and men into Docks to watch Nashville, and also pointed out that a boat, apparently armed, from the Tuscarora, had been observed pulling in and out of the Docks without landing during the night. Captain Craven gave assurance that this would not be repeated. "January 13.-Tuscarora left anchorage at 4 A.M., and proceeded to anchor one mile west of Calshot light-ship. Returned at 4 P.M. to former anchorage at entrance of Itchen river. "January 15.-Tuscarora at 2 P.M. weighed, and passed Calshot. "January 16.-At 2 P.M. returned to original anchorage. "January 20.-At 8 P.M. proceeded down Southampton Water, and anchored outside Calshot Castle. “January 22.—At 10 A.M. returned to anchorage at mouth of Itchen river. "January 25.-Captain Patey reported Nashville coaled, and necessary repairs completed, and Tuscarora ready for sea; also that, in conversation with him, Captain Craven, of Tuscarora, had avowed that he would do his utmost to render rule as to twenty-four hours' start null and void, by constantly keeping up steam, and having slips on her cable, so that the moment Nashville might move Tuscarora would precede her, and claim priority of sailing, returning again within twenty-four hours, and so actually blockading Nashville in a neutral port. "January 26.-Under instructions Captain Patey obtained written promises from Captains of Tuscarora and Nashville not to leave their then positions without giving twenty-four hours' notice. "January 27.—In order to prevent any hostile proceedings between the two vessels in British waters, a messenger was despatched in the morning to Southampton with instructions to Captain Patey to require Nashville to depart by 12 o'clock at noon on Tuesday, the 28th of January, and Tuscarora on following day at same hour; but at 1 P.M., and before receiving these last-mentioned instructions, Captain Patey telegraphed that Captain of Tuscarora had notified to him that that ship would put to sea on the following day, namely, on the 28th January, at 11 A.M. To this telegram an answer was at once sent that Tuscarora was accordingly to be allowed to proceed first; and, under the circumstances, Captain Patey did not think it necessary to acquaint the Captain of Tuscarora of the orders he (Captain Patey) received subsequently (on the afternoon of the 27th), requiring the ship to quit Southampton. 66 January 28.-Captain of Tuscarora reported by letter to Captain Patey that he should defer departure, in consequence of inclemency of weather, until 29th, or first fine day. Captain Patey, in answer, told Captain Craven that he saw nothing in the state of the weather to prevent Tuscarora proceeding, and requested she would lose no time in doing so, observing that, having received from Captain Craven a written notification of his intention to proceed on the 27th, at 11 A.M., he (Captain Patey) had not deemed it necessary to convey Chap. XI. Chap. XI. to Captain Craven the instructions he had received for Tuscarora to leave Southampton at noon on the 28th. "January 28.-Captain Patey directed by telegraph not to take any steps, at present, to compel Tuscarora's departure. "January 29.-At 8:10 A.M. Tuscarora proceeded down Southampton Water. "January 30.- Captain Patey, by telegraph, reports Tuscarora at 2 P.M., remains in Yarmouth Roads, and he asks for instructions as to Nashville's departure. Informed, in reply, that the time of Nashville's departure will date from hour Tuscarora shall really go to sea, in accordance with notice. Captain Patey's letter of the 25th January, referred to in the foregoing Memorandum, was as follows: Captain Patey to the Secretary to the Admiralty. (Extract.) "The Nashville's necessary defects have been made good, and she has been coaled; and, judging from the frequent movements of the Tuscarora up and down the Southampton Water, including one trip through the Needles and round the Isle of Wight, that that ship is in all respects ready for sea, I am induced to bring this matter under the notice of their Lordships, because it appears to me from the course pursued, and avowedly so made known to me by the Captain of the Tuscarora in a conversation which I have had with that officer, he will do his utmost to render the rule of twenty-four hours' start which the Nashville may be inclined to take advantage of, null and void, by constantly keeping up his steam, and having slips on his cable, so that the moment Nashville moves Tuscarora will precede her, and at once claim priority of sailing, returning to this port again within the lapse of twenty-four hours; it hence follows that Nashville is closely blockaded in a neutral port, and this is, without doubt, the special object of the Tuscarora's visit to Southampton. "I would also beg to point out to their Lordships the possibility of the Tuscarora and Nashville coming into collision in a narrow channel and at night, and the probability of Tuscarora, supposing that the other ship had purposely run into her, opening fire on her, and hence bringing on a grave difficulty in the matter. Under all the circumstances of this peculiar case, I think it my duty to make this communication to their Lordships, that they may take such steps as may by them be deemed necessary, respectfully submitting that the Commanders of the Tuscarora and Nashville respectively should be Chap. XI. called upon to give me a written notice of the date and hour they intend to proceed to sea, and that having received such notice from either one, the other should be immediately notified of the fact, and that he would not be allowed to follow until twenty-four hours had elapsed." The rule that, when hostile ships meet in a neutral harbour, the local authority may prevent one from sailing simultaneously with or immediately after the other, even though they may have entered without previous notice that such a prohibition would be enforced, will not be found in all books on International Law. The recorded cases in which it has been appealed to are not numerous, though they extend over a considerable period of time. It is, however, a