victory, won where there was neither battle nor contest, is usually ruinous to the victor by the consequence it entails. The contest of 1824 was sufficiently terrible to make up for the absence of any in 1820. The people gave neither candidate a majority. Jackson had 99, Adams 84, Crawford 41, and Clay 37 votes. The House of Representatives, voting by States, elected from the three who had the most votes. Instead of devoting themselves to the business of legislation, the attention of members seemed mostly engrossed in President-making. Bargains and corruptions were freely charged upon each, and, whether true or not, the reputation of that Congress, at home and abroad, suffered much from the election in the House. It is understood that, before his death, Mr. Monroe arrived at the conclusion that, if it were possible, it would not be best to try to banish political parties from among us.

58. THE NEW YORK STATE CONSTITUTIONS OF 1821 AND 1846.

New York formed her first constitution the year after the Declaration of Independence. It prescribed a property qualification for those voting for Governor and Senators. All appointments, down to the county magistrates, were made by the Governor. The Governor, Chancellor, and Judges of the Supreme Court constituted a Council of Revision, holding the veto-power. There was also a Council of Appointment, consisting of one Senator from each of the Senate districts, to be selected by the Assembly annually. Thus all power was concentrated in a few hands at the State capital. The Democracy of the State considered these and some other provisions as anti-Democratic, and wished them changed. The Federalists were decidedly opposed to it, and resorted to various efforts to prevent the call of a convention. When the law authorizing it had passed, notwithstanding the recent lull in politics, the Federalists threw into the convention as many of their ablest partisans as they could elect, but failed in commanding a majority of the delegates. The convention was the great battle-ground for the ascendency of political principles. Columbia County, where Mr. Van Buren resided, was then anti-Democratic. To secure the ser

ices of this popular Democratic leader, Otsego County elected him one of her five delegates. The best talent in the State was found in this convention. Governor Tompkins was made president of it.

The anti-Democrats, though not seriously objecting to some modifications of the old constitution, were unwilling to submit to the radical changes proposed by the Democrats. They were satisfied with the arrangement of the courts, the appointing power, and the restricted elective franchise. The Democrats were not satisfied with either. Under the old system, the judges of the Supreme Court, generally twice a year, visited every county in the State, to hold Circuit and Oyer and Terminer Courts. They formed the acquaintance of the bar, sheriffs, clerks, local judges, and leading men, and especially of their own party, and became their organ, with the appointing power at the capital. This made them, in fact, the agents of their party in political matters. Their influence was potent both at Albany and in the counties. The appointing power owed no responsibility to the voters. Removals and appointments sometimes so surprised the people, that they often imputed bad motives to men in high places, and stigmatized their acts as "political jugglery." They could not well fathom the motives of the actors, and, where they could not understand them, they were more apt to condemn than approve. They could not comprehend why the owner of real estate was more competent or better entitled to vote for Governor and Senator than one of equal intelligence who had none.

The Democrats set themselves to work to get rid of these objectionable features, and substitute others which should bring home to the people the business of self-government. The old judicial system was mainly swept away, and a new one instituted, providing a Court of Chancery, to be held at the capital, a Supreme Court to perform only duties in bank, and eight circuit judges to hold courts to try issues of fact in the counties, and who were also to act as vice-chancellors in their districts. This rendered the judges politically powerless. It left no cords binding the judges and the county politicians together. The council of appointment was stricken down, and the judges, masters in

chancery, surrogates, and some other minor officers were to be appointed by the Governor, with the consent of the Senate. Sheriffs were made elective, and clerks and district attorneys were appointed by the courts. The justices of the peace were first di rected to be appointed by the Board of Supervisors, but subsequently made elective by the towns. The freehold qualification was abolished, so that every man could participate in practical self-government. Militia officers were made elective, the company officers by the privates, and all above, by commissioned officers, and the State officers by the Legislature. The seat of political power was changed from the State capital to the counties. The masses became more powerful and were felt in the affairs of state. Formerly, if they had wishes upon political subjects, they could not make themselves heard, to any considerable extent, but now they can command attention and force respect from political leaders. Formerly the question was, "What will the political manager say?" now, "What will the people say?" In practice, we began to carry out self-government. The battle was long, and every inch of ground closely contested, but the victory was won. The work so well begun in 1821 was extended in 1846, so that nearly every officer in the State is made elective by immediate constituents. Every school district, town, county, Assembly, Senate, and Supreme Court district, transacts its own business, appointing its own agents. The Governor, Lieutenant-Governor, State officers, Canal Commissioners, and Judges of the Court of Appeals-all are elective by the common voters. The people, in their sovereign capacity of electors, in nearly all their business, nominate and elect their own agents, and hold them accountable for their trust. If they are indifferent, or unwise, and select weak, incompetent, or dishonest agents, the punishment falls upon them alone. They have no one to complain of. The man who thinks he can select one agent that will be more wise and honest than himself in appointing another, pays himself a poor compliment. This theory was incorporated into the national Constitution, in appointing electors of President and Vice-President, but has not once been practically carried out. Those selecting the electors have, in all cases, done so with a full understanding as to who they would

