plied, "If he takes Richmond, let him have it." He admonished the officials of the administration against too much activity and rebuked them for opposing his enemies. He made no speeches of importance during the campaign, but on several occasions addressed delegations which visited Washington, appeared at sanitary fairs for the benefit of sick soldiers, responded to serenades, and whenever custom or courtesy required him to appear in public he did so without reference to political results.

In August, 1864, the political horizon was very dark, and the President himself, who was always the most hopeful and confident of men, almost entirely lost heart. Having convinced himself that the campaign was going against him, he deliberately laid down a line of duty for himself, and at the Cabinet meeting on August 23 he requested each one of his ministers to write their names upon a folded sheet of paper in such a way that the seal could not be broken without mutilating their autographs. He made no explanation of its contents or of his reason for desiring them to attest it, but after the election it was disclosed that the mysterious paper contained a pledge from himself and his administration loyally to accept any verdict which the people of the country might pronounce upon their efforts to save the Union, and to continue their labors with zealous loyalty until relieved by their successors. The pledge closed as follows:

"This morning, as for some days past, it seems exceedingly probable that this administration will not be re-elected. Then it will be my duty to so co-operate with the President-elect as to save the Union between the election and the inauguration, as he will have secured the election on such ground that he cannot possibly save it afterwards."

V

A PRESIDENT AND HIS CABINET

LINCOLN tells us that before he left the telegraph office at Springfield on the night of the election in November, 1860, he had practically selected his Cabinet. The superintendent of the telegraph company gave him a room from which all other visitors were excluded, and, with no company but two operators, he read the reports as they came in. Between times he had plenty of opportunity for meditation, and, always confident, the returns soon convinced him of his election and his mind naturally turned upon the next important act for him to perform. "When I finally left that room," he said afterwards, “I had substantially completed the framework of my Cabinet as it now exists."

To begin with, he decided to offer posts of honor to those who had been his rivals for the Presidential nomination,-Seward, Chase, Cameron, and Bates,—and to fill the remaining places with representatives of the various elements that had combined to form the Republican party. It was to be a composite Cabinet, purely political, including no intimate friends, no personal adherents, and in the entire list there was not one with whom he ever had confidential relations. His plan seems to have been to combine, as one of his secretaries said, the experience of Seward, the integrity of Chase, the popularity of Cameron, and to hold the West with Bates, attract New England with Welles, please the Whigs through Smith, and convince the Democrats through Blair. Lincoln always had a great respect for names. No one had studied more closely the careers of American politicans, although his personal acquaintances outside of his own State were limited, and he was more familiar

with the personal qualifications and political records of the gentlemen he had chosen than were they with his. Perhaps he overestimated their ability and the value of their advice, as he was likely to do because of his own modesty and inexperience. He saw distinctly the impending crisis, and felt the need of support from leaders of experience, ability, and influence, as well as popular sympathy. But at the same time the combination he selected had in it all the seeds of disaster because of personal jealousy, previous political rivalry, and the intrigues of their henchmen. Yet by his great tact, patience, and strength of purpose he made them instruments of his will. As finally chosen, his Cabinet represented every faction of the new Republican party and the ablest representative of each division as evenly as an odd number could. When reminded that he had selected four Democrats and only three Whigs, he promptly replied that he was himself a Whig, and hoped that he should often be at Cabinet meetings to make the parties even. This was a famous jest during the early part of the administration.

Although he had decided in his own mind upon five of seven of his future advisers before the votes that elected him were counted, he treated with patience and courtesy the crowds of politicians that came from different parts of the country to advise and persuade him in the interest of their friends. He listened attentively to all that his visitors had to say and gave their suggestions careful reflection. He said to Thurlow Weed that he supposed the latter had some experience in cabinet-making, and, as he had never learned that trade himself, he was disposed to avail himself of the suggestions of friends. The making of a Cabinet, he added, was by no means as easy as he had supposed, partly, he believed, because, while the population had increased, great men were scarcer than they used to be.

He was extremely anxious to get two Southerners for

the Cabinet, as he believed that such an act might go far to reconcile the loyal people of that section to his election and establish him in their confidence, but from the beginning he saw that his hopes were not to be realized. In order to draw out public sentiment, he wrote a brief anonymous editorial for the Illinois State Journal on the subject, in which he asked whether it was known that any Southern gentlemen of character would accept such an appointment, and, if so, on what terms. would they surrender their political differences to Mr. Lincoln or Mr. Lincoln to them.

"There are men in Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, and Tennessee," said Thurlow Weed, " for whose loyalty under any circumstances and in any event I would youch."

"Let's have the names of your white blackbirds," replied Lincoln, and Weed gave him four, Mr. Seward suggested several, and Mr. Greeley suggested five. Of all the gentlemen named, Lincoln preferred John A. Gilmer, of North Carolina, with whom he had served in Congress, and who had been a prominent leader of the Whig party in that State. He invited Gilmer to Springfield, but the latter would not come, and after canvassing the various suggestions which were made him, he found that he must limit his choice to the border States, and selected Edward Bates, of Missouri, and Montgomery Blair, of Maryland.

Mr. Bates was an able lawyer and a highly respected and popular antislavery Whig from a slave State. He had been a candidate for the Presidential nomination at Chicago, and had received 48 votes out of 465 cast by delegates from Delaware, Maryland, Missouri, Texas. Oregon, Rhode Island, and Connecticut. Early in December he sent word to Mr. Bates that he would be in St. Louis the next day to consult him about matters of importance; but Mr. Bates would not permit him to make the journey, and started at once for Springfield.

They had been acquainted for several years and were very good friends, and after cordial greetings, Lincoln explained that he would like to have Mr. Bates accept the post of Attorney-General in his Cabinet, for which the latter was in every way qualified, and which he would find congenial. Mr. Bates accepted, and the next day the announcement was given to the newspapers for the purpose of quieting the demands of the conservative Republicans and antislavery Whigs in the border States for recognition.

A few days later he offered a Cabinet position to Caleb B. Smith, of Indiana, without assigning him to any particular portfolio. This was done to relieve him from the pressure that was being brought by Schuyler Colfax, whose friends were exceedingly persistent. Mr. Colfax was very much disappointed, and attributed his failure to obtain the appointment to Lincoln's resentment towards him because he had favored the re-election of Douglas to the United States Senate in 1858. Lincoln was not aware of this supposition until after he had entered upon his duties as President, when he showed his candor and good-nature by writing a friendly letter to Mr. Colfax explaining that " a tender of the appointment was not withheld in any part because of anything that happened in 1858. Indeed, I should have decided as I did, easier than I did, had that matter never existed. I had partly made up my mind in favor of Mr. Smithnot conclusively, of course-before your name was mentioned in that connection. When you were brought forward I said, 'Colfax is a young man already in a position, is running a brilliant career, and is sure of a bright future in any event. With Smith it is now or never.' I now have to beg that you will not do me the injustice to suppose for a moment that I remember anything against you in malice."

Mr. Smith did not remain in the Cabinet a great while, however. The duties of Secretary of the Interior