MR. EVERETT TO FRANCE AND ENGLAND. 271 was presented, on the 23d of April, | of Texas; as to which, Mr. Everettto Mr. Webster, then our Secretary overdoing his part, as is natural in a of State, and by him courteously Federalist turned fillibuster-volunacknowledged, six days later, in a teers the wholly gratuitous assertion note which, though not without that "there never was an extension demur, expressed the acquiescence of territory more naturally or justifiof our Government in the general ably made." Ignoring the fact that views expressed by France and Eng- Great Britain has still possessions in land with reference to Cuba, and this hemisphere nearly, if not quite, gave assurances that, "The Presi- equal in extent to those of our own dent will take M. de Sartiges' com- country, and that her important munication into consideration, and island of Jamaica is quite as near give it his best reflections." to Cuba as is any portion of our Southern coast, Mr. Everett says: "The President does not covet the acquisition of Cuba for the United States; at the same time, he considers the acquisition of Cuba as mainly an American question. The proposed convention proceeds on a United States have no other or greater different principle. It assumes that the interest in the question than France or England; whereas, it is necessary only to cast one's eye on the map to see how remote are the relations of Europe, and how intimate those of the United States, with this island." Mr. Webster being dead" and Mr. Everett duly installed as his successor, the latter answered 16 a note of M. de Sartiges, recalling Mr. Webster's attention to this subject, under date of July 8th. In this answer, our Government peremptorily declines, for various and elaborately stated reasons, any such convention or compact as that proposed to it by France and England. While still disclaiming, pro forma, any desire If three strong men were traversor intention on our part of acquiring a desert in company with a ing Cuba, this document affords the fourth rich, but weak, companion, strongest evidence of a contrary dis- and two of them should propose to position. It assumes that the Sen- the other a mutual stipulation not to ate would inevitably refuse its asrob or otherwise abuse their weak sent to the treaty proposed, and brother, it could hardly fail to astonadds: “its certain rejection by that ish them to hear their proposition body would leave the question of declined, as contemplating an Cuba in a more unsettled position tangling alliance”—a perplexing and than it is now." It doubts the con- troublesome undertaking, whereof stitutional power "to impose a per- no one could fully calculate the scope manent disability on the American and ultimate consequences. Yet Mr. Government for all coming time." Everett sees fit to say that It parades, with significant emphasis, the repeated and important acquisitions of territory by our Government, through the purchase of Louisiana in 1803, and of Florida in 1819, as also through the annexation 15 Oct. 24th, 1852. en "There is another strong objection to est traditions of the Federal Government is the proposed agreement. Among the oldan aversion to political alliances with European powers. In his memorable Farewell great rule of conduct for us in regard Address, President Washington says: "The to foreign nations is, in extending our com 16 December 1, 1852. pro mercial relations, to have with them as little political connection as possible. So far as we have already formed engagements, let them be fulfilled with perfect good faith. Here let us stop.' President Jefferson, in his Inaugural Address in 1801, warned the country against entangling alliances.' This expression, now become verbial, was unquestionably used by Mr. Jefferson in reference to the alliance with France of 1778—an alliance, at the time, of incalculable benefit to the United States; but which, in less than twenty years, came near involving us in the wars of the French Revolution, and laid the foundation of heavy claims upon Congress, not extinguished to the present day. It is a significant coincidence, that the particular provision of the alliance which occasioned these evils was that under which France called upon us to aid her in defending her West Indian possessions against England. Nothing less than the unbounded influence of Washington rescued the Union from the perils of that crisis, and preserved our neutrality." Mr. Everett proceeds: "But the President has a graver objection to entering into the proposed convention. He has no wish to disguise the feeling that the compact, although equal in its terms, would be very unequal in substance. France and England, by entering into it, would disable themselves from obtaining possession of an island remote from their seats of government, belonging to another European power, whose natural right to possess it must always be as good as their own-a distant island in another hemisphere, and one which, by no ordinary or peaceful course of things, could ever belong to either of them. *** The United States, on the other hand, would, by the proposed convention, disable themselves