156

IREDELL'S DEFENSE.

clergyman, logical and fixed in his opinions, objected to the opening of the preamble, "We the people," for the people, he said, had not empowered the Federal Convention. to use their name; to which Davie replied that the Convention, which had been called to decide upon the most effectual means of removing the defects of the Confederation, had submitted the Constitution, believing full well that it would be in no sense binding until it had received the solemn assent of the people,1 and entering upon a general defense of the new plan he elaborated the meaning of the preamble, showing that the entire instrument was in keeping with its scope and purpose.

Caldwell still demanded to know why the delegates from the States had styled themselves "we the people?" Iredell answered, that the words were not to be applied to the members themselves, but were the style of the Constitution, when it should be ratified by the States.2 But the plan made the President a law maker, and gave the Vice-President a vote, in case the Senate was equally divided. To which Governor Johnston replied, that if a Senator were to be appointed Vice-President, the State which he represented would either lose a vote, if he was not permitted to vote on every occasion, or in some instances would have two votes; and Iredell added that the President had no power of legislation, but only authority to object to a bill and thus to secure its reconsideration: an assurance against a law passed by a bare majority.3 Goudy, of Guilford, objected to being represented with negroes, to which Davie made answer, that the southern delegates had insisted on the admission of slaves into representation, because they contributed by their labor to

1 Id., 16-23.

2 Id., 23.

8 Id., 26-27.

the general wealth as well as other members of the community, and as rational beings had the right to be represented. The final conclusion in the matter had been a compromise. But North Carolina, said Galloway, had too few representatives, which Spaight explained was due to the lack of a census of the State and the number proposed was only temporary. Great dread was expressed of the Senate and of the investment of the whole power of impeachment in the House of Representatives. But Johnston and Iredell cited the precedent of the British Constitution, and explained the checks which were imposed upon the management of cases of impeachment and in judgments arising in them.1

Especially did the Anti-Federalists object to the long term of the Senate, as well as to its powers, to which Iredell and Davie answered as they had already been answered in the Federalist;2 The Senate must be organized to give stability to the government, and therefore, the term must be sufficiently long. Even Governor Johnston confessed that he could not comprehend the reason for giving Congress power over elections, and he was quickly supported by Spencer, who saw in this grant of authority only a blow at the State legislatures and a tendency toward a consolidated government. Iredell demonstrated that the very existence of the general government would depend on that of the State legislatures; the power over elections had been given Congress to be exercised in case the State did not make adequate provision either by neglect or in time of war. Davie admitted that if there were any seeds in the Constitution

1 Id., 32-36, 43, 48.

2 No. LXII.

3 Id., 37-43.

4 Id., 54.

158

THE TAXING POWER.

which might one day produce a consolidation of government there would be an insuperable objection to it, but as it depended upon the State governments for a House of Representatives, for a Senate and for a President, he thought that the danger was unreal, the whole could never swallow up the members.1 As in other States so here the Anti-Federalists found nothing to which they could give their approval in that portion of the Constitution which declares the powers of Congress.2 With Spencer of Anson, they preferred quotas to taxes and imposts, though Spaight clearly showed that a government cannot exist without certain adequate funds, and that requisitions could not be depended upon.*

McDowall saw in the taxing power the prospect of an army of tax-gatherers and of a people despoiled of their property. Two governments authorized to tax could not exist together; one must submit, therefore, the State governments must suffer. Goudy asserted that because the people of the State had no gold or silver, or substantial money, with which to pay taxes, the enormous taxing powers of Congress would destroy their liberties, and most of the Anti-Federalists agreed with McDowall, that paper money had saved the country and that to deprive the people of it would trespass on their rights."

6

Equally objectional to McDowall was the clause fixing a limit to the slave trade. Spaight explained that it was a compromise between the North and the South; South Carolina and Georgia had insisted on the clause

1 Id., 59.

2 Article I, Section 8.

3 Elliot, IV, 75-77.

4 Id., 82.

5 Id., 87.

• Id., 93.

7 Id., 88.

"MIGRATION" AND "IMPORTATION" OF SLAVES. 159

expecting to fully supply themselves with slaves during the next twenty years, but this explanation did not satisfy. Iredell pronounced the slave trade inconsistent with the rights of humanity, and declared that its entire abolition. would give him the greatest pleasure. By rejecting the Constitution, the evil would not be remedied, whereas, by ratifying it, the trade must cease after twenty years, if Congress should so declare, whatever particular States might wish. Georgia and South Carolina had insisted on the clause, as it would give them opportunity to make up the loss of their slaves, incurred during the war. Galloway wished an end put to the trade, but instead of laying a tax, a bounty should be offered to encourage foreigners to come to the State; yet he feared that the clause meant the manumission of slaves, and he declared that it would be impossible for the white people of the State to be happy if the blacks after enfranchisement were to stay among them.1

At this Iredell pointed out the distinction between the words "migration" and "importation" in the clause: the first meaning persons coming into the State as free persons; the last extending to slaves only, and he particularly denied the correctness of Galloway's interpretation that the clause would empower Congress to free the slaves already in the country.3 The Anti-Federalists hurried the proceedings along, not even offering observations on many parts of the Constitution. This ominous precip

1 Compare this opinion with the defense in North Carolina at the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, for an account of which see post, Vol. III, pp. 308-315.

2 Compare a discussion of the same point at the time of the admission of Missouri in 1820; for an account of which see my Constitutional History of the American People, 1776-1850, Vol. I, 274275. Also post, pp. 360-377.

3 Elliot, IV, 101-102.

itancy called forth a protest from Davie, who urged a freer and fuller discussion and demanded the cause of the silence and gloomy jealousy of the opposition.1 But its general and rather sullen feeling was that discussion was a waste of time. Joseph Taylor objected to giving Congress the power to determine the time of choosing the presidential electors and of fixing the same day of election throughout the United States, for the army might be employed to compel the electors to vote at the pleasure of the government. To this astonishing objection Iredell replied, that should the time of elections be different in different States, the electors chosen in one might go from State to State and thus choose the President through undue influence. The method proposed would entirely prevent corrupt combination.

Governor Johnston was in doubt whether by the Constitution the electors were to be chosen by the people at large, or to be appointed by the State legislatures; to which Maclaine answered, that the State legislatures might direct in what manner the electors should be chosen and thus direct it to be done by the people at large,2 and Spaight added, as a specific answer to Taylor's objection, that, under the Constitution, Congress might prolong an election to seven years; that the power could be exercised properly only by one general superintending government; that different times of election and different times of choosing electors would produce hopeless confusion, to avoid which the provision had been inserted in the Constitution.3

The powers of the President, which had called forth

1 Id., 103.

2 Id., 104-105. For the manner of appointing electors from 1789 to 1868, see Vol. I, p. 570.