TO THE EDITOR OF THE ATLANTIC.

SIR: After reading in twenty-six different papers a variety of denials and criticisms by agents and officers of various steamship lines, called forth by my article in the May Atlantic, entitled 'The Man on the Bridge,' I wish to add a few facts and comments pertinent to the discussion.

Let me first attend to the statement of the agents, for they are floundering in the deeper water. To a deep-sea officer who knows his profession, their ignorance seems complete, and there is a reason for it. In ten years' experience with steamship agents, I have never known an agent to be in evidence aboard a liner except at the hours of arrival or departure. Of the normal conditions on board ship when in dock, or of the state of things at sea, he knows nothing at first hand. My article charged that liner officers were overworked. The chorus of agents stated that they were not. Specifically, Mr. Charles P. Sumner, agent for the Cunard Line, stated that the Cunard officers are on duty for four hours, and off for eight hours. He omitted, however, to state the very material fact that such heavenly watches as these are kept on Cunard steamships only when the vessels are well clear of the land, and dangers are at their minimum. The Cunard agent furthermore prudently omitted from his denial any

reference to what I said about the strain officers are subjected to when leaving dock on the morning tide before sailing-day. In my remarks, I kept well within the margin of truth, and stated times and duties which upon investigation would prove to be strictly

correct.

I regret that the Cunard agent did not see fit to enter into illuminating detail, and state that on the passenger steamers of his company only six officers are carried, against seven of the White Star Line. The public may know that many of the White Star Atlantic passenger steamers are only half the size and speed of the big Cunard fliers, and yet even these smaller steamers carry one more officer than the Cunard complement. The public, however, does not know that White Star officers do not handle mail and baggage, as is the Cunard practice. These duties are attended to by post-office officials and a baggage-master, thus relieving an officer from something like 20 hours' continuous strain when approaching the land, in addition to his bridgeduties and station-work incidental to arrivals and departures. Why, then, is the additional officer carried on White Star ships? Surely not because he is necessary. Possibly from philanthropy. Furthermore, why is the new president of the Cunard Company now making inquiry into the strain certain officers

are required to stand? Now that he has begun to take the public into his confidence, perhaps the Cunard agent would be good enough to explain all of these matters.

In my article, I stated that officers and masters were sometimes on duty for from 20 to 70 hours at a stretch. I said on duty, and not on the bridge, as some of my critics have ingenuously supposed. I stated clearly that, in addition to bridge-watches, the various unnecessary duties performed by officers at sailing-time made up the total. It was specifically of captains that I said that during fog they may sometimes have to remain on the bridge for over 70 hours. In regard to this statement, let me quote from the New York World the words of three captains interviewed by that paper on the subject of my article.

Captain Cannon of the S. S. Minnetonka stated that 'he had never heard of a captain being obliged to remain on the bridge for 30 or 40 hours at a stretch.'

Captain Wettin of the S. S. George Washington stated that 'he had often been 30 and even 40 hours on the bridge at a stretch, but was not unfit for duty.' Captain Dahl of the Friedrich der Grosse stated that 'he had been even four days on the bridge, and was alert and wide-awake all that time.'

Contrast this first statement with the second. Contrast both with the last. Remember also that liner-masters are generally past middle life. Many of them are well over sixty. Medical opinion on this point would prove valuable, both to the companies and to the public. Suppose we put the question thus:

'Is a man of about sixty years a proper person to be intrusted with the safety of some 3000 souls, after standing in foggy weather on the bridge in a watch like Captain Dahl's, - over four over four

days, — in damp foggy weather with the whistle at his ear screaming continuously?'

I notice that of the liner officers, captains alone give their views. It is a pity that subordinate officers also were not interviewed. Ask a White Star mate if his two hours on watch and four hours off allow him a healthful and continuous sleep. Ask a Cunard mate if my statements are exaggerated. Question them about leaving dock on a morning tide the day before sailing.

I do not wish to leave these charges relative to overwork without mentioning the subject of vacations. I have yet to see any officer of any English liner who was in a position to state that he ever got two weeks' consecutive leave on full pay. On shore even officeboys get their week-ends off, in addition to two weeks' leave annually; while aboard ship officers, even after being away a full year, are as often as not called down to the dock on Sunday to shift ship. Instead of leave of absence when in home port, not to speak of annually, certain officers have to keep watch on a cold ship in winter, and often for 24 hours are left absolutely without food. While superintendents, stewards, cooks, butchers, and shoreclerks, can come aboard liners when in dock, and partake of hot food, the officers in their quarters receive none. Of course, if they wish to do so, they can place themselves under an obligation to the ship's butcher or cook, but a gentleman of the service prefers to go hungry. I speak from experi

ence.

