sence of our ambassadors, were adding a new decree to their authorizations of piracy, they were kept idle in Paris, that he might dance attendance in the ante-chamber of Talleyrand. But another part was reserved for him. On the 4th of February, that minister, by order of the Executive Directory, had privately made to him the proposition of a separate negotiation! Mr. Gerry's own account of the interview, and of one which followed, shall be given. It is taken from a letter written some months after to Talleyrand, when, his patience fairly worn out, he began at last to show a spirit of feeble resistance.

"From the arrival of the Envoys at Paris, to the departure of two of them, the objects of their mission were defeated by insuperable bars, arising from demands of loans; which, violating the neutrality of the United States, would have involved them in immediate war; and of procuring reparations for the observations hinted at. Towards the end of that period, AFTER IMPOSING ON ME SECRECY, you stated the embarrassments and dissatisfaction of the Executive Directory, on account of the opinions and conversations of my colleagues, its determination not to treat with them, and its desire to treat with me; and you added that my de parture would produce an immediate rupture. Astonished as I was at this communication, I informed you that I had no powers to treat separately; the measure was impossible; and that had my powers been adequate, a treaty made under such circumstances, could never be ratified by my government. You differed from me. We reasoned on the subject, and each adhered to his opinion. I urged in vain the unreasonableness of admitting prejudices against my colleagues, without informing them of the consequences thereof; the good effect in removing them, which might result from such information, and the necessity of making known to them all that had now passed between us. YOU HELD ME TO THE PROMISE OF SECRESY, adding that if I would negotiate, we could soon finish a treaty; for the Executive Directory were not in the habit of spending much time about such matters. You desired another interview, in which, after a discussion of the subject, I confirmed and adhered to my determination. In this state, affairs remained for some time, and I flattered myself with the hope that, failing in the proposition for negotiating with me separately, your next would be to accredit the three Envoys; in such event, the secrecy mentioned would have been proper. This expectation was strengthened by the two subsequent interviews which they had with you; and you may judge of my surprise on the receipt of your letter of the 18th March, containing a refusal to treat with two of the Envoys, and renewing the proposition to treat with me. Finding that I was the person alluded to, and that all hopes of our being jointly accredited were at an end, I again re

July 20th, see President's Message and documents of Jan. 18, 1799.

fused, in the most positive terms, to negotiate separately; another proposition was then made that to prevent a rupture, I should remain here till information could be sent to my government of the events."

So far Mr. Gerry in July succeeding this affair. An extract from Gen. Marshall's private journal, will show what mention of it was vouchsafed him at the time.

"February 4.-Mr. Gerry returned from his visit to Talleyrand, and informed me that communications and propositions had been made to him by that gentleman which he was not at liberty to impart to Gen. Pinckney or myself; and that he had also propounded some questions to the minister which had produced some change in the proposition from its original aspect; that he was to give an answer tomorrow or the day after, and that upon it depended peace or war.

It will be observed that Mr. Gerry, in the letter to Talleyrand, makes no mention of the questions "propounded" by him, which produced the change in the proposition, nor in fact of any change therein made. These are still unexplained. One thing, however, is clear; that Mr. Gerry, a co-ambassador from the United States, had permitted himself to promise concealment from his colleagues of an overture made him in that capacity by the official organ of a hostile government, and that the subject was a proposed intrigue to get rid of these colleagues as persons who did not suit the purposes of those to whom they were sent. The sequel of this will be seen presently.

In his final letter to the Secretary of State, Mr. Gerry thus alludes to another proposition: "The Minister afterwards desired me, by his Secretary, to communicate to the other Envoys his proposition for a loan subsequent to the war, which he soon relinquished. On this subject our first instructions were silent; the last were explicit, and necessary to determine my judgment." This notice is, as will be seen, very guardedly worded, so far as respects his opinion on the loan. A letter of General Pinck

a Cited in Pickering's Review, Section 1V.

Those contained in Pickering's letter of 23d March, 1798.

ney, to his brother, Mr Thomas Pinckney, of March 13th, however, gives a more distinct idea of it.