from making an acquisition which might take place without any disturbance of existing foreign relations, and in the natural order of things. The island of Cuba lies at our doors. It commands the approach to the Gulf of Mexico, which washes the shores of five of our States. It bars the entrance of that great river which drains half the North American continent, and with its tributaries forms the largest system of in ternal water communication in the world. It keeps watch at the doorway of our intercourse with California by the Isthmus route. If an island like Cuba, belonging to the Spanish crown, guarded the entrance of the Thames and the Seine, and the United States should propose a convention like this to France and England, those powers would assuredly feel that the disability assumed by ourselves was far less serious than that which we asked them to assume." Mr. Everett, having thus, in effect, apprised the civilized world that the acquisition of Cuba is essential to our independence, and that we shall proceed in our own time to appropriate it, turns to give our slaveholders a meaning hint that they must not be too eager in the pursuit, or they will overreach themselves. He says: "The opinions of American statesmen, at different times, and under varying circumstances, have differed as to the desirableness of the acquisition of Cuba by the United States. Territorially and commercially, it would, in our hands, be an extremely valuable possession. Under certain contingencies, it might be almost essential to our safety. Still, for domestic reasons, on which, in a communication of this kind, it might not be proper to dwell, the President thinks that the incorporation of the island into the Union at the present time, although effected with the consent of Spain, would be a hazardous measure; and he would consider its acquisition by force, except in a just war deprecated take place), as a disgrace to the with Spain (should an event so greatly to be civilization of the age. In another place, he gives them another intimation of the solicitude with which our Government watches and wards against any subversion of Slavery in Cuba; saying: "Even now, the President cannot doubt that both France and England would prefer any change in the condition of Cuba to that which is most to be apprehended, viz.: an internal convulsion which should renew the horrors and the fate of San Domingo " But Cuba, it seems, is not merely a slaveholding, but a slave-trading dependency, which affords still another reason why Spain should lose and we gain it. Says Mr. Everett: "I will intimate a final objection to the proposed convention. M. de Turgot and Lord Malmesbury put forward, as the reason for entering into such a compact, the attacks which have lately been made on the island of Cuba by lawless bands of adventurers from the United States, with the avowed design of taking possession of that THE OSTEND MEETING AND CIRCULAR. island.' The President is convinced that the conclusion of such a treaty, instead of putting a stop to these lawless proceedings, would give a new and powerful impetus to them. It would strike a death-blow to the conservative policy hitherto pursued in this country toward Cuba. No administration of this Government, however strong in the public confidence in other respects, could stand a day under the odium of having stip ulated with the Great Powers of Europe, that, in no future time, under no change of circumstances, by no amicable arrangement with Spain, by no act of lawful war (should that calamity unfortunately occur), by no consent of the inhabitants, should they, like the possessions of Spain on the American continent, succeed in rendering themselves independent; in fine, by no overruling necessity of self-preservation, should the United States ever make the acquisition of Cuba." 273 James Buchanan, John Y. Mason, and Pierre Soulé, our Embassadors at London, Paris, and Madrid respectively, to convene in some European city, there to confer with regard to the best means of getting possession of Cuba. They met accordingly at Ostend," and sat three days; adjourning thence to Aix-la-Chapelle, where they held sweet council together for several days more, and the result of their deliberations was transmitted to our Government in a dispatch known as the 'Ostend Manifesto.' In that dispatch, they say: "We firmly believe that, in the course of human events, the time has arrived when the vital interests of Spain are as seriously involved in the sale, as those of the United States in the purchase, of the island, and that the transaction will prove equally honorable to both nations. After all this, and much more of the same purport, a smile must have irradiated the countenance of even the most impassive European diplomatist on reading the concluding paragraph of Mr. Everett's dispatch, the malign influence of foreign powers, who viz.: "For these reasons, which the President has thought advisable, considering the importance of the subject, to direct me to unfold at some length, he feels constrained to decline respectfully the invitation of France and England to become parties to the proposed