citizens, nay, by any larger number, according to the population of the town. But, giving the objection its full force, could this circumstance make any solid objection? Are not the senators in several of the States chosen by as large a number? Have they been found more corrupt than the representatives? Is the objection supported by reason? Can it be said that five or six thousand citizens are more easily corrupted than five or six hundred?1 That the aggregate mass will be more under the influence of intrigue than a portion of it? Is the consequence deducible from the objection admissible? If it is, then we must deprive the people of all choice of their public servants, in all cases where numbers are not required.2 What, then, is to be done in those States where the governors are by the State constitution to be chosen by the people? Is the objection warranted by facts? The representation in the British house of commons (as has been already stated) very little exceeds the proportion of one for every thirty thousand inhabitants. Is it true that the house of commons have elevated themselves upon the ruin of the many? Is it true that the representatives of boroughs have been more faithful, or wise, or honest, or patriotic than those of cities and of counties? Let us come to our own country. The districts in New Hampshire, in which the senators are chosen immediately by the people, are nearly as large as will be necessary for her representatives in Congress. Those in Massachusetts come from districts having a larger population, and those in New York from districts still larger. In New York and Albany the members of assembly are elected by nearly as many voters as will be required for a member of Congress, calculating on the number of sixty-five only. In some of the counties of Pennsylvania the State representatives are elected in districts nearly as large as those required for the Federal representatives. In the city of Philadelphia (composed of sixty thousand inhabitants) every elector has a right to vote for each of the representatives in the State legislature, and actually elects a single member to the executive council. These are facts which demonstrate the fallacy of the objection, for no one will pretend that the rights and liberties of these States are not as well maintained and as well understood by their senators and representatives as those of any other States in the Union by 1 The Federalist, No. 57. 8 Id Nos. 56, 57. 2 Id. No. 57. The Federalist, No. 57. theirs. There is yet one stronger case, that of Connecticut; for there one branch of the legislature is so constituted that each member of it is elected by the whole State.1 § 668. The remaining objection was, that there was no security, that the number of members would be augmented from time to time, as the progress of the population might demand.2 § 669. It is obvious that this objection is exclusively founded upon the supposition that the people will be too corrupt, or too indifferent, to select proper representatives, or that the representatives when chosen will totally disregard the true interests of their constituents or wilfully betray them. Either supposition (if the preceding remarks are well founded) is equally inadmissible. There are, however, some additional considerations which are entitled to great weight. In the first place, it is observable that the Federal Constitution will not suffer in comparison with the State constitutions in regard to the security which is provided for a gradual augmentation of the number of representatives. In many of them the subject has been left to the discretion of the legislature, and experience has thus far demonstrated not only that the power is safely lodged, but that a gradual increase of representatives (where it could take place) has kept pace with that of the constituents. In the next place, as a new census is to take place within every successive ten years for the avowed purpose of readjusting the representation from time to time according to the national exigencies, it is no more to be imagined that Congress will abandon its proper duty in this respect than in respect to any other power confided to it. Every power may be abused, every duty may be corruptly deserted. But as the power to correct the evil will recur at least biennially to the people, it is impossible that there can long exist any public abuse or dereliction of duty, unless the people connive at and encourage the violation.* In the next place there is a peculiarity in the Federal Constitution which must favor a constitutional augmentation of the representatives. One branch of the national legislature is elected by the people, the other by the States. In the former, consequently, the large States will have more weight, in the latter the smaller States will have the advantage. From this circumstance it may 1 The Federalist, No. 57. 2 The Federalist, No. 58; 1 Elliot's Debates, 204, 224 8 The Federalist, No. 58 41 Elliot's Debates, 239. be fairly inferred that the larger States, and especially those of a growing population, will be strenuous advocates for increasing the number and weight of that part of the legislature in which their influence predominates.1 § 670. It may be said that there will be an antagonist influence in the Senate to prevent an augmentation. But, upon a close view, this objection will be found to lose most of its weight. In the first place, the House of Representatives, being a co-ordinate branch, and directly emanating from the people, and speaking the known and declared sense of the majority of the people, will, upon every question of this nature, have no small advantage as to the means of influence and resistance. In the next place, the contest will not be to be decided merely by the votes of great States and small States, opposed to each other, but by States of intermediate sizes, approaching the two extremes by gradual advances. They will naturally arrange themselves on the one side. or the other, according to circumstances; and cannot be calcu lated upon as identified permanently with either. Besides, in the new States, and those whose population is advancing, whether they are great or small, there will be a constant tendency to favor augmentations of the representatives; and, indeed, the