Opinion of the court. from considerations of the public good, and the best means of advancing it. Whatever tends to divert the attention of legislators from their high duties, to mislead their judg ments, or to substitute other motives for their conduct than the advancement of the public interests, must necessarily and directly tend to impair the integrity of our political institutions. Agreements for compensation contingent upon success, suggest the use of sinister and corrupt means for the accomplishment of the end desired. The law meets the suggestion of evil, and strikes down the contract from its inception. There is no real difference in principle between agreements to procure favors from legislative bodies, and agreements to procure favors in the shape of contracts from the heads of departments. The introduction of improper elements to control the action of both, is the direct and inevitable result of all such arrangements.* The same principle has also been applied, in numerous instances, to agreements for compensation to procure appointments to public offices. These offices are trusts, held solely for the public good, and should be conferred from considerations of the ability, integrity, fidelity, and fitness for the position of the appointee. No other considerations can properly be regarded by the appointing power. Whatever introduces other elements to control this power, must necessarily lower the character of the appointments, to the great detriment of the public. Agreements for compensation to procure these appointments tend directly and necessarily to introduce such elements. The law, therefore, from this tendency alone, adjudges these agreements inconsistent with sound morals and public policy.† Other agreements of an analogous character might be mentioned, which the courts, for the same or similar reasons, refuse to uphold. It is unnecessary to state them particularly; * Marshall v. Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company, 16 Howard, 314; Harris v. Roof's Executors, 10 Barbour, 489; Fuller v. Dame, 18 Pickering, 472. Gray v. Hook, 4 Comstock, 449. Statement of the case. it is sufficient to observe, generally, that all agreements for pecuniary considerations to control the business operations of the Government, or the regular administration of justice, or the appointments to public offices, or the ordinary course of legislation, are void as against public policy, without reference to the question, whether improper means are contemplated or used in their execution. The law looks to the general tendency of such agreements; and it closes the door to temptation, by refusing them recognition in any of the courts of the country. It follows that the judgment of the court below must be reversed, and the cause remanded for a new trial; and it is So ORDERED. GREGG v. FORSYTH. Error does not lie to a refusal of the Circuit Court to award a writ of restitution in ejectment. FORSYTH had brought ejectment against Gregg in the Circuit Court for Illinois, and obtained judgment for the land sued for. On writ of error taken by Gregg, this court reversed that judgment and remitted the case with directions to issue a venire de novo. Between the time, however, that the Circuit Court gave its judgment of recovery, and that when this court gave its of reversal, Forsyth had been put in possession of the premises by a habere facias, and had collected, moreover, the costs of the suit. As soon as the mandate of this court reversing the judgment was sent down to the court below, but before it had been filed or a rule entered in pursuance of its directions, Gregg moved the court for a writ of restitution. This motion the court refused to grant. Whereupon, a writ of error-the present writ-was brought. Mr. Justice NELSON delivered the opinion of the court. Upon the facts of this case, it will be seen that at the time the motion was made in the court below, the cause was not then pending in the court. Although the mandate had been Opinion of the court. sent down to the circuit from this court it had not been filed there, nor had the rule been entered in pursuance of its directions reversing the judgment. The court had not, therefore, obtained possession of the cause, and this was, doubtless, the reason for refusing the motion for restitution. The plaintiffs in error were entitled to restitution both of the premises and costs on the reversal of the judgment, and the modern practice is to apply to the court on the coming down of the mandate from the appellate tribunal and the entry of the judgment of reversal for a writ of restitution, setting forth the facts entitling the party to the remedy and giving notice of the motion to the adverse party. The earlier and more formal remedy was by scire facias.* It seeins that the writ of restitution may be granted though a new venire has been directed. In Smith's Lessee v. Trabue's Heirs,† this court held, that a writ of error would not lie to an order of the Circuit Court awarding a writ of restitution on motion, and dismissed the case for want of jurisdiction. The writ in the present case must be dismissed for the same reason. The order is not considered a final judgment within the meaning of the Judiciary Act. DISMISSAL ACCORDINGLY. BANKS v. OGDEN. 1. A plat of an addition to a town, not executed, acknowledged, and recorded in conformity with the laws of Illinois, operates in that State as a dedication of the streets to public use, but not as a conveyance of the fee of the streets to the municipal corporation. 2. A conveyance, by the proprietor of such an addition, of a block or lot bounded by a street, conveys the fee of the street to its centre, subject to the public use. * Rex v. Leaven, 2 Salkeld, 558; Sympson v. Juxon, Cro. Jac. 699; 2 Sellon's Prac. 387; 2 Tidd's do. 1033, 1188; Safford v. Slevens, 2 Wendell, 164; Close v. Stuart, 4 Id. 95; Smith's Lessee v. Trabue's Heirs, 9 Peters, 4; Jackson v. Hasbrouk, 5 Johnson, 366; Cassel v. Duncan, 2 Sergeant & Rawle, 57 · Russel v. Gray, 6 Id. 208; Rarck v. Backer, 13 Id. 41. † 9 Peers, 4. Statement of the case. 8. When a street of such an addition is bounded on one side by Lake Michigan, the owner of the block on the other side takes only to the centre; while the fee of the half bounded by the lake remains in the proprietor, subject to the easement. 4. When the lake boundary so limits the street as to reduce it to less than half its regular width, the street so reduced must still be divided by its centre line between the grantee of the lot bounded by it and the original proprietor. 5. Accretion by alluvion upon a street thus bounded will belong to the original proprietor, in whom, subject to the public easement, the fee of the half next the lake remains. 6. The limitation of the 8th section of the bankrupt. act of 1841 does not apply to suits by assignees or their grantees for the recovery of real estate until after two years from the taking of adverse possession. THIS was an ejectment brought to December Term, 1859, in the Circuit Court for the Northern District of Illinois, to recover a lot of ground, A A, formed by accretion on the western shore of Lake Michigan. The case was thus: Kinzie, being owner in fee of a fractional section of land bounded on the east by the said lake, and lying immediately north of the original town of Chicago, made a subdivision of it in 1833, which he called Kinzie's addition, and deposited a plat of it in the office of the county recorder, where it was recorded in February, 1834: though not in accordance with certain statutes of Illinois, which, it was contended in the argument, give an effect to plats properly made, acknowledged, and recorded, that changes the rule of the common law regarding the streets on which the lots are sold. The north and south street of the subdivision nearest the lake was called Sand Street; the east and west street nearest the north line of the fraction was named Superior Street. The waters of the lake limited Sand Street on the north by an oblique line extending from a point on its eastern side, about a hundred feet below, to a point on its western side. about a hundred feet above Superior Street; as indicated on the diagram opposite. The northeastern block of the subdivision, numbered 54, was bounded, on its eastern side, in part by Sand Street and in part by the lake. Sand Street, therefore, terminated in a small triangular piece of land, |