vote for. An elector of President who should cheat the people in giving his vote, would soon be politically crucified.

It has been made a question whether an elective judiciary is as safe and appropriate as one appointed by an Executive, with the consent of one branch of the Legislature. It is feared that it will assume a partisan character, and make bad decisions, to secure reëlection. A man of only small common-sense, seeking a reëlection, would prefer to go before the people upon his good rather than his bad decisions. The judiciary, who make their decisions, after argument, before the assembled public, and assign their reasons for them, are not likely knowingly to make bad ones to be discussed at an election, or otherwise. If they do so, the remedy is with the voters. Whoever expects that Governors, who are elected as partisans, and are sustained by party, will nominate for judicial office men who are not distinguished by their party position, and who are without party feelings, may read his disappointment in the history of the past. A Governor who would not reward his friends, would soon be without friends to sustain him. All men are partisans, though in different ways and degrees. Recent history teaches us, that diamonds, and other presents, have exerted an influence in relation to high appointments. One seeks place, another profit, and another power and notoriety. Even the venerated Marshall was an ardent partisan. Not a judge on the United States Supreme Court bench, from the gentle, firm, and honest Jay to Chief-Justice Chase-a recognized candidate for the presidency—has been appointed who was not, at the time, an ardent partisan. The blood of some, like Samuel Chase, boiled on the bench. Why not elect expounders of the law, as well as those who make and execute them? It is the plainer and simpler duty. Men without partisan feeling cannot be found, at least with brains enough to distinguish between right and wrong. Few are so debased as to manifest such feelings when holding the scales of justice between man and man. Men are the same whether appointed or elected. They have their passions and weaknesses, which they cannot always control. Of all the judges in our country who have been impeached, not one had been elected by the people. We prefer the broadest possible use of the elective principle, be

cause it is the broadest self-government-because it comes home to the people for their decision, which they are competent to make.

Once a year the people cast about to see what agents they have to select-they nominate-warm up-talk loud, and compare the merits of candidates-and then vote. The election being over, the warmed-up feelings subside, and the voter falls into his accustomed track. He has had his say, whether successful or not, and is bound to be content. If successful, he is satisfied; but if beaten, he counts upon doing better next time. In a week after election all excitement passes away; and the people, proud in the protection which our institutions afford them, move on, seeking to be as happy as the condition of man will permit. Such is the effect of the free play of democratic principles. If unfortunate consequences ever result by following them, they will not be traceable to them, but to the imperfection of man and the infirmity of human nature itself.

59. THE NEW YORK ELECTORAL LAW, 1824.

The national Constitution left it open to the States to select their own mode of designating presidential electors. Most of the States, and New York among them, had confided this duty to the State Legislature. William H. Crawford, of Georgia, then Secretary of the Treasury, had been nominated, like Jefferson, Madison, and Monroe, by a caucus of Democratic members of Congress. This nomination was treated as binding upon the Democratic members in the New York Legislature, and if so, electors favorable to Mr. Crawford would be appointed, at its meeting. This was expected of them by those who elected them. Clay, Adams, Jackson, and Calhoun were also candidates, variously brought before the public, though the last was early settled upon as a common candidate for the vice-presidency. General Jackson had little strength in New York. The only hope on the part of Clay's and Adams's friends was based upon an expected change of the old law which had existed since 1789. They went before the people, and aroused a warm feeling on the part of all opposed to Crawford, and a change in the electoral law was demanded of the