"delegated;" and all officials to be mere "substitutes and agents" of the people. [Ibid. Part. I. articles 4, 5.]

She declares her people to be her citizens, and calls them "subjects of this commonwealth" [Ibid. Part I. art. 11]; while the federal pact corroborates it, by calling all the people of the country "citizens of different states."

She commands her governor to assemble all her "citizens" and "subjects," or rather "inhabitants". this being the word she uses -to "repel" "by force of arms," and to kill, slay, and destroy all such persons as shall "attempt" "the destruction, invasion, detriment, or annoyance of this commonwealth." She makes no exception of, but includes, the federal government, as I have heretofore shown. [Ibid. Part II., ch 2.]

She requires, in her constitution and laws, that every officer shall take an oath of allegiance to her as a sovereign. Up to 1820, the oath was in the extended form given heretofore. In that year it was shortened, but not weakened, to read as follows: "I. A. B., do solemnly swear that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the commonwealth of Massachusetts, and will support the constitution thereof: so help me God." [Amendments 1820, art. 6; see also her law and oath of 1866, referred to supra, 407.]

She declares, under the heading of "offences against the sovereignty of this commonwealth," that "treason," in one of her "citizens" or "subjects," "shall consist only in levying war against her, or in adhering to her enemies, giving them aid and comfort." [R. S. of Mass., ed. 1836, p. 715.] To aid any person or authority, whether federal or other, to coerce her with arms, would constitute the crime.

And finally she declares, that " every person who shall commit the crime of treason against her shall suffer death." [Ibid.] And if on any one of several occasions and especially the one occurring in 1814 the federal government had pushed the dispute with Massachusetts to an issue of arms, she would rightfully have executed any subject of hers who had dared to fight for the said agency, against his commonwealth and sovereign!

Vermont and Kentucky add Conclusive Proof. — These two states make the correctness of the foregoing completely manifest. They show the understanding that morally binds all the states, the people, and the general government, to the proposition that the allegiance of the citizen is due alone to his state, and that hence the only possible treason is a crime against the original sovereign- the commonwealth of people; the law of treason being their will, and the trying and punishing functionaries being their instruments.

Vermont and Kentucky were the first states to join the federal union after it was first formed, the former in 1791, and the latter in 1792; and their cases became designed, studied, and most conspicuous precedents, especially on the vital subjects of allegiance and

treason.

6

Let us first take the case of Vermont. She "laid the law on" her people, through her convention, on January 10, 1791, as follows: This convention . . . do . . . approve of, assent to, and ratify the said constitution; and declare that the same shall be binding on us and the people of the state of Vermont for ever." [I. Ell. Deb. 338.]

Two years after this, supposing herself to be like her sisters, a "free, sovereign, and independent state," she formed her state constitution, aiming, of course, to harmonize it with her federalized condition. Therein she prescribes the following "oath of allegiance to this state," as she calls it, to be taken by all her officers: "You do solemnly swear that you will be true and faithful to the state of Vermont."

This constitution, lately, if not now, extant, contains the following remarkable provision: "Every person of good character, who comes to settle in this state, having first taken an oath of allegiance, may purchase . . . real estate, and after one year's residence shall be ... entitled to all rights of a natural born subject of this state, except," &c.

So much for Vermont. Next let us note
Kentucky's view of Allegiance and Treason.

- In 1792 she held

a convention, through which she declared her will to be a state, and to become a member of the union, while about the same time congress passed an act admitting her both acts taking effect, ex vi termini, on the first of June, 1792.

In her constitution, adopted 17th August, 1799, and lately, if not now, extant, is the following official oath of allegiance: I do solemnly swear, that I will be faithful and true to the commonwealth of Kentucky, as long as I continue a citizen thereof.

One more extract from the record of this county or province, will suffice: "Treason against the commonwealth shall consist only in levying war against it, or in adhering to its enemies, giving them aid and comfort."

We are now enabled plainly to see

The Early Faith on this Vital Subject. On the momentous occasion of admitting the first of the long line of new states, the land would have resounded with objections and protests, if there had been error on these vital points of allegiance and treason, but there was none.

