but as

"No official notice had been given of the blockade; the report was current, and announced in the newspapers, that two vessels of war were off the Passes, I immediately apprised the masters of the British vessels in port to lose no time in completing their cargoes, as I had been informed by Her Majesty's Minister at Washington that, after the blockade was established, the time for vessels to leave, with or without cargo, was limited to fifteen days.

"In consequence of the low stage of the water on the bar nearly thirty vessels were at this time detained, being unable to get to sea. The greater number were bound for Liverpool, and the aggregate value of their cargoes could not be less than 1,000,000l. sterling. It therefore became a matter of great importance to know the course which the blockading squadron would pursue towards those vessels, some of whom had left the port six weeks before the blockade.

"On the 1st current, I was informed that the Tow-Boat Company had that day ordered all their tow-boats to withdraw from the bar and return to the city, in consequence of apprehensions being entertained by them that their boats might be captured while engaged in tugging the vessels to sea. Although it appeared to me that their apprehensions were groundless, as the tow-boats ought to be considered in the light of neutrals and identified with the vessels that employed them, yet the Directors refused to permit their boats to resume operations at the bar until they received the assurance from the foreign Consuls that no attack should be made on their boats while engaged in the service of transporting vessels to sea.

"As no time was to be lost in endeavouring to remove this obstacle, it was resolved by myself and the Consuls of France and Spain to proceed at once to the Balize, and confer with the Commanders of the blockading vessels. Accordingly on the 2nd current we proceeded down the river in a boat, accompanied by the Consul for Bremen and one of the Managers of the Tow-Boat Company. We directed our course to the Pass à l'Outre, where the United States' steam-ship Brooklyn was at anchor, blockading that pass. Having exhibited the flags of our respective nations, we were immediately received on board, with the usual formalities. We had a long conversation with Captain Poore, who expressed a desire to take as liberal a view of his instructions as he could, consistently with the duty entrusted to him. He recommended us to visit the United States' steam-ship Powhatan stationed at the South-west Pass, about 28 miles distant. We arrived there late in the afternoon of the 3rd, and were received very courteously by Captain Porter, the Commander of the Powhatan.

"In order not to trespass on your Lordship's time, I shall merely give a résumé of the points discussed connected with the blockade, and the result of our conversation:

"1. The day on which the blockade was established had been officially announced by Captain Poore, of the Brooklyn, on the 26th

B

Chap. X.

Chap. X. of May, in a letter to Major Duncan, commanding one of the forts near the mouth of the Mississippi River. Major Duncan omitted to communicate this intelligence publicly. The time when vessels could leave was therefore limited to the 10th of June. I urged that this date should be considered as applicable to vessels clearing from the port, and that some time should be allowed for them to be towed down the river and over the bar. To this suggestion both captains gave their consent, and designated the 14th current as the final day.

"2. Regarding the immunity of tow-boats from molestation while engaged in taking vessels to sea, both captains assented to my view that they were to be regarded in the light of the sails of the vessel, or as pilots; in fact, to be treated as neutrals. The Commanders stated, however, that they were well aware that some of the old tow-boats carried guns, and had become privateers, and that to them no privileges could be accorded. In order to prevent any misunderstanding upon this point, I handed them a list of the names of the boats employed by the Association.

"3. The next and last point discussed was the position of those vessels which had been detained for several weeks by the low state of water on the bar. The Commanders of the blockading vessels stated that their instructions from the Secretary of the United States' Navy did not allow them discretion to extend the time, but under the peculiar circumstances of the case, they would take the responsibility, and give some latitude to those vessels, provided efforts were made to get them off, and no partiality was shown by the Tow-Boat Company in taking over certain vessels owned in the South.

"I have thus given to your Lordship an abstract of the conversation we had with the Commanders of the blockading vessels, who readily assented to our requests. Before we left the bar to return to the city, we had the satisfaction of knowing that all the tow-boats were ordered to resume operations. Since our arrival I have been informed that twelve vessels have been towed to sea, and I hope that very few will be detained at the bar on the 14th current. I deemed it my duty to visit the squadron, in order to prevent, as far as possible, a large amount of property belonging to British subjects from being locked up for an indefinite period, and I feel assured that your Lordship will approve of the steps which I adopted to accomplish this end."

A like permission to use tow-boats had been given at Mobile, and there, as well as at Pensacola, the British ships in port got safely to sea. Galveston, in Texas, was blockaded on the 2nd June by a single ship, the South Carolina, which afterwards armed one of her prizes and employed her as a tender.