large States may compel it by making reapportionments and augmentations mutual conditions of each other. In the third place, the House of Representatives will possess an exclusive power of proposing supplies for the support of government, or, in other words, it will hold the purse-strings of the nation. This must forever give it a powerful influence in the operations of the government, and enable it effectually to redress every serious grievance. The House of Representatives will, at all times, have as deep a concern in maintaining the interest of the people as the Senate can have in maintaining that of the States.1 § 671. Such is a brief view of the objections urged against this part of the Constitution, and of the answers given to them. Time, as has been already intimated, has already settled them by its own irresistible demonstrations. But it is impossible to withhold our tribute of admiration from those enlightened statesmen whose profound reasoning and mature wisdom enabled the people to see 1 The Federalist, No. 58; 2 Lloyd's Debates, in 1789, p. 192. 2 The Federalist, No. 58. The Federalist, No. 57; 1 Elliot's Debates, 226, 227. the true path of safety. What was then prophecy and argument has now become fact. At each successive census the number of representatives has been gradually augmented. In 1792 the ratio adopted was 33,000, which gave an aggregate of one hundred and six representatives. In 1802 the same ratio was adopted, which gave an aggregate of one hundred and forty-one members. In 1811 the ratio adopted was 35,000, which gave an aggregate of one hundred and eighty-one members. In 1822 the ratio adopted was 40,000, which gave an aggregate of two hundred and ten members. In 1832 the ratio adopted was 47,700, which gave an aggregate of two hundred and forty members.2 § 672. In the mean time the House of Representatives has silently acquired vast influence and power over public opinion by its immediate connection and sympathy with the people. No complaint has been urged, or could now with truth be urged, that it did not understand, or did not represent, the interests of the people, or bring to the public councils a competent knowledge of, and devotion to, the local interests and feelings of its constituents. Nay, so little is and so little has the force of this objection been felt, that several States have voluntarily preferred to elect their representatives by a general ticket, rather than by districts. And the electors for President and Vice-President are more frequently chosen in that than in any other manner. The representatives are not, and never have been, chosen exclusively from any high or privileged class of society. At this moment, and at all previous times, the House has been composed of men from almost every rank and class of society,- planters, farmers, manufacturers, mechanics, lawyers, physicians, and divines; the rich and the poor; the educated and the uneducated men of genius; the young and the old; the eloquent and the taciturn; the statesman of a half-century, and the aspirant just released from his academical studies. Merit of every sort has thus been able to assert its claims, and occasionally to obtain its just rewards. And if any complaint could justly be made, it would be that the choice had sometimes been directed by a spirit of intolerance, that forgot everything but its own creed; or by a spirit of party, that remembered everything but its own. duty. Such infirmities, however, are inseparable from the condi 1 Act of 1792, ch. 23; Act of 1802, ch. 1; Act of 1811, ch. 9; Act of 1822, ch. 10 1 Tuck. Black. Comm. App. 190; Rawle on Constitution, 45. 2 Act of 22d May, 1832, ch. 91. tion of human nature; and their occurrence proves nothing more than that the moral, like the physical, world is occasionally visited by a whirlwind or deluged by a storm. § 673. It remains only to take notice of two qualifications of the general principle of representation, which are ingrafted on the clause. One is, that each State shall have at least one representative; the other is that already quoted, that the number of representatives shall not exceed one for every 30,000. The former was indispensable in order to secure to each State a just representation in each branch of the legislature; which, as the powers of each branch were not exactly coextensive, and especially as the power of originating taxation was exclusively vested in the House of Representatives, was indispensable to preserve the equality of the small States, and to reconcile them to a surrender of their sov ereignty. This proviso was omitted in the first draft of the Constitution, though proposed in one of the preceding resolutions.1 But it was adopted without resistance when the draft passed under the solemn discussion of the convention.2 The other was a matter of more controversy. The original limitation proposed was 40,000; and it was not until the very last day of the session of the convention that the number was reduced to 30,000. The object of fixing some limitation was to prevent the future existence of a very numerous and unwieldy House of Representatives. The friends of a national government had no fears that the body would ever become too small for real, effective, protecting service. The danger was, that from the natural impulses of the popular will, and the desire of ambitious candidates to attain office, the number would be soon swollen to an unreasonable size, so that it would at once generate and combine factions, obstruct deliberations, and introduce and perpetuate turbulent and rash counsels.5 § 674. On this subject let the Federalist speak in its own fearless and expressive language: "In all legislative assemblies, the greater the number composing them may be, the fewer will the men be who will, in fact, direct their proceedings. In the first place, 1 Journal of Convention, 157, 158, 209, 215. 2 Journal of Convention, 8th Aug. p. 236. 8 Journal of Convention, 157, 217, 235, 352. Journal of Convention, 17th Sept. 1787, p. 389. 1 Lloyd's Debates in 1789, 427, 434; 2 Lloyd's Debates, 183, 185, 186, 188, 189, 190. 6 The same thought is expressed with still more force in the American pamphlet, entitled Thoughts upon the Political Situation of America, (Worcester, 1788,) 54. |