These new states, and the congress of states, as did all the people, and all their leaders and political philosophers, concurred in the view that there were,

1. No political organizations of people but states.

2. No political rights but the rights of states.

3. No sovereignty but that of the people of states. 4. No citizens but citizens of states.

5. No allegiance but allegiance to states.

6. And no treason but that against a state.

CHAPTER XI.

ALL TREASON IS AGAINST THE STATE (CONTINUED).

HE above conclusions are supported by all the facts of history;

the fathers; and by all the provisions

and principles of the constitution itself. The fathers who planned, and aided to establish, the federal system, whether acting as delegates to the federal or the state conventions, were members, citizens, and subjects of the commonwealths, owing allegiance to, and bound to preserve, them. Hence these builders built with pre-existent materials combined indestructible and absolute states into a new federal polity. Nothing was created, destroyed, or changed. The people, as states, exerted their own wills, and became "united states' "essential component parts" of the "new system" (as Hamilton himself declared), intending to exercise government themselves. Obviously, treason is against the people as they are organized. But let us reason further into the philosophy of the matter.

The Crime is against Society. It is obvious that treason is not against the instituted government; but is against society, which rules and protects, and is entitled to allegiance, precisely as if a king. The monarch in the one case, and society in the other, says: "I am the state; allegiance is due me, and treason is against me."

If not so, why did Webster say: "Sovereignty of government is unknown in North America; . . . the people alone are sovereign"? [Speech of 1833.] If not so, why did Madison say: "Each state . . is considered as a sovereign body . . . only to be bound by its own voluntary act" [Fed. 39]; and that the present system "consists of many co-equal sovereignties"? [III. Ell. Deb. 381.] If not so, why did the Federalist, speaking the views of Hamilton and Jay, as well as Madison, declare that "the federal and state governments are, in fact, but different agents and trustees of the people, instituted with different powers, and designated for different purposes"? [Art. 46.] And why, finally, if it be not so, did Mr. G. T. Curtis state, as the American doctrine, that governments with us are only "agents and depositaries of the power of the people" [II. Hist. Const. 38.]

Treason is against the state, then, not only according to the constitution and the fathers, but, as we shall see, according to natural reason. The body rules and protects, and is entitled to reciprocal duty and devotion [see pream. const. Mass. appendix D]. Hence we infer that true loyalty in a citizen is fidelity to his state, and that treason against the united states ceases to be a crime when the alleged act is done in defending one's state, or when she disunites herself.

It is not inconsistent with these principles, for the states, acting under the jus gentium, to force a seceder to come back to the same old constitution, with all its provisions and principles intact: for it provides for equal and self-governing united states. And if truth, justice, and the principles of institutional liberty, which are formulated in the constitution, are persistently violated, and no remedy is found therein, a state ought to withdraw, as one patriarchate withdrew, with God's approval, from another, to avoid strife. [Gen. xiii.] They, like our states, willed to be together, and they could equally will to separate. Of course, withdrawal tenders an issue under the jus gentium, which the adhering states have as good a right to accept as the others to tender. [See Part I. ch. iv.]

Remembering that

Naturally Disunion ends Federal Treason. the power of repeal is precisely commensurate with, and the exact opposite of, the power to enact or ordain; and remembering that all the powers of the constitution are delegated by the will of superior authority, and hence withdrawable, natural reason and common sense will teach us that the crime of "treason against the united states" must end, as to a citizen, with his state's withdrawal from the association, and recall of her delegations.

We must keep it in mind that man is merged and politically lost in the state, and becomes subject to duty to and protection from her, by virtue of the social compact; as well as an integral part of the said state; and in his societal capacity a part of the governing authority. Politically, he is nothing, except in this connection. Moreover, the state is named in the federal pact, and recognized as one of its constituents, while the man is designated as her citizen, and is of course, a part of her. As such part, he was carried by her into the union. She organically survived the completion of it, abating nothing of her sovereign will. Being identical with said citizens, she functionally. commands and controls them in all matters, including those of the federal instrument this being her "law laid on them," just as the state constitution is, both being declared by her convention.

Citizens had no agency in giving life or validity to the federal compact, or doing anything towards it, except voting for delegates, who, in convention, were to express the will of the state to ratify, and thereby