§ 562. In order to justify the existence of a senate with co-ordinate powers, it was said, first, that it was a misfortune incident to republican governments, though in a less degree than to other governments, that those who administer them may forget their obligations to their constituents, and prove unfaithful to their important trust. In this point of view, a senate, as a second branch of the legislative assembly, distinct from and dividing the power with a first, must be in all cases a salutary check on the government. It doubles the security to the people by requiring the concurrence of two distinct bodies in schemes of usurpation or perfidy, whereas the ambition or corruption of one would otherwise be sufficient. This precaution, it was added, was founded on such clear principles, and so well understood in the United States, that it was superfluous to enlarge on it. As the improbability of sinister combinations would be in proportion to the dissimilarity in the genius of the two bodies, it must be politic to distinguish them from each other by every circumstance which would consist with a due harmony in all proper measures, and with the genuine principles of republican government.1 § 563. Secondly. The necessity of a senate was not less indicated by the propensity of all single and numerous assemblies to yield to the impulse of sudden and violent passions, and to be seduced by factious leaders into intemperate and pernicious resolutions. Examples of this sort might be cited without number, and from proceedings in the United States as well as from the history of other nations. A body which is to correct this infirmity ought to be free from it, and consequently ought to be less numerous, and to possess a due degree of firmness, and a proper tenure of office.2 § 564. Thirdly. Another defect to be supplied by a senate lay in the want of a due acquaintance with the objects and principles of legislation. A good government implies two things, — fidelity to the objects of the government; secondly, a knowledge of the means by which those objects can be best attained. It was suggested that in the American governments too little attention had been paid to the last, and that the establishment of a senate upon a proper basis would greatly increase the chances of fidelity and 1 The Federalist, No. 62. 2 The Federalist, No. 62; Paley's Moral and Political Philosophy, B. 6, ch. 6, 7; 2 Wilson's Law Lect. 144 to 148. of wise and safe legislation. What (it was asked) are all the repealing, explaining, and amending laws, which fill and disgrace our voluminous codes, but so many monuments of deficient wisdom, so many impeachments exhibited by each succeeding against each preceding session, so many admonitions to the people of the value of those aids, which may be expected from a well-constituted senate ? 1 § 565. Fourthly. Such a body would prevent too great a mutability in the public councils, arising from a rapid succession of new members, for from a change of men there must proceed change of opinions, and from a change of opinions a change of measures. Such instability in legislation has a tendency to dimin ish respect and confidence abroad, as well as safety and prosperity at home. It has a tendency to damp the ardor of industry and enterprise, to diminish the security of property, and to impair the reverence and attachment which are indispensable to the permanence of every political institution.2 § 566. Fifthly. Another ground, illustrating the utility of a senate, was suggested to be the keeping alive of a due sense of national character. In respect to foreign nations this was of vital importance, for in our intercourse with them, if a scrupulous and uniform adherence to just principles were, not observed, it must subject us to many embarrassments and collisions. It is difficult to impress upon a single body, which is numerous and changeable, a deep sense of the value of national character. A small portion of the praise or blame of any particular measure can fall to the lot of any particular person, and the period of office is so short that little responsibility is felt, and little pride is indulged, as to the course of the government.3 § 567. Sixthly. It was urged that, paradoxical as it might seem, the want in some important cases of a due responsibility in the government arises from that very frequency of elections which in other cases produces such responsibility. In order to be reasonable, responsibility must be limited to objects within the power of the responsible party; and in order to be effectual it must relate to operations of that power, of which a ready and proper judgment can be formed by the constituents. Some measures have singly an immediate and sensible operation; others, again, depend on a succession of well-connected schemes, and have a 1 The Federalist, No. 62. 2 Id. No. 62. 8 Id. No. 63. gradual and perhaps unobserved operation. If, therefore, there be but one assembly, chosen for a short period, it will be difficult to keep up the train of proper measures, or to preserve the proper connection between the past and the future. And the more numerous the body, and the more changeable its component parts, the more difficult it will be to preserve the personal responsibility, as well as the uniform action, of the successive members to the great objects of the public welfare.1 § 568. Lastly. A senate duly constituted would not only operate as a salutary check upon the representatives, but occasionally upon the people themselves, against their own temporary delusions and errors. The cool, deliberate sense of the community ought, in all governments, and actually will in all free governments, ultimately prevail over the views of their rulers. But there are particular moments in public affairs when the people, stimulated by some irregular passion or some illicit advantage, or misled by the artful misrepresentations of interested men, may call for measures which they themselves will afterwards be the most ready to lament and condemn. In these critical moments how salutary will be the interference of a body of respectable citizens, chosen without reference to the exciting cause, to check the misguided career of public opinion, and to suspend the blow, until reason, justice, and truth can regain their authority over the public mind. It was thought to add great weight to all these considerations that history has informed us of no long-lived republic which had not a senate. Sparta, Rome, Carthage, were, in fact, the only states to whom that character can be applied. 