convenient and reasonable rule; it has gained, I think, sufficient foundation in usage; and the interval of twenty-four hours, adopted during the last century in a few Treaties and in some Marine Ordinances, has been commonly accepted as a reasonable and convenient interval, though it may perhaps be questioned whether a steamer, which can always in a very few hours gain an offing that puts her beyond the reach of pursuit, requires for her protection so long a period as was formerly thought necessary for sailing ships. There are, however, difficulties in applying the rule, which are well exemplified in the case of the Tuscarora and Nashville. Where there is a considerable disparity of force, it is the interest of the weaker party to get the start of his enemy; whilst the latter will, if he be able, prevent this-will take what advantage he can of uncertain weather—and, if he goes first to sea, will linger in the offing. The neutral authority should be firm in detecting all manœuvres, within the local limit of its jurisdiction, to frustrate or elude the rule. The vessel which first came in should be permitted, and may be required, to sail first, if ready for sea; if not ready, she should not be suffered to delay the T Chap. XI. departure of her adversary; notice of an intention to sail should be reasonable in point of time, and punctually adhered to; and the right of priority should be lost by failure to depart at the expiration of the notice, as well as by a return before the end of the interval during which the other belligerent is detained in port.1 The practice of the late war has assisted to settle and confirm this salutary rule. Another course, however, 1 "Les belligérants ne doivent, ni par eux-mêmes ni par leurs corsaires, s'établir dans les mers neutres pour surveiller l'ennemi et lui courir sus. Ils ne doivent pas non plus rester en croisière dans les mers neutres pour saisir l'ennemi à sa sortie des ports neutres ou amis. Et lorsqu'ils ont été avec l'ennemi chercher asile dans un port, ils no doivent pas le poursuivre à sa sortie. On oblige généralement les corsaires à ne sortir que vingt-quatre heures après le navire qu'ils avaient poursuivi. Quant aux bâtiments de guerre, on exige seulement la parole d'honneur du commandant de ne pas donner la chasse aux bâtiments ennemis, et de ne les combattre qu'après vingt-quatre heures depuis la sortie du port."-De Pistoye et Duverdy, Traité des Prises Maritimes, vol. i, p. 108. "La priorité est très importante. En effet celui qui, étant le plus faible, désire eviter un combat a un très grand intérêt à mettre la voile vingt-quatre heures avant son adversaire, parce que cette avance lui donne la presque certitude d'échapper à l'ennemi. L'usage adopté à cet égard est que le bâtiment entré le premier a le droit de sortir également le premier. Cependant, comme le retard qu'il mettrait à effectuer son appareillage ne peut retenir son ennemi dans le port pendant un temps plus long qu'il ne veut y rester, le commandant entré le premier dans le port n'ayant exprimé aucune intention de reprendre la mer le premier, le vaisseau entré le dernier qui desire sortir doit prévenir les autorités du port vingt-quatre heures à l'avance. Celles-ci font connaître la notification au vaisseau entré le premier afin qu'il n'ait à profiter du délai et user de son droit de priorité. S'il ne le fait pas, son ennemi peut mettre à la voile pendant les vingt-quatre heures suivantes; mais s'il n'exécute pas son projet dans ce délai il est dans la nécessité de faire une nouvelle notification et d'attendre un nouveau laps de temps de vingt-quatre heures. Le délai court non du moment de la notification du commandant, mais de celui de l'appareillage réel, lorsqu'il a eu lieu immédiatement."-Hautefeuille, Droits et Devoirs des Nations Neutres, vol. i, p. 366. The discussion which arose in the case of the French ships under M. de Castillon, and the squadron under Vice-Admiral Brodrick, both anchored in the harbour of Cadiz in 1759, is stated in Ortolan, Diplomatie de la Mer, vol. ii, p. 257. has been sometimes taken. This is to exact from the Chap. XI. commanding officer of the ship which is the last to sail his word of honour that he will not give chase to or attack, within a certain time, the enemy who has preceded him. This alternative is preferred by some authorities, on the ground that it not only avoids the necessity for a delay which may be irksome and inconvenient, but is in reality more efficacious, since an officer who will certainly evade, if he can, a restriction which is forced on him will not try to evade his word of honour. The objection to it appears to lie in the difficulty of making the promise specific enough to be effectual, without fettering, more than is absolutely necessary, the belligerent's right to engage his enemy when and where he is able.1 The story of the Sumter and Iroquois, which belongs to the same same period, may be placed side by side with that of the Nashville and Tuscarora. The rule of twenty-four hours was enforced, as we have seen, on the Tuscarora; the Iroquois, as we are about to see, contrived to avoid it, but all to no purpose. The Sumter -I return once more to the career of that reckless little cruiser- reached Martinique on the 9th November. Preparing, as she then was, for a run across the Atlantic, she had pressing need of coal. The Collector at St. Pierre refused at first to permit it to be supplied; but Captain Semmes obtained a letter from the Governor, before which the scruples of the inferior official gave way. She was not yet ready for sea when the United States' steam-sloop Iroquois, a vessel superior to the 1 Hautefeuille (vol. i, p. 369) would extend the engagement to the whole subsequent voyage of the ship which sails first; but this is a restriction to which no naval officer could be reasonably asked to submit. 2 "Having observed a large supply of excellent coal in the Government dockyard as I pulled into the landing, I proposed to his Excellency that he should supply me from that source upon my paying cost and |