The Sumter, as we know, ran out from the Mississippi Chap. X. on the 30th June, and Galveston was never completely closed against vessels whose light draft enabled them to take the shallower channels across the bar. But on the whole the Gulf ports appear to have been effectively blockaded from the first. It was on the east coast, stretching from the Capes of Virginia to the southernmost point of Florida, that the disproportion of the naval force employed to the work which it was supposed to be performing was at first most palpable. Up to the 8th July hardly an armed ship was to be discovered anywhere between those two points, except at Savannah and Charleston. Wilmington and Beaufort remained perfectly open. On the 13th July, however, Commodore Pendergrast issued the following notice :

"PROCLAMATION.

"U.S. Flag-ship Roanoke,' off Charleston, July 13, 1861.

"To all whom it may concern.

"I hereby call attention to the Proclamation of his Excellency Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States, under date of the 27th April, 1861, for an efficient blockade of the ports of Virginia and North Carolina, and warn all persons interested that I have a sufficient naval force here for the purpose of carrying out that Proclamation.

"All vessels entering the ports of North Carolina, or hovering about the coast of the same, will subject themselves to capture. Those coming from abroad and ignorant of the blockade will be warned off.

"All vessels bound to the Capes of Virginia will be allowed to proceed by having their papers endorsed, and will be allowed to enter any of the ports of Maryland.

"Fifteen days after this date the above Proclamation will be rigidly enforced against all vessels.

(Signed)

"G. J. PENDERGRAST, Flag-Officer,

The coast-line and ports south of the Fear River were not included in the terms of this notice; and, with the exception only of the main entrances to the harbours of Charleston and of Savannah, they continued unguarded,

Chap. X,

save by the occasional visits of ships cruising up and down.
The general features which are common to a great part
of this coast with that of North Carolina have been
already described. Of the islands on the Georgian coast
an American geographer, who wrote eighty years ago,
says:" These islands are surrounded by navigable
creeks, between which and the mainland is a large
extent of salt marsh fronting the whole State, not less
on an average than 4 or 5 miles in breadth, intersected
with creeks in various directions, admitting through the
whole an inland navigation between the islands and
mainland from the north-east to the south-east corners
of the State. The east sides of these islands are for the
most part clean, hard, sandy beaches, exposed to the wash
of the ocean.
Between these islands are the entrances
of the rivers from the interior country, winding through
the low salt marshes and delivering their waters into the
sounds, which form capacious harbours of from 3 to 8
miles over, and which communicate with each other by
parallel salt creeks." This description, which is sub-
stantially true at the present day, explains the ease with
which, notwithstanding the blockade, the coasting trade
was carried on. Sailing schooners, small steamers, and
other lesser craft ran safely through the interior waters,
stealing out into the sea when no cruiser was in sight,
and kept up frequent intercourse with the various little
havens south of the Savannah river. It explains also
the difficulty which was really experienced - though
it has sometimes been exaggerated-in enforcing the
blockade of Savannah and Charleston. To Charleston
harbour there are several entrances practicable for small
vessels drawing little water; against these the blockade
was ineffective, but it appears both there and at
Savannah to have been effective against the larger craft
which could penetrate only through the main channels.

1 The American Geography. By Jedidiah Morse. Second edition,

p. 556.

As autumn and winter drew on, the naval force at the Chap. X. disposal of the Federal Government increased rapidly, and the blockade became more stringent; but there were occasional instances of laxity.

The following despatch, addressed to Lord Lyons in February 1862, expresses the views on which the British Government had up to that time acted, and afterwards continued to act:

"My Lord,

Earl Russell to Lord Lyons.

66

Foreign Office, February 15, 1862. "Her Majesty's Government have had under their consideration the state of the blockade of the ports of Charleston and Wilmington.

"It appears from the reports received from Her Majesty's naval officers that although a sufficient blockading force is stationed off those ports, various ships have successfully eluded the blockade; a question might therefore be raised as to whether such a blockade should be considered as effective.

"Her Majesty's Government, however, are of opinion that, assuming that the blockade is duly notified, and also that a number of ships is stationed and remains at the entrance of a port, sufficient really to prevent access to it or to create an evident danger of entering or leaving it, and that these ships do not voluntarily permit ingress or egress, the fact that various ships may have successfully escaped through it (as in the particular instances here referred to) will not of itself prevent the blockade from being an effective one by international law.

"The adequacy of the force to maintain a blockade being always, and necessarily, a matter of fact and evidence, and one as to which different opinions may be entertained, a neutral State ought to exercise the greatest caution with reference to the disregard of a de facto and notified blockade; and ought not to disregard it, except when it entertains a conviction, which is shared by neutrals generally having an interest in the matter, that the power of blockade is abused by a State either unable to institute or maintain it, or unwilling, from some motive or other, to do so.

It is a settled rule of international law that blockades, to be binding, must be effective; that is, the number, strength, and disposition of the blockading force must be such that no ship can go in or out except at the risk— and that a serious and manifest risk-of capture.

The