1 The Federalist, No. 63. 2 Id. The Federalist, No. 63. There are some very striking remarks on this subject in the reasoning of the convention, in the county of Essex, called to consider the constitution proposed for Massachusetts, in 1778,* and which was finally rejected. "The legislative power," said that body, "must not be trusted with one assembly. A single assembly is frequently influenced by the vices, follies, passions, and prejudices of an individual. It is liable to be avaricious, and to exempt itself from the burdens it lays on its constituents. It is subject to ambition; and after a series of years will be prompted to vote itself perpetual. The Long Parliament in England voted itself perpetual, and thereby for a time destroyed the political liberty of the subject. Holland was governed by one representative assembly, annually elected. They afterwards voted themselves from annual to septennial, then for life; and finally exerted the power of filling up all It is contained in a pamphlet entitled "The Essex Result," and was printed in 1778. I quote the passage from Mr. Savage's valuable Exposition of the Constitution of Massachusetts, printed in the New England Magazine for March, 1832, p. 9. See also, on this subject, Paley's Moral Philosophy, B. 6, ch. 7, p. 388; The Federalist, Nos. 62, 63. § 569. It will be observed that some parts of the foregoing rea soning apply to the fundamental importance of an actual division of the legislative power, and other parts to the true principles upon which that division should be subsequently organized, in order to give full effect to the constitutional check. Some parts go to show the value of a senate, and others what should be its structure in order to insure wisdom, experience, fidelity, and dig nity in its members. All of it, however, instructs us that in order to give it fair play and influence as a co-ordinate branch of government, it ought to be less numerous, more select, and more durable than the other branch, and be chosen in a manner which should combine and represent different interests with a varied force. How far these objects are attained by the Constitution will be better seen when the details belonging to each department are successively examined. § 570. This discussion may be closed by the remark that in the Roman republic the legislative authority, in the last resort, resided for ages in two distinct political bodies, not as branches of the same legislature, but as distinct and independent legislatures, in each of which an opposite interest prevailed. In one the patrician, in the other the plebeian, predominated. And yet, during the coexistence of these two legislatures, the Roman republic attained to the supposed pinnacle of human greatness.2 vacancies, without application to their constituents. The government of Holland is now a tyranny, though a republic. The result of a single assembly will be hasty and indigested, and their judgments frequently absurd and inconsistent. There must be a second body to revise with coolness and wisdom and to control with firmness, independent upon the first, either for their creation or existence. Yet the first must retain a right to a similar revision and control over the second." 1 The Federalist, Nos. 62, 63. 2 The Federalist, No. 34. CHAPTER IX. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES. § 571. THE second section of the first article contains the structure and organization of the House of Representatives. The first clause is as follows: "The House of Representatives shall be composed of members chosen every second year by the people of the several States, and the electors in each State shall have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the State legislature." § 572. As soon as it was settled that the legislative power should be divided into two separate and distinct branches, a very important consideration arose in regard to the organization of those branches respectively. It is obvious that the organization of each is susceptible of very great diversities and modifications in respect to the principles of representation, the qualification of the electors and the elected, the term of service of the members, the ratio of representation, and the number of which the body should be composed. § 573. First, the principle of representation. The American people had long been in the enjoyment of the privilege of electing at least one branch of the legislature, and in some of the colonies. of electing all the branches composing the legislature. A house of representatives, under various denominations, such as a house of delegates, a house of commons, or simply a house of representatives, emanating directly from, and responsible to, the people, and possessing a distinct and independent legislative authority, was familiar to all the colonies, and was held by them in the highest reverence and respect. They justly thought, that as the government in general should always have a common interest with the people, and be administered for their good, so it was essential to their rights and liberties that the most numerous branch should have an immediate dependence upon, and sympathy with, the people.1 There was no novelty in this view. It was not the mere 1 The Federalist, No. 52; 1 Black. Comm. 158, 159; Paley's Moral Philosophy, B. 6, ch. 7; 1 Wilson's Law Lect. 429 to 433; 2 Wilson's Law Lect. 122 to 132. |