In my paper, I brought up this topic of vacation particularly with reference to the officers on the Mauretania, saying that on certain occasions they only got 24 hours' leave ashore to visit their families after a voyage. Curiously enough, the last time they were in port, they, as well as the officers of the

Lusitania, had better reliefs than have been known since either ship was put into commission. To use an Americanism, has my muckraking had anything to do with it? I am very much inclined to think so.

Veer now to log-faking and cutting corners. All the steamship agents interested, with a single honorable exception, agreed that log-book faking is impossible. One agent sagely pointed out that it is an offense punishable by law. Now, there is a brief catechism which I should like to put to these agents:

'Do you know the difference between the official log and the chief officer's log?'

'Do you know that the chief officer's log-book is never called for by the British Board of Trade except in cases of collision or stranding? Copy-logs are sent in to the companies' marine superintendent after the completion of each voyage, and these are copied from the chief officer's log by a junior officer.'

Agents who have never heard of these familiar facts will be interested to learn the difference between the official log-book and the chief officer's logbook. The official log contains entries relating to births, deaths, accidents, loggings of crew, desertion, draught, times of arrival and departure, etc. The noon position, whether by observation or dead reckoning, is never entered in the official log-book.

The chief officer's log will contain many of the above entries, and in addition the course and distance made, course and distance to steer, latitude and longitude at noon by observation and dead reckoning, revolutions of propeller, compass-course steered, wind and weather conditions, etc.

Now, if the chief officer's log stated that his ship was in latitude 42.18 N, longitude 62.52 W, on a certain day,

who is to say that the ship was not in that position, and how could any official arrive at such a conclusion? The course and distance steered from the position of the day before would place the ship exactly where the entry placed her, and no agent will, I imagine, dispute this.

The truth is that log-book faking across the Atlantic is the easiest thing in the world, and in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred, no risk is involved it only means the stating of a lie, and nothing more, claims on the underwriters seldom being made.

The faking of log-books is by no means confined to the officers of transatlantic liners. The detestable practice of many shipowners now carrying insurance, in order to have their repairs made at the expense of the underwriters, is an occurrence well recognized. Let me quote from a plain-spoken contemporary:

"There are firms known who, from one year's end to the other, hardly ever pay for the repairs due to the natural deterioration of the ships under their management, nothing being too small or too big to be entered in the log-book as due to some cause or other wherewith they can recover from the insurance; and yet a big item for repairs is usually included in each balance-sheet issued to the shareholders, and as they are audited by chartered accountants, it is only reasonable to suppose that there are vouchers to prove same.

'Now, in the majority of these cases the superintendent is an engineer, and he is responsible to the managing owner for all the repairs both to the hull and engines, and has, therefore, both the mate's and engineer's log-books at his command. After a visit down below, where the engineer points out the various repairs that are necessary, he strolls round the deck with a mate, and soon has a list of repairs that would

make a ship-repairer's mouth water. But, alas! only a few are executed. Unfortunately for the superintendent, there are some things that do not come within the scope of "engines badly strained," "bearings running hot," "condenser choked," etc. These, consequently, must be repaired and are paid for with the money received for those that are not done, but come under the comprehensive term of "insurance,"

Let me also quote a copy of log entries written out by an engineer-superintendent for a writer in the Nautical Magazine, a publication of Glasgow. The entry is written in Hamburg, and is designed to cover the facts for a fake stranding on a passage round to the Bristol Channel:-

(Date and time) Weather foggy; engines eased to half-speed and soundings taken.

Weather still foggy; stopping at frequent intervals to take soundings,

At... m. Ship took the ground heavily. At once put engines "Full astern" and kept them going astern until、、、、 when worked them “Full ahead," and then "Full astern,” working also continuously from port to starboard, and kept doing this and pump ing out water-ballast until vessel floated at... m.

