in which the country was involved; and, when Congress met in December, it was found that they continued to exist, and were effective for evil. The election of a sectional candidate to the presidency, who had not even an electoral ticket in the field, in the fifteen slave States, and upon issues hostile to them, naturally aroused a deep feeling in those States, whose rights were thought to be in danger. Much had been said during the campaign, calculated to irritate and inflame the public mind, and give force and effect to discontent. Their rights, whatever they might be, were clearly as sacred as those of other States. But the mode of protection selected was a fatal, suicidal one, and destructive to their own, as well as to the interests of the nation. They should have fought the battle for their preservation, in instead of out of the Union, and then the Democracy would have sustained them as far as the Constitution authorized. But the fatal step of secession was resolved upon, to be followed by an appeal to the God of battles, whose decision, they ought to have known, would be against them. Here a new and great danger presented itself, and its manner of treatment by Mr. Buchanan has been grossly misrepresented and misunderstood, which created a false and unjust impression against him. It is the rising, and not the setting sun that is worshipped, and his was the setting. In Congress there were two sections who cherished no kind feelings toward him-one, embracing a portion of the Democratic party, who were willing to see him crucified; and another which were ready for any measures which might result in the triumph of abolition. Neither took one step to prevent or repress secession, or to avoid the conflict of arms which naturally followed. Mr. Lincoln and his leading friends stood pledged to their followers to abolish slavery. This could not be done, in any possible way, under the Constitution, and this could not be amended without the consent of a large portion of the slave States. How, then, was it to be done? The North could not declare war, to enforce abolition in the South. There was no possible way of keeping their promises, but to present such a state of things as to induce the South to become actors in secession, and then to be allowed, on Mr. Greeley's plan, to "go in peace," with slavery, or to

plunge the country into a war, and to secure the extinction of it, as one of the consequences of resorting to arms. Although Republicans did not agree in the mode of freeing the nation from the taint of slavery, they did agree in taking no steps to stifle secession. Both plans were based upon secession movements at the South, and one of them held out encouragement of a bloodless result. Although fearing fatal results, Mr. Buchanan's oft-repeated communications to Congress on the subject produced no action. As President, when Congress was in session, his power of action was limited, and Congress conferred no power-none authorizing action of any kind. The army, on a peace establishment, was almost nominal, and distributed at points of danger; and he had no power to solicit volunteers, or call out the militia. The laws did not provide for the existing state of things, and he could not change them; and Congress declined to act. The South was encouraged to enter upon her fatal movement by numerous Republican papers, and induced to believe that no efforts would be made to prevent their going in peace, as Chief-Justice Chase suggested, after he came into Lincoln's Cabinet. The responsibility of omitting all action to prevent or meet secession rested, not with Mr. Buchanan, but with Congress, which refused to do any thing. Mr. Buchanan's vindication proves this beyond doubt or question. A careful examination of the journals and debates of Congress, as well as the laws then passed, will incontestibly prove what we assert. No man can point to one law passed by Congress to prevent secession, or to avoid war. Those Republicans

who did not go with Greeley and Chief-Justice Chase, in letting the South "go in peace,” expected and wished for war, as a means of fulfilling their promises to the abolitionists. This view is supported by high authority. When, in 1866, Mr. Seward was charged with not being sufficiently radical, the Albany Evening Journal, in an article, probably written by him, proceeds to show that he had been a great Radical, and says:

"The Pittsburg Convention and the Philadelphia Convention, which gave shape and crystallization to the sentiment of the North, were both 'radical' bodies, in the sense in which we assume that term to be used by the Times. They proposed

tundamental changes in the policy of our Government. To accomplish these they declared war upon slavery. Instead of 'con

serving' that institution, they took measures which every political observer knew must, if successful, result in its ultimate extinction. With full understanding of the fact that their platform, free soil, free speech, free men,' was AN INVITATION TO SOUTHERN REVOLT,

AND THAT THE ELECTION OF THEIR CANDIDATE WOULD PRECIPITATE

A CRISIS, they went into the contest, which had become a necessity of national preservation and integrity. Beaten in the first national canvass, they continued the fight in Kansas and upon the floors of Congress, and, returning to the charge in 1860 with a railsplitter' candidate for the presidency, won a signal triumph.”

