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VITALITY OF THE ISSUE.

whole question was essentially one of sovereignty. Thirtyseven years passed before this question reached the Supreme Court of the United States in the famous case of Dred Scott, and the decision then rendered was speedily set aside by the Civil War. But during the intervening years the question was one of continuous discussion in one form or another. The final decision in 1857, was anticipated in 1820, as was also the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Curtis in the Dred Scott case. While the Missouri compromise was under discussion no less an authority than John Jay expressed the opinion that Congress had power to restrict slavery and to prohibit the importation and immigration of slaves in old States or in new ones, for slavery was repugnant to the principles of the Revolution.2 This opinion was also held by Webster and was embodied by him in the memorial sent forth on slavery extension by the citizens of Boston in a public meeting.3 He held that the power of Congress to regulate commerce gave it complete authority to regulate, and therefore, to restrict slavery. But there were contrary opinions of which the most influential were those held by Madison,* who asserted that restriction of slavery by Congress was unconstitutional, thus anticipating the decision of the Supreme Court in the Dred Scott case.

The Missouri Compromise was a triumph for national sovereignty in so far as it confirmed the authority of Con

1 Dred Scott vs. Sandford, 19 Howard, 393.

2 Jay to Elias Boudinot, November 17, 1819.

Niles Register, XVII, 242; Wilson's Rise and Fall of the Slave Power, I, 150; the memorial does not appear in Webster's Works; it was published in pamphlet form by Sewell Phelps, No. 5 Court St., Boston, 1819, and was reprinted, together with various speeches and documents on the Nebraska Question, by J. S. Redfield, New York, 1854.

4 Letter to Robert Walsh; Works, III, 149.

NATURE OF THE ISSUE.

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gress to prescribe conditions for the territories and the States, but it was also a triumph for slavocracy in that a new slave State had been admitted into the Union. Time alone could determine whether the compromise would prove permanent. The great constitutional issues from the adoption of the Constitution to the adoption of the Missouri Compromise were essentially a series of contests between the States and the United States for sovereignty. As yet neither power had triumphed. The organization and administration of government were matters of compromise. We shall see how this spirit of compromise dominated another generation.

CHAPTER II.

THE CONTEST COMPROMISED.

While the Missouri Compromise was pending, events in South America were shaping an international policy for the United States, which was not of our own seeking and was destined to survive the period in which it originated and to give a unique position to our government. Early in the nineteenth century, the Spanish-American States revolted and asked the United States for recognition of their independence. The unsettled state of Europe, after the fall of Napoleon, led the ruling Houses of France, Russia, Prussia and Austria to unite for the purpose of maintaining peace and redressing revolutions within each other's domain, and especially to repress all attempts at liberal government. This was the so-called Holy Alliance of 1815. About this time the Spanish colonies in South America had met with such success in their efforts for independence, that Spain began to doubt her ability to subjugate them, and rumor passed through the world, that the Alliance contemplated offering assistance to Spain. Interference of this kind was construed by England as inimical to her interests, and Canning, her Prime Minister, intimated to our Ambassador at the Court of St. James, Richard Rush, that the United States should take decided action against it. President Monroe submitted the wishes of the British government to his cabinet, and also to Jefferson and Madison. The reply of Jefferson covered the whole principle involved. The question, he said, was the most momentous which had come before him since that of American independence. "That made us a nation; this sets our compass and points

380

THE MONROE DOCTRINE.

the course which we steer through the ocean of time opening on us." And he laid down a maxim which he thought should be fundamental in our government, that we should never entangle ourselves in the broils of Europe, nor suffer Europe to intermeddle with affairs this side of the Atlantic. "America, North and South, have a set of interests distinct from those of Europe and peculiarly her own. She should, therefore, have a system of her own separate and apart from that of Europe." The governments of the old world were laboring to become the home of despotism, but our endeavor should be to make the Western Hemisphere the home of freedom. In pursuing our true policy only one nation, England, could disturb us, but by acceding to her proposition respecting the South American republics, we could detach her from an unfriendly European alliance and bring her mighty weight into the scale of free government. "Great Britain,” he concluded, "is the nation which can do us the most harm of any or all on earth, and with her on our side we need not fear the whole world."

3

A few days later Madison replied in the same spirit,2 and the Cabinet mainly agreed with the opinions of the two ex-Presidents. The result was the famous message which Monroe sent to Congress on December 2, 1823, proclaiming a policy which has received his name. The time had come, he announced, when it was proper to assert as a principle in our government, that the American continents, by the free and independent condition which they had assumed to maintain were henceforth not to be considered as subjects for colonization by any European

1 October 24, 1823, Works, VII, 315.

2 October 30, Works, III, 338.

3 Adams's Memoirs, VI, 177, et seq., November 7-26, 1823.