THE NUMBER OF CANDIDATES.

315

Why not elect Presi

broken, civil war might follow. dent and Vice-President by a majority vote? asked Bradley, on the twenty-fourth; the Vice-President being, in certain cases the successor to the President, the two officers should be chosen by the same ratio of votes. And he wished, in case the electors failed to choose a VicePresident, that the Senate should elect from the two highest on the list. His suggestion was rejected, but, after some discussion, he renewed it, because he wished to prevent the office of Vice-President from being "hawked about to the highest bidder." Hillhouse agreed with him, and reminded the Senate that there was not a word in the Constitution about voting for a Vice-President, and the discriminating principle ought surely to apply to that office.

Wright, of Maryland, supported Bradley and cited the resolutions of New Hampshire in 17992 adopted, with slight alteration by Massachusetts in the following year, in favor of amending the Constitution, as the precedent for his plan; though he wished the discriminating principle to apply to both President and Vice-President. Bradley's suggestion was then adopted.

Adams again objected to the number three, and, on motion of Cocke, of Tennessee, the number was left blank. This precipitated a debate whether the change from five to a less number would diminish the rights of the smaller States, or tend to defeat the popular will, or encourage intrigue and corruption, or, in the majority of cases, give the election to the House. Maclay, of Pennsylvania, took the unusual view that whether the number was five or three, the effect of the amendment would be to bring the Constitution into line with the State constitutions, and to conform the election of President and Vice-President

1 Id., 90.

2 Id., 95, where they are reprinted.

316

"HIGH FEDERAL VIEWS."

to the practice of the States in the choice of their executives.1 On the twenty-fifth, without debate, it was agreed that the vote in the House should be by States,-following the language of the original clause of the Constitution, on this point; and also, that the choice of the Senate should be restricted to the two highest numbers on the list. Thus far little had been said in support of the Constitution as it originally stood, but there were some Senators who wished no change, and among them, Pickering, of Massachusetts, the late Secretary of State, who, with a mind not unfamiliar with "high-Federal views," remarked that much had been said about the will of the people, but how could it be ascertained? From the newspapers? From private society? From resolutions of legislatures? Better avoid mere innovation. To his mind, the number three conformed more to its spirit than the number five, but it was best to preserve the federative and popular principles, on which it rested, unimpaired. He believed it to be the intention of the Constitution that the people should elect the President and Vice-President, directly. But finally, by a vote of twenty-one to ten, the number three was agreed to.2

This conclusion, however, did not end difficulties. How should the House decide between several candidates, say four or five, having an equality of votes? At this point, so many amendments were offered that it was decided to have them printed in order that the Senate might discover how the matter stood. On the following day, Dayton moved to strike out all relating to the Vice-President. This was pronounced out of order. Adams hinted that he had a number of amendments which he thought of pro

1 The State practice was, in most instances, for the Legislature to choose by a majority vote, in joint ballot.

2 Annals, November 29, 1803, 8th Cong., 1st Sess., 123.

TOO MUCH LEFT TO LOT.

317

posing. Pickering moved to amend so that the House be given twenty-four hours in which to choose the President, after which an election should be made "according to law." This led Tracy, of Connecticut, to remark, that Pickering's motion would lead to a dozen explanatory amendments, to which the Massachusetts Senator replied that the President might be chosen by lot, or the names of the candidates be put in a box from which the Speaker might draw one. "Why not throw dice for the office, the highest number to win it?" asked Smith.1

Adams objected to the existing provision in the Constitution because it left the choice too much to mere lot, and he offered an amendment that in case the House did not choose within a fixed number of days, then the VicePresident should act as President, but in case that office was vacant, the succession should fall upon whomsoever the law might direct. Wright at once reminded Adams that it would be impossible to put anyone over the VicePresident when he had become President. It will be remembered that as yet no Vice-President had succeeded to the Presidency because of the death of a President and it was not as yet understood that he would be more than an acting-President. Indeed, very vague opinions of his functions, title and powers prevailed. Might it not be necessary in the amendment under consideration, to provide for a vacancy in the office of Vice-President as well? The succession provoked sufficient agitation to lead Wright to say that "we do not wish to see a man seated in the Executive chair whom the people never contemplated to place there, and who never had a vote." 2 To clear up the matter, Taylor, of Virginia, proposed that in case the House failed to elect a President, when the choice

1 Annals, Id., 130.

2 Annals, December 1, 1803, 135.

318.

OBJECTIONS TO AMENDMENT.

devolved upon it, the Vice-President should act as President in like manner as in case of the death or resignation of the President.

On the next day, Friday, Taylor wished to insert a limit of time, that the House must choose "before the fourth day of March next following." Adams liked the addition, because it would tend to control party spirit and to prevent evil. Pickering thought the time too long, and as he would have none left "for corruption to operate," proposed to give the House two or three days, but Taylor's amendment was agreed to by a vote of twenty-one to ten.1

The whole resolution was now before the Senate. White, of Delaware, then arose and delivered the longest speech heard in either House on the subject.2 He opposed any change. The country was divided, as doubtless it would continue to be divided, into two great political parties. If the amendment was adopted, it would follow, that every four years the four candidates in the field would be greatly tempted to tamper with the electors, because one of the four would be chosen President. True, a disputed election had occurred, but it had passed away and the country had suffered no harm. In the ordinary course of events, a similar case would rarely arise. the country grew older, and new States came into the Union, the contingency became more improbable. It had become fashionable to attach little importance to the office of Vice-President, even to designate it as the fifth wheel of a wagon. But the functions of this officer were very great, not merely as a possible successor to the President, but in the administration of the government. If the proposed amendment passed, if the electors were to designate their votes, then irresistible temptation was held 1 Annals, 138.

2 Id., 139-151, December 2, 1803.

As

THE BASIS OF REPRESENTATION.

319

out for contracts and compromises among the larger States for these offices. Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, Virginia and North Carolina might totally exclude the other States. Already population had set its face southwestward and the States of Virginia, the Carolinas, Georgia, Kentucky and Tennessee, together with the new States growing out of the territories on the Mississippi, would have it in their power, after the census of 1810, to appoint both President and Vice-President. This and other causes would give rise to schisms among the States which at last might plunge the country into civil war and produce a separation.

Plumer, of New Hampshire, touched on the basis of representation. The slave States had eighteen additional electors and representatives, a number equal to all that four and a half of the free States were entitled to choose. The amendment would lessen the weight and influence of the Eastern States and the inequality of representation would also remain. Tracy, of Connecticut, argued at length, that the amendment would deprive the small States of their most important rights. It was intended that the election by the House should be a compromise between the federal and the republican principle, and as Madison had said in the Virginia Convention, "in the eventual election, the small States would have the advantage; why then destroy every federal principle in the Constitution.?" The Convention, "to secure the rights of the minority, as well as to check the intolerance of the majority, placed the majority in jeopardy if they should attempt at grasping all the benefits of a President and Vice-President within themselves, to the total exclusion of the minority." Hillhouse declared that it was his purpose "to prevent a minor faction from carrying a VicePresident into that chair." Finally, the vote being taken