Public Opinion and Abortion

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the majority to continue to insist on a law
in such circumstances would mean that the
minority were compelled to a pseudo-cooperation
toward an objective they did,"
aspect of the common good.

not see as an

The reason this line of reasoning is fallacious respecting
the issue of abortion is that it disregards first, the
fundamental purpose of the community; second, the
role of legislation in influencing community values;
and third, the fact that abortion is simply unjust.

First, the American community was established, according
to our Declaration of Independence, to secure inalienable
rights, including life. Those advocating and supporting
abortion are attempting to change our country's purpose.
Why should those who maintain the founding principles
are correct, voluntarily give them up?

Second, the Law plays a significant role in educating
citizens, so the process of working for and ultimately
passing a Human Life Amendment, may well develop the
consensus referred to. What progress would have been
made respecting civil rights, ending the Vietnam War,
and providing equal opportunities, if pursuing these
goals had been delayed until majority support occured?
In each of these cases, it was precisely through the
legislative process that some consensus was developed
and ultimately, some acceptable legislation achieved.
It is not the task of a legislator in a representative
democracy to simply tally the positions of the majority,
rather to study the issues himself, weighing all the
substantive factors, and to decide in reliance (at
least in part) on his own wisdom. Although he is the
voice of his constituents, he is also their leader.
As such he is presumed more informed, if not wiser,
than the average voter.

Thirdly, the existence of substantial dissent does not
always show that enforcement of a law would be unjust.
The Civil War marked the enforcement of federal primacy
and the principle that slavery should be outlawed
against a very "substantial body of decent opinion."
The rights of slaves to liberty and the survivial of the
federal union were at stake, and these factors justified
the war in the eyes of Lincoln and those who followed
him.

Justice takes precedence over consensus, and it is unjust
for an unborn child to be denied its life. It would
remain unjust no matter how many people advocated it.
And since it is unjust, it should be vigorously opposed,
as slavery was, until it is made illegal.

Public Opinion and Abortion

Page 11

FOOTNOTES

2

Judith Blake, Population and Development Review, Vol 3,
Nos. 1&2:47-51 (March and June 1977: cpt. 1977 by The
Population Council, Inc.) Judith Blake is a professional
demographer and social scientist. She formerly was the
chairman of the Department of Demography at the
University of California, Berkeley, and is presently
Boxby Professor of Demography and Sociology at UCLA.

Gallup surveys from 1975 and 1977, Times-Union and Journal,
Jacksonville, FL, 1/28/78, p. E-5. The language in
parenthesis was either changes or added language by
Gallup for 1975, 1977, 1979 and 1980.

4

5

James J. Kilpatrick, "The Game of Polling", Washington
Star, 8/17/78.

Msgr. R. G. Peters, "A Poll Depends on the Way You Phrase
It", National Catholic Register, 10/2/77.

9

Congressional Record, 11/2/77, E 6788.

Lifeletter #7, Ad Hoc Committee in Defense of Life, 1975.

12

13

14

NC News Service, 8/16/78, p. 18.

Barry Sussman, "The Perils of Flawed Polls", Washington
Post, 1/30/77, p. C-1.

Germain Grisez, Abortion: The Myths, the Realities, and
the Arguments, (New York; Corpus Books, 1972), p. 446.
Ibid.

ROE ET AL. v. WADE, DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF
DALLAS COUNTY

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

No. 70-18. Argued December 13, 1971-Reargued October 11, 1972-Decided January 22, 1973

A pregnant single woman (Roe) brought a class action challenging the constitutionality of the Texas criminal abortion laws, which proscribe procuring or attempting an abortion except on medical advice for the purpose of saving the mother's life. A licensed physician (Hallford), who had two state abortion prosecutions pending against him, was permitted to intervene. A childless married couple (the Does), the wife not being pregnant, separately attacked the laws, basing alleged injury on the future possibilities of contraceptive failure, pregnancy, unpreparedness for parenthood, and impairment of the wife's health. A three-judge District Court, which consolidated the actions, held that Roe and Hallford, and members of their classes, had standing to sue and presented justiciable controversies. Ruling that declaratory, though not injunctive, relief was warranted, the court declared the abortion statutes void as vague and overbroadly infringing those plaintiffs' Ninth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The court ruled the Does' complaint not justiciable. Appellants directly appealed to this Court on the injunctive rulings, and appellee cross-appealed from the District Court's grant of declaratory relief to Roe and Hallford. Held:

1. While 28 U. S. C. § 1253 authorizes no direct appeal to this Court from the grant or denial of declaratory relief alone, review is not foreclosed when the case is properly before the Court on appeal from specific denial of injunctive relief and the arguments as to both injunctive and declaratory relief are necessarily identical. P. 8.

2. Roe has standing to sue: the Does and Hallford do not. Pp. 9-14.

Reproduced by the Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service on January 29, 1973...

(a) Contrary to appellee's contention, the natural termination of Roe's pregnancy did not moot her suit. Litigation involving pregnancy, which is “capable of repetition, yet evading review," is an exception to the usual federal rule that an actual controversy must exist at review stages and not simply when the action is initiated. Pp. 9-10.

(b) The District Court correctly refused injunctive, but erred in granting declaratory, relief to Hallford, who alleged no federally protected right not assertable as a defense against the good-faith state prosecutions pending against him. Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U. S. 66.

(c) The Does' complaint, based as it is on contingencies, any one or more of which may not occur, is too speculative to present an actual case or controversy. Pp. 12-14.

3. State criminal abortion laws, like those involved here, that except from criminality only a life-saving procedure on the mother's behalf without regard to the stage of her pregnancy and other interests involved violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which protects against state action the right to privacy, including a woman's qualified right to terminate her pregnancy. Though the State cannot override that right, it has legitimate interests in protecting both the pregnant woman's health and the potentiality of human life, each of which interests grows and reaches a "compelling" point at various stages of the woman's approach to term. Pp. 36-49.

(a) For the stage prior to approximately the end of the first trimester, the abortion decision and its effectuation must be left to the medical judgment of the pregnant woman's attending physician. Pp. 36-47.

(b) For the stage subsequent to approximately the end of the first trimester, the State, in promoting its interest in the health of the mother, may, if it chooses, regulate the abortion procedure in ways that are reasonably related to maternal health. Pp. 43-44.

(c) For the stage subsequent to viability the State, in promoting its interest in the potentiality of human life, may, if it chooses, regulate, and even proscribe, abortion except where necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of the mother. Pp. 44-48.

4. The State may define the term "physician" to mean only a physician currently licensed by the State, and may proscribe any

abortion by a person who is not a physician as so defined. Pp. 34-35, 48.

5. It is unnecessary to decide the injunctive relief issue since the Texas authorities will doubtless fully recognize the Court's ruling that the Texas criminal abortion statutes are unconstitutional. P. 51.

314 F. Supp. 1217, affirmed in part and reversed in part.

BLACKMUN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C. J., and DOUGLAS, BRENNAN, STEWART, MARSHALL, and POWELL, JJ., joined. BURGER, C. J., and DOUGLAS and STEWART, JJ., filed concurring opinions. WHITE, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which REHNQUIST, J., joined. REHNQUIST, J., filed a dissenting opinion.