According to this, on the 25th February, Gerry told his colleagues that he had received a proposition from Talleyrand's secretary, suggesting a means of conciliation. which he considered in a different light from any that had been made before; "It was to stipulate a loan to the French government now, but not payable until after the war, in supplies of our own produce for St. Domingo and their islands." "Mr. Gerry," he says, "to support this proposition, entered into a long detail of the ill consequence of a war with France, the advantages which would accrue from our securing payment to our fellow citizens for the supplies made by them, and the property taken from them by the French government, which he thought might be obtained if a treaty was made on the basis of such a loan, and which might be so guarded, in his opinion, as not to violate our neutrality." a Marshall and Pinckney, both opposed this on every consideration.

Meantime, no answer having been received to the note to Talleyrand of January 17th, the draft mentioned in their letter of March 9th, to the Secretary of State, intended as a remonstrance against the decree of January 18th, had been prepared by General Marshall. This draft was on the 6th of February put into the hands of Mr. Gerry for correction, and on the 7th, in jointly writing to the Secretary of State, they referred to the paper, and their intention to apply explicitly for their passports. The draft was retained by Mr. Gerry until the 14th, when he returned it with amendments. On the 18th, it being fully prepared, Mr. Gerry refused to sign it at all.

The time when the proposition which Gerry communicated to his colleagues on the 25th, was first made to him, cannot be stated with certainty. It is presumed

a MSS.

that it was some days previous, if not at the time of the proposal for a separate negotiation, and that his refusal to sign the remonstrance after it had been amended by himself, was caused by that overture. This connection between the events is indeed distinctly averred by Gen. Pinckney in a letter to Mr. King, of the 14th March.a Independently of such corroboration, the supposition, as furnishing the only plausible explanation of his conduct, is justifiable. It has been shown that he received the proposition with favor, and was disposed to proceed on its basis.

A short time after this, on the 2d of March, the envoys had the meeting with Talleyrand, previously mentioned, at which, and a second one on the 6th, this proposition of a secret loan, payable after the war, was brought up. Finding, from their conduct, that there was nothing to be gained from Pinckney or Marshall, or from Gerry, while they were present, Talleyrand took measures to rid himself of them. In the steps taken to accomplish this object, his characteristic chicanery displayed itself. It was a necessary measure, as they had manifested a firmness which could not be subdued; a discernment which promised no advantage. Unembarrassed by their presence, it was hoped, if negotiation was intended at all, to conduct it on terms which suited France. The letter of 18th March, was accordingly sent them, in which the Directory offered to treat with the "impartial" one. Talleyrand had expected that they would point him out, and by a voluntary withdrawal, in some degree sanction Gerry's stay and procedure. This they were not inclined to do. The cautious answer of Marshall announced that no one was authorized to negotiate alone, and no two disposed to withdraw from their task while there was any prospect of performing it. These envoys, it is known, would long

a MSS.

before have demanded their passports, but from the fear that Gerry would remain, and by so doing, divide the country. They had now no intention of adding a color of acquiescence in what they expected would be his conduct. Talleyrand's wishes in this respect being foiled, studied indignities were, by his instigation, heaped upon the two refractory characters, to compel their departure; and these also failing, they were finally ordered to quit the territories of France. Neither passports nor safe conduct was sent them, but General Marshall was directed to apply through his consul for his papers, and even threatened with the supervision of the police. These attempts were properly resisted, and the passports were at length sent in due form; but while Pinckney, whose daughter was dangerously ill, could hardly obtain permission to remain with her, the departure of Marshall was embarrassed as much as possible. Mr. Gerry, to whom no passport was sent, although he had repeatedly told his colleagues that he would not stay, remained, and without explaining to them the reason. From this fact, and from the circumstance that General Marshall, through whom he wrote to Mr. Adams, knew nothing of the contents of the letter, Mr. Jefferson shrewdly drew the conclusion, "that there must have been a previous understanding between Talleyrand and Gerry."

The reason that Mr. Gerry gave, afterwards, was that Talleyrand had threatened him with immediate war, if he did not remain. That France ever intended war on such a pretext, or indeed at all, was never fully believed by those who had the best opportunity of judging, including his colleagues. The event gave certainty to their opinions on this point, as well as that Talleyrand did not, at the time, desire a treaty on any terms. He had not, indeed,

a MSS. letter of Gen. Pinckney to Thomas Pinckney, March 13, 1798. < Jefferson's Writings, III. 390.

VOL. II.

4

b Gen. Marshall left Paris on the 12th April, and France on the 16th.