Mar. 7.

rimac to make her appearance before day after to-morrow, Sunday," said Fox; "but she may come at any moment, for my agent Friday, informs me that her engines are working and that her armor is complete. I am going to Fortress Monroe to be there when she comes down from Norfolk. I suppose, Mr. President, that you are prepared for disastrous news?"

"Oh no. Why should I be? We have three of our most effective war vessels in Hampton Roads, and any number of small craft that will hang on to the stern of the Merrimac like small dogs on the haunches of a bear. They may not be able to tear her down, but they will be able to interfere with the comfort of her voyage."

"I think that you do not take into account all the possibilities of the Merrimac," said Captain Fox.

"Have we not three good ships against her?"

"But the Merrimac may prove invulnerable. Suppose they are powerless, and she sinks them?"

"You are looking for disaster, I see."

"I anticipate nothing. If she sinks our ships, what is to prevent her from coming up and sending a shell into this room?"

"The Almighty! I expect set-backs, defeats; we have had them and shall have them. They are common to all wars. But I have not the slightest fear of any result which shall fatally impair our military and naval strength, or give other powers a right to interfere in our quarrel. The destruction of the Capitol would do both. I do not fear it. This is God's fight, and He will win it in His own good time."

"I sincerely hope you are right, Mr. President, but probably we cannot even guess what the Merrimac will do."

"Ericsson's vessel, the Monitor, ought to be at Hampton Roads now. I believe in the Monitor and in her commander, Captain Worden. I believe he will give a good account of himself," said the President.

"The new iron craft is an experiment, Mr. President. We know nothing about her. She is liable to break down. She went to sea without a trial trip, when she should have had several. We ought not to be disappointed if she does not reach the mouth of the James. If she arrives, she may break down with the firing of her first gun."

"No, captain; I respect your judgment, as you have good reason to know, but this time you are wrong. I believed in her when Ericsson showed me the plans. I am confident she is afloat and will give a good account of herself," said the President, with an enthusiasm which Captain Fox could but admire. (")

Mar. 8.

Eleven days had passed since McClellan's return from Harper's Ferry, and he had not called upon the President. It was early in the morning-half-past seven-when a messenger informed him that Mr. Lincoln desired his presence at the White House-an indication that the chief magistrate of the nation did not intend to again subject himself to the sneers of men who were opposed to the war. He obeyed the command. Just what was said by the President in this interview will never be known. McClellan, in his "Own Story," says:

"He appeared much concerned about something, and soon said that he wished to talk with me about a very ugly matter. I asked what it was, and, as he still hesitated, I said that the sooner and more directly such things were approached the better. He then referred to the Harper's Ferry affair. . . . He then adverted to the more serious, or ugly, matter, and now the effects of the intrigues by which he had been surrounded became apparent. He said that it had been represented to him (and he certainly conveyed to me the distinct impression that he regarded these representations as well founded) that my plan of the campaign (which was to leave Washington under the protection of a sufficient garrison, and to throw the whole army suddenly by water from Annapolis and Alexandria to the forts on James River) was conceived with the traitorous intent of removing its defenders from Washington, and thus giving over to the enemy the capital and the Government, thus left defenceless."-Page 195.

"In a manner perhaps not altogether decorous towards the chief magistrate, I desired that he should retract the expression, telling him that I could permit no one to couple the word treason' with my name. He was much agitated, and at once disclaimed any idea of considering me a traitor, and said that he merely repeated what others had said, and that he did not believe a word of it. I then informed him that I had called a meeting of the generals of division for that day with reference to the proposed attack upon the enemy's Potomac batteries, and suggested that my plan should be laid before them in order that he might be satisfied. This was done, and I heard no more of treason in that connection."-Page 196.

To understand the situation in which the President was placed, we must keep in mind the fact that the discontent of the people was increasing. The victories won in the West intensified it. If Garfield, Thomas, and Grant could move, why not McClellan? The failure at Harper's Ferry was commented upon in the newspapers, in the hotels of Washington, in the corridors of the Capitol. Men said McClellan had no heart in the war. The fact that the boats were too wide to be taken through the locks was regarded as evidence of design on the part of somebody to thwart a movement of the army.

Of the twelve division commanders, eight had been appointed by McClellan, and were said to be his pets. Many of the commanders of brigades appointed by him were said to be attached to his interests. Every morning letters came to the President, expressing fears that

McClellan was surrounded by men who wanted the war to end in failure. Members of Congress were outspoken in their denunciations.

With great frankness, according to McClellan's own account, the President informed him of the state of public opinion, and yet acknowl edged his own disbelief in the stories. McClellan has not published all the President said to him: in substance, that if he were not ready in ten days with a plan which he could at once execute, he would be relieved of the command of the army. (") McClellan took his departure, and the President, anticipating what the verdict of the majority of the division commanders might be, wrote an order in advance of their assembling. No movement of the army should be made without leaving in and about Washington a force that would make the capital secure; not more than two army corps-about 50,000 troops-should be moved until the Potomac was freed from the enemy's batteries; that the movement should begin as early as March 18th, or within ten days.

