well born and would degrade the freemen of the State. It was the rich man's plan, devised to rob the poor man, and all who labored for their bread. This notion was reechoed in other States. In Massachusetts the Anti-Federalists hastened to point out that its truth was corroborated by the class of men who supported the new plan; the lawyers, the clergy, the judges and the rich merchants.1 Thus the contest over the ratification of the Constitution, as it was more or less elsewhere, was a contest between classes.

But not all the plowmen were Anti-Federalists. Jonathan Smith, of Berkshire county, who declared himself a plain man, who got his living by the plow, came from a part of the State which had been harrowed by Shays and his followers. He described the terrible effects of that insurrection. One of the Anti-Federal leaders tried to cut him off, as he vividly described the robberies, the burning of farm buildings, the alarm from town to town, and the breaking up of families, which the insurrection had caused. But Samuel Adams declared Smith in order, and told him to go on in his own way. It led to the conclusion that anarchy breeds tyranny.2 He had made a strong plea for the federal cause, but had not removed the suspicion that the new plan was essentially autocratic.3 Then, too, the paper money men and the friends of the tender laws opposed the new plan; for they saw in it the end of their schemes. Here was a serious obstacle in the way of the Federalists; but here lay the strength of the opposition. The inhabitants of Maine desired separation, and the delegates from this part of the State read in the clause regulating the organization of new States or

1 Harding, 76-77; Debates, 409.

2 Debates, 204.

3 Harding, 78.

4 Harding, 43, 79.

46

POLICY OF THE ANTI-FEDERALISTS.

parts of old ones a serious if not a fatal delay of their wishes.1 So most of the Maine delegates were opposed to the Constitution.2

3

The policy of the Anti-Federalists was to postpone the vote; adjourn the convention and await the decision of other States. Thus they all declaimed against undue haste. The new plan, they said, instead of being an amendment to the Articles of Confederation was a wholly different government; therefore, allow the people time for reflection before asking them to approve it. The worst feature of this objection was the power of the AntiFederalists to carry it through. It had been agreed at the opening of the session that the discussion should be by sections, until the whole Constitution had been considered. The convention was now amidst the powers of Congress, when on the twenty-third of January, Mason proposed that the form of procedure, by paragraphs, should be abandoned; that the whole instrument be discussed on its merits, and the vote on ratification be taken.* This was alarming, but on the following day, happily

1 When in 1819, separation was finally agitated, the Federalists opposed it; for an account of the separation see my Constitutional History of the American People, 1776-1850, II, Index "Maine." See the Debates and other proceedings of the convention of delegates assembled at Portland on the 11th and continued until the 29th of October, 1819, for the purpose of forming a constitution for the State of Maine, to which is prefixed the constitution taken in convention by Jeremiah Perley, Counsellorat-law, Portland; A. Shirley, Printer, 1820, 300 pages; Journal of the Convention, Augusta, 1856, 112 pages; The Debates and Journal (reprint), Edited by Charles E. Nash, Augusta, Maine, Farmers' Almanac Press, 1894. This also contains the Brunswick Convention of 1816 and biographical sketches of its members and of those of the convention of 1819.

2 Harding, 81.

3 Debates, 160-161.

4 Debates, 195.

A POLITICAL BARGAIN.

47

for the Federalists, Samuel Adams spoke against the proposition and it was defeated. The Anti-Federalists" were remarking that it was time they were going home to attend to their work, but Adams answered that this was not the time to desert public interests for private concerns. It would be better, he said, to lend the money which any of the country members needed rather than hurry so great a subject.

Adams's opposition was somewhat unexpected and was greeted with mingled applause and hisses, but it showed where he stood. It showed more; namely, that if the Constitution was to be ratified, the Federalists must come to some terms with their opponents. In Pennsylvania the Federalist majority of two to one had made such terms unnecessary, though even there the political effect would have been highly advantageous. In Massachusetts a compromise was absolutely necessary. Opposition must be quieted by conceding to amendments covering the more serious objections. These should be adopted in the form of a recommendation to Congress, but ratification should not be conditional upon their final incorporation into the Constitution. It appears that this procedure was contemplated early in the session, indeed, within the first week.2 The exact source of the scheme is unknown, but probably it occurred to several of the Federal leaders, all of whom were practical politicians. Its successful operation involved some difficulties, not the least of which was the adroit management of Hancock.

As yet he had not appeared. His gout, which, John Adams said, always overtook him when there was anything unpopular or unpleasant for him to do, had kept

1 Debates, 197.

2 Harding, 84;

Massachusetts Centinel, January 12, 1788; Avery and Thatcher, January 19.

him at home.1 King observed that as soon as the majority on either side was beyond doubt, Hancock's gout would disappear. But his support was essential to the Federalist scheme. He desired a re-election as governor. His chief competitor was James Bowdoin, but Bowdoin's friends in the convention persuaded themselves that under some circumstances they could support Hancock; there must be a President and a Vice-President chosen under the new plan; the political opportunity was ample; and it was soon known that Hancock would not disappoint federal expectation. If for a few days his caprice could be restrained, the Constitution would be ratified in Massachusetts.

A strong alliance of the Bowdoin and Hancock men was made, and King records that in case Virginia did not ratify, Hancock would become a fair candidate for President. That a bargain was made is beyond doubt. Hancock was made to believe that his re-election as governor was secure, and that he should at least become Vice-President. His gout yielded to this skillful treatment; he took his seat as chairman of the convention on the thirtieth of January, and on the following day, General Heath made a politic speech preparatory to the coming transformation. After remarking on the momentous importance of the subject before the House and the exhaustive discussion which it had received, he observed that many appeared to be opposed to the system, not as a whole, but to particular parts. Was there not a way in which their minds might be relieved of embarrassment, for certainly if there was, no exertion should be spared in that direction. If the convention should ratify the Constitution, and in1 Until January 30; Harding, 85.

2 Life of King, I, 319; Harding, 86. * Harding, 87.

struct the first members to Congress to exert their utmost endeavors to have such checks and guards provided in some of the paragraphs, as seemed necessary, and if the amendments, judged proper, were communicated to the sister States and their concurrence was requested, was there not the highest probability that everything desirable would be effectually secured? This practicable solution would remove all difficulties from the minds of the members, who found some provision of the Constitution objectionable and would unite the country; and he earnestly recommended the suggestion "to the serious consideration of every gentleman in the honorable convention."

At this, President Hancock arose, observing that he was conscious of the impropriety, as chairman, of his entering into the discussion. Unfortunately, through painful indisposition of body, he had been prevented from attending, but from all he had learned, there appeared to him to be a great dissimilarity of sentiment in the convention. To remove the objections of some, he felt himself induced to hazard a proposition which he would offer in the afternoon.1

When afternoon came, Hancock read nine amendments, which had been prepared and put into his hands by Parsons, King and Sedgwick, the Federalist leaders,3 but Hancock gave the impression that he was their author. The paradox was as complete as the success of the scheme. The Federalist leaders had written amendments similar to those proposed by Whitehill and Findley in the Pennsylvania convention. The Massachusetts amendments de clared that the powers not expressly delegated to Congress are reserved to the States. There should be one repre

1 Debates, 222-224.

2 January 31, 1788; Debates, 79-81.

3 They were in the handwriting of Parsons; Harding, 88.