The truth of this declaration by the Evening Journal has never been denied. It is unquestionably true, and proves two things the real motives in running abolitional and sectional candidates, and why the Republicans in Congress took no steps, under Mr. Buchanan's recommendations, in relation to secession, or made any movement of their own. War was desired by two classes: one who staked every thing on abolition, and the other wishing for rapid and easy means of making fortunes by furnishing supplies for the army and navy. Mr. Buchanan wished to avoid war, but they did not aid him in preventing it, because their hopes of final success in abolition depended upon the nation being plunged into one. Such preventive measures as he could take, were adopted by Mr. Buchanan, under the advice of General Scott, whose autobiography, in this respect, is singularly erroneou's. He confided in the honesty of his Cabinet, but dismissed Floyd the moment he detected him in an untruth, without suspecting his loyalty to the Government; and the stories that he had improperly sent the Southern States national arms, were untrue. They had not their share under the law. Up to this period Floyd professed to be an uncompromising Unionist. Mr. Buchanan believed that the fires first kindled in South Carolina, and which were spreading to other States, would burn themselves out in a short time, if no fuel in the shape of blood should be supplied; but when that should be furnished, the flames would be unmanageable. After blood is shed, few men reason. Until Mr. Lincoln

was sworn into office the fires of secession were decreasing, and would have died out but for the attack upon Fort Sumter, which was made for the purpose of keeping the war-spirit alive in the South, and of arousing it at the North, both of which it accomplished. Mr. Buchanan did not desire war, but the South and Mr. Lincoln, or at least his controlling friends, did. His policy would have avoided it, while theirs would precipitate it. He Isaid to the writer in substance: "When blood is drawn men cease to reason, and blows must follow, but delay cools the passion and usually ends in peace." His policy was not understood by the public. Had it been pursued the South could never have made common cause against the North, nor would general secessions or war have followed. It is convenient for those whose acts will not bear the test of strict scrutiny to attempt to turn attention from themselves by charges of wrong against others, and especially when so situated that their defence cannot reach the common ear. Mr. Buchanan's real record, in relation to secession and the war, challenges scrutiny, and when honestly and thoroughly made will prove him a wise and safe counsellor.

The charge often made, and as often denied, that he permitted Mr. Toucey, as Secretary of the Navy, so to dispose of our naval vessels as to enable the rebels to profit by it, has been disproved by the oath of Mr. Toucey before a Republican committee of the Senate, and the charge abandoned as a slander.

Massachusetts spoke the then common voice, on the 18th of January, 1861, when the Senate of that State passed a series of resolves by a unanimous vote, which were soon after concurred in by the House, of which the following is one:

"Resolved, That the Legislature of Massachusetts, now, as always, convinced of the inestimable value of the Union, and the necessity of preserving its blessings to ourselves and our posterity, regard with unmingled satisfaction the determination evinced in the recent firm and patriotic special message of the President of the United States [Mr. Buchanan] to amply and ably discharge his constitutional duty of enforcing the laws and preserving the integrity of the Union, and we proffer to him, through the Governor of the Commonwealth, such aid in men and in money

as he may require to maintain the authority of the General Government.*

During Mr. Buchanan's administration, Colorado, Nevada, and Dakota, were organized as Territories. Other measures of an important character were adopted, but we have not space to enumerate them. It has been our purpose, as far as our space would permit, to do Mr. Buchanan justice. The general publications of the day have not done this, if it were even their intention to do His own political friends have not fully understood his acts or policy, and have too readily assented to the assumptions of his political enemies. In our judgment his name will occupy a high place in the history of our country.

100.-THE TYRANNY OF MAJORITIES IN CONGRESS.

The two Houses of Congress were established by the Constitution as deliberative bodies to discuss, deliberate, and determine questions involving the interests of the American people under that instrument. The right to assemble in public meetings, and to petition for the redress of grievances, was provided by an amendment of the Constitution, substantially agreed upon before this great charter was assented to. The freedom of speech and of the press, contained in it, had a like origin. The honor of the nation requires that every question involving the powers and duties of the Government and the rights of the people, should be open to free discussion in Congress, where they are acted upon. Every question has two sides, a strong and a weak one, which are only ascertained by free discussion and an honest and fair interchange of opinions, and the reasons upon which they are founded. It never entered the mind of the framers of the Constitution, that a bill could be presented to Congress and, without discussion, forced to a vote, without any consideration whatever. Such a course is in violation of the implied, if not express, privileges of legislative bodies, and of the rights of their constituents. We remember, when dis

* This important fact we take from the volume of the Hon. George Lunt, entitled "The Origin of the Late War." We are largely indebted to this book for many important facts, and consider it one of the most reliable works on that subject, and hope it may find a place in every household.