convention. He is persuaded that these friendly powers will not attribute this refusal to any insensibility on his part to the advantages of the utmost harmony between the great maritime States on a subject of such importance. As little will Spain draw any unfavorable inference from this refusal; the rather, as the emphatic disclaimer of any designs against Cuba on the part of this Government, contained in the present note, affords all the assurance which the President can constitutionally, or to any useful purpose, give, of a practical concurrence with France and England in the wish not to disturb the possession of that island by Spain." Soon after the passage of the Nebraska bill, President Pierce, through a dispatch from Gov. Marcy as Secretary of State," directed Messrs. 17 Dated Washington, August 16, 1854. "Under these circumstances, we cannot anticipate a failure, unless, possibly, through possess no right whatever to interfere in the matter. "We proceed to state some of the reasons which have brought us to this conclusion; and, for the sake of clearness, we shall specify them under two distinct heads: "1. The United States ought, if practicable, to purchase Cuba with as little delay as possible. "2. The probability is great that the Government and Cortes of Spain will prove willing to sell it; because this would essentially promote the highest and best interests of the Spanish people. 'Then, 1. It must be clear to every reflecting mind that, from the peculiarity of its geographical position, and the considerations attendant on it, Cuba is as necessary to the North American republic as any of its present members, and that it belongs naturally to that great family of States of which the Union is the providential nursery. "From its locality, it commands the mouth of the Mississippi, and the immense and annually increasing trade which must seek this avenue to the ocean. "On the numerous navigable streams, measuring an aggregate course of some thirty thousand miles, which disembogue themselves through this magnificent river 18 October 9, 1854. into the Gulf of Mexico, the increase of the population within the last ten years amounts to more than that of the entire Union at the time Louisiana was annexed to it. States will not be warmly enlisted in favor of their oppressed neighbors. "We know that the President is justly inflexible in his determination to execute "The natural and main outlet to the the neutrality laws; but, should the Cubans products of this entire population, the high- themselves rise in revolt against the oppresway of their direct water-course with the sion which they suffer, no human power Atlantic and the Pacific States, can never be could prevent citizens of the United States, secure, but must ever be endangered, whilst and liberal-minded men of other countries, Cuba is a dependency of a distant power, in from rushing to their assistance. Besides, whose possession it has proved to be a the present is an age of adventure, in which source of constant annoyance and embar-restless and daring spirits abound in every rassment to their interests. Indeed, the Union can never enjoy repose, nor possess reliable security, as long as Cuba is not embraced within its boundaries." These arguments for the necessity of acquiring Cuba on our part, though not so strong intrinsically as might be adduced to justify the acquisition of Great Britain by France, are still further amplified; intermingled with demonstrations that Spain would be, pecuniarily, the gainer by the sale, and insults which would seem offered on purpose to render her compliance impossible. impossible. Witness these specimens: "Such is her present wretched financial condition, that her best bonds are sold upon her own Bourse at about one-third of their par value; whilst another class, on which she pays no interest, have but a nominal value, and are quoted at about one-sixth the amount for which they were issued. Besides, these latter are held principally by British creditors, who may, from day to day, obtain the effective interposition of their own Government for the purpose of coercing payment. Intimations to that effect have been already thrown out from high quarters; and, unless some new source of revenue shall enable Spain to provide for such exigencies, it is not improbable that they may be realized. "Extreme oppression, it is now universally admitted, justifies any people in endeavoring to relieve themselves from the yoke of their oppressors. The sufferings which the corrupt, arbitrary, and unrelenting local administration necessarily entails upon the inhabitants of Cuba, cannot fail to stimulate and keep alive that spirit of resistance and revolution against Spain, which has of late years been so often manifested. In this condition of affairs, it is vain to expect that the sympathies of the people of the United portion of the world. "It is not improbable, therefore, that Cuba may be wrested from Spain by a successful revolution: and, in that event, she will lose both the island and the price which beyond what was ever paid by one people to we are now willing to pay for it-a price far another for any