While ashore something struck the propeller heavily. After floating and getting ship on her course, sounded all round and found water in all bilges on both port and starboard sides, fore and aft. Pumped this out. On passage to... found all tanks leaking badly into bilges. Steering engine working badly, being apparently strained. “

Simply tid in the blanks, mail to the underwriters agent, and there you are! Returning, however, to the imme diate question of transatlantic pass ages, I have remarked that there was

one agent who very frankly admitted that cutting corners was commonly practiced. The following is quoted verbatim from the Evening Post, New York, April 29:

"The head of another large transatlantic line, who did not wish his name to be used, remarked that it was true that some of the ocean liners took short cuts. He said that the charge had been made before, and that it had been proved in one case where a steamship company was obliged to retract the record it had given out. He also declared that it was quite possible for captains to go out of their courses without being detected, and that in so doing, they gained considerable time. They also endangered the lives of those on board.'

Just as the captains were not agreed on the question of overwork, so the agents disagreed as to short cuts. It would be well for their purpose to scan old log-books and find out for themselves how often positions by observation are entered when vessels are approaching the 'corner.' It is remarkable how much dull and cloudy weather is perpetually hanging round this corner, and how many dead-reckoning positions are entered just there, and how daily runs always seem to be a little bigger in that vicinity.

Of course the reader must remember that there is the Gulf Stream setting one north, and the engineers want colder water for their vacuum too, so a short cut helps in more ways than mileage alone.

There are two ships in the Cunard service whose passage records are interesting in this connection. They are sister ships, and between their speeds there is not 3 of a knot diference, but one habitually arrives from 20 to 24 and sometimes 30 hours ahead of the other. Now the ship which makes the quicker passage may carry more hari

coal, and she may strike better weather, but surely this disparity could not be maintained, voyage after voyage, purely through accidental causes. Tides may help one and hinder the other; stokers and engineers of one may be skilled and on the other raw, but in time these advantages would surely be equalized. The faster ship frequently docks on Wednesday afternoon, and the slower one sometimes as late as Friday morning.

Now, if it were possible, instead of following the southern track westbound, Fastnet to Sandy Hook, to follow the northern without fear of detection, thus saving 109 miles, the great divergence between the ships would cease. One meets only freighters in the northern direction at the time vessels are supposed to be on the southern track, and even they are few. If freighters chance to know of the tracks, they know nothing of when they are to be followed and by which vessels. Will not the saving of 165 miles by following the northern and westward laid track instead of the southern and eastern Boston to Fastnet - have a little to do with the great difference in the average speeds of the two vessels? There is absolutely nothing to keep any vessel from following the northern track mentioned, whether steering east or west. Admitting that the early vessel has 34 of a knot faster speed than the late vessel, her average speed will net her 133.4 miles on an eight days' passage at 14 knots per hour. This, plus 165 miles gained by shortened corners, equals 298.4 miles, which at the rate of 14 knots means 21.3 hours steaming time. Furthermore, it is possible to slice an hour's run off the northern corner, and adding it to 21.3, we have a gain of 22.3 hours, steering east, which almost amounts to a day's run. It is possible, indeed, to go still farther north by passing Sable Island to

the southward and keeping out of signal range when nearing Cape Race. If we footed up all these items, they would I fear, account for the 'milk in the cocoanut' if applied to the two vessels spoken of.

It is only fair to add that to follow the Cape Race course is dangerous on account of the greater number of icebergs met with, as well as on account of the dreaded Virgin Rocks. Suppose, however, a ship left the great circle track at a point in latitude 46.07 N, and in longitude 36.58 W, and picked up the rhumb-line track at a point in latitude 41.00 N, and longitude 63.28 W. How much distance would she save? 47 miles. Again, suppose she departed from the track a little more to the eastward, in latitude 46.38 N, and longitude 35.27 W, and steered a straight course to position latitude 40.49 W, longitude 66.20 W, on the rhumb-line course. The saving would be 56 miles, the official distance between the points being 1440 miles, and the distance actually traveled 1384. This saving would make quite a little difference in the average speeds of two vessels, one of which followed the track religiously, while the other made one of her own. The 56-mile cut is not considered a big one by daring captains.

Now, my critics point out that if a vessel were seen off the track, she would be reported as early as possible. I ask who is going to report the vessel which left the track in latitude 46.38 N, and longitude 35.27 W? Captains of liners? What are they doing there? Looking for the track? No, in this instance there would be no reporting. It is only when a man nibbles at cutting corners on the homeward-bound southern and northern routes, and edges close to the outward tracks, that he is seen and reported, maybe, by a captain who does keep to the track. There are many men I know of, who steer every mile of