The interview with the President and the issuing of the order produced a commotion among the Senators and members of Congress who were on intimate terms with McClellan. General Naglee, commanding a brigade in Hooker's division, received a note from Senator Latham, of California, saying that something must be done immediately by the friends of McClellan, as the patience of the President would bear no further strain. (") Naglee hastened to Washington. Latham had been called to New York, but a consultation was had with Senator Rice, of Minnesota, who understood the situation. It was decided that McClel lan should not attend the meeting which had been called. Those generals who had been appointed by him were to write out their views on slips of paper of various sizes and colors, in order to avoid any appearance of concerted action. By such a procedure they would hoodwink the President. (1)

They did not mistrust that forthcoming events would compel a movement of the army. Startling the news: The Merrimac had sunk

Mar. 9.

the frigates Cumberland and Congress! Wooden war-ships were Sunday, of no account in a contest with an iron-clad vessel. Telegrams were flying to all the seaboard cities. What was there to prevent the Merrimac from making her way to New York, or ascending the Potomac to Washington and sending a shell into the White House? As night came on workmen were loading canal-boats with stone, to be taken down the Potomac and sunk where the channel was narrowest.

There was other information: not a Confederate soldier remained at Centreville or Manassas. The great army which McClellan had de

clared to be confronting him had departed: soldiers, cannon, supplies -all gone.

Glorious news! Ericsson's Monitor is at Hampton Roads, and the Merrimac, instead of sending the Minnesota and all the other vessels to the bottom, is staggering back to Norfolk. Since the days of Monday, David and Goliath there has been no such contest. No need now to block the channel of the Potomac. The Merrimac will not make her appearance at Washington.

Mar. 10.

Just what McClellan's emotions were at the news of the departure of the Confederates we do not know, but orders were issued, and the troops which previously could not move on account of mud Mar. 11. marched to Centreville. They found deserted fortifications with wooden cannon behind the embankments, the railroad bridges burned, and the Confederate army beyond the Rapidan.

The division commanders assembled in council, eleven in number. General Hooker was absent. General Naglee had so managed things that no notice had been sent to Hooker. He himself was there instead. It was known that McDowell held opinions differing from theirs, and he was called upon to preside. A chairman could not express his own views without leaving the chair; with him presiding, his voice would not be heard opposing any plan.

Which is the best route to Richmond? Shall the army move overland from where it is? Four voted yes--the other eight against the proposition. Shall the army go to Fredricksburg and move along the line of the railroad to Richmond? Five voted in favor, seven against the plan. There was still another proposition. Shall the army go to Fortress Monroe by water and make that the base of operation?

Naglee-brigade, and not a division commander-said the last plan ought to be adopted.

President Lincoln and Mr. Stanton were present. Mr. Stanton noticed that when the President asked a question Naglee was quite ready to reply.

"General Naglee," said Mr. Stanton, "you are not a division commander; what are you here for?"

"General Hooker is indisposed, and I am here to represent him," the reply.(")

Naglee did not say what he afterwards told a friend: that Hooker was known to be opposed to the movement to Fortress Monroe. The plan was adopted, although General Blenker said he did not understand it, but voted for it because McClellan had requested it. General Keyes

voted for it upon condition that the Potomac should be first opened. Four of the division commanders voted against the plan.

The President and the Secretary of War, upon the adjournment of the council, met for consultation. "We can do nothing else than adopt this plan and discard all others," the words of the President. "With eight out of twelve division commanders approving it, we can't reject it and adopt another without assuming all the responsibilities in case of failure of the one we adopt."

"I agree with you," said Stanton, "in your conclusion, but not in your arithmetic. The four generals who dissent from the plan are independent of the influence of McClellan, while all the others owe their positions to him, and are especially under his influence, so that instead of eight to four, it is really one to four. You, Mr. President, are a lawyer. In estimating the value of a witness you look not only at the words of the witness, but to his manner and all the surrounding circumstances of bias, interest, or influence that may affect his opinion. Now, who are the eight generals upon whose votes you are going to adopt the proposed plan? All made so since General McClellan assumed command, and upon his recommendation, and influenced by his views and subservient to his wishes. In fact, you have in this decision only the operation of one man's mind."

What shall the President do? The Secretary of War is opposed to the movement. Five division generals, including Hooker, are opposed to it, only seven in favor, leaving out Naglee, the brigadier. The man who has been accustomed to look at all sides of a case while riding the circuit in Illinois makes this reply:

"Mr. Secretary, I admit the full force of your objection, but what can we do? We are civilians. We should be justly held accountable for any disaster, if we set up our opinions against those of experienced military men in the practical management of the campaign. We must submit to the action of the majority of the council, and the campaign will have to go on as decided by that majority."(")

"What force, Mr. President, do you intend to have left behind to make Washington secure?"

"General McDowell will remain with 40,000 men to cover the capital."

During the Revolutionary War, General Washington was hampered and distressed by those who conspired against him. In like manner Abraham Lincoln was forced by the cabal surrounding General McClellan to consent to that which his judgment did not approve. He wisely dis