province. Finally, Spain is frankly told by our model diplomatists that we will have Cuba at any rate; that resistance on her part will only serve to deprive her of the liberal bonus we are prepared to pay for its peaceful cession. Here is the language: "But if Spain, dead to the voice of her own interest, and actuated by stubborn pride and a false sense of honor, should refuse to sell Cuba to the United States, then the question will arise, What ought to be the course of the American Government under such circumstances? Self-preservation is the first law of nature, with States as well as with individuals. All nations have, at different periods, acted upon this maxim. Although it has been made the pretext for committing flagrant injustice, as in the partition of Poland and other similar cases which history records, yet the principle itself, though often abused, has always been recognized. After we shall have offered Spain a price for Cuba far beyond its present value, and this shall have been refused, then it will be time to consider the question, Does Cuba, in the possession of Spain, seriously endanger our internal peace and the existence of our cherished Union? * * * * "Should this question be answered in the affirmative, then, by every law, human and divine, we shall be justified in wresting from Spain, if we possess the power: and this upon the very same principle that would justify an individual in tearing down the burning house of his neighbor if there was no other means of preventing the flames from destroying his own home. "Under such circumstances, we ought THE OSTEND CIRCULAR IN EUROPE. We "We fear that the course and current of events are rapidly tending toward such a catastrophe. We, however, hope for the best, though we ought certainly to be prepared for the worst.' 275 neither to count the cost nor regard the odds | But, though the exactions of morality which Spain might enlist against us. forbear to enter into the question whether are often disregarded by monarchs the present condition of the island would and cabinets in our day, the requirejustify such a measure. We should, how-ments of decorum are very rarely deever, be recreant to our duty, be unworthy of our gallant forefathers, and commit base fied and derided by any power north treason against our posterity, should we of the Mediterranean; and the blackpermit Cuba to be Africanized and become est political crimes of the present age a second St. Domingo, with all its attendant horrors to the white race, and suffer the have usually been perpetrated in the flames to extend to our own neighboring abused names of Order, of Legitimashores, seriously to endanger, or actually to cy, and of Religion. That the Uniconsume, the fair fabric of our Union. ted States should covet Cuba, and seek by any means to acquire it, did not severely shock Europe's sense of decency; that we should openly, boldly, set forth such justifications of our lust, clearly did. The coarseness, the effrontery, and the shamelessness of the Ostend Manifesto seemed to carry the world back to the days of Attila or Genghis Khan, and to threaten the centers of civilization and refinement, the trophies of art and the accumulations of wealth, with a new irruption of barbarians from the remote, forbidding West. No other document that ever emanated from our Government was so well calculated to deepen and diffuse the distrust and apprehension wherewith the growth and power of our country had already come to be regarded by the more polite, intelligent, and influential classes of the Old World. When this dispatch was made public in Europe through the newspapers, the first sensation created by it was one of stubborn incredulity. The journal which contained it having a far higher reputation for enterprise than for accuracy, our minister at one of the minor courts did not hesitate at once to assure the diplomatic circle that it was a transparent and unquestionable hoax; and such it was quite commonly adjudged until later advices had left no room for doubt. The civilized world, unhappily, was not now for the first time to make the acquaintance of the rule of the strongest. The partition of Poland, Napoleon's perfidious clutch of Spain and her royal Bourbons, with a portion of the doings of the triumphant despots who resettled Europe by dividing it among themselves at the Congress of Vienna in 1815, and several less conspicuous examples, had already guarded the intelligent classes against the delusion that, in Christendom any more than out of it, temptations to gigantic robbery will be uniformly resisted even by nations and their rulers-that rapacity ever needs any other excuse than the proximity and defenselessness of its prey. The doctrines of this Manifesto were in no respect disavowed, modified, or explained, by our Government. None of our citizens who had openly, notoriously contributed to fit out and man the Lopez expedition were brought to justice, or exposed to any punishment whatever. While strenuous efforts were made to procure the pardon and release of such Americans as had been captured while participating in that ill-fated adventure, evidence was |