovereignty against our consent in all cases whatsoever.

The colonies during this period, have recurred to every peaceable resource in a free constitution, by petitions and remonstrances, to obtain justice, which has been not only denied to them, but they have been treated with unexampled indignity and contempt; and at length open war of the most atrocious cruel and sanguinary kind has been commenced against them. To this an open, manly and successful resistance has hitherto been made; thirteen colonies are now firmly united in the conduct of this most just and necessary war, under the wise councils of their congress.

It is the Will of Providence, for wise, righteous and gracious Ends, that this Colony should have been singled out by the Enemies of America, as the first Object, both of their Envy and their Revenge; and after having been made the Subject of Several merciless and vindictive Statutes, one of which was intended to subvert our Constitution by Charter, is made the Seat of War.

No effectual Resistance to the System of Tyranny prepared for us, could be made without either instant Recourse to Arms or a temporary Suspension of the ordinary Powers of Government, and Tribunals of Justice; to the last of which Evils, in hopes of a Speedy Reconciliation with Great Britain, upon equitable Terms, the Congress advised us to Submit; and Mankind has seen a Phenomenon without Example in the political World, a large and populous Colony Subsisting in great Decency and Order, for more than a Year under such a Suspension of Government.

But as our Enemies have proceeded to such barbarous Extremities, commencing Hostilities upon the good People of this Colony, and with unprece dented Malice exerting their Power to Spread the Calamities of Fire, Sword and Famine through the Land, and no reasonable Prospect remains of a Speedy Reconciliation with Great Britain, the Congress have resolved "That no Obedience being due to the Act of Parliament for altering the Charter of the Colony of Massachusetts Bay, nor to a Governor or Lieutenant Governor who will not observe the Directions of, but endeavor to Subvert that Charter, the Governor and Lieutenant Governor of that Colony are to be considered as Absent and their Offices vacant; and as there is no Council there, and Inconveniences arising from the Suspension of the Powers of Government are intolerable, especially at a time when General Gage hath actually levied War and is carrying on Hostilities against his Majesty's peaceable and loyal subjects of that Colony; that, in order to conform as near as may be to the Spirit and Substance of the Charter, it be recommended to the Provincial Convention to write Letters to the Inhabitants of the Several Places which are intituled to Representation in Assembly, requesting them to chuse such Representatives, and that the Assembly when chosen, do elect Councillors; and that such Assembly and Council exercise the Powers of Government, untill a Governor of his Majesty's Appointment will consent to govern the Colony, according to its Charter."

In Pursuance of which Advice, the good People of this Colony have chosen a full and free Representation of themselves, who, being convened in Assembly have elected a Council, who as the executive Branch of Government have constituted necessary Officers through the Colony. The present Generation, therefore, may be congratulated on the Acquisition of a Form of Government, more immediately in all its Branches under the Influence and Control of the People, and therefore more free and happy than was enjoyed by their Ancestors; But as a Government so popular can be supported only by universal