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THE NEW YORK CONVENTION.

139

the principles of freedom and the topics given; "which will be always interesting to mankind so long as they shall be connected in civil society."

In the New York convention Chancellor Livingston opened the discussion with an examination of the Confederation, pointing out its defects and the superiority of the proposed plan. Under it, New York would have greater prosperity; the Union would be capable of selfdefense, and the dangers incident to its situation would be practically removed. It was agreed, as it had been in Virginia, that the vote should not be taken until the Constitution had been considered clause by clause, and that amendments, if any, should be made in accordance with the same rule. Lansing, who, it will be remembered, together with his colleague, Yates, had left the Federal Convention early in July, under the excuse that it was exceeding its powers, replied to Livingston, in a general support of the Articles, and declared that a consolidated government, such as was proposed, was not adapted to so extensive a territory as the United States and could not preserve the rights or liberties of its people.3

Melanchton Smith, the ablest Anti-Federalist in the convention, was devoted to a government strictly on a federal plan, which he thought the Constitution would violate. Thus he complained that its rule of apportionment of representation was inadequate and unjust, because it failed to fix the minimum membership of the House of Representatives. Particularly did he object to the inclusion of three-fifths of the slaves. It would be impossible for representatives chosen on the basis proposed to possess the requisite information, therefore he

1 Washington to Hamilton, August 28, 1788; Sparks, IX, 420. 2 Elliot, II, 208-216; June 19, 1788.

s Id., 216-221; June 20, 1788.

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ALEXANDER HAMILTON.

proposed that the apportionment should be changed to one for every twenty thousand inhabitants.1 Hamilton entered extensively into the history of confederacies and showed that they were all organized on fatal principles. Weakness in the head had produced resistance in the members. The defects of the Confederation had not been realized until after the peace, though the opponents of the Constitution insisted that it was the Articles which had brought the country through the war. He defended the rule of apportionment and the basis of representation, as more liberal than that under the Articles, and as adapted to the growth of the country. Vermont, Kentucky and Frankland would soon become independent; new members of the Union would be formed in the West which must be represented, and the membership of the Federal legislature would steadily increase. The State governments would forever preclude the possibility of federal encroachments; and the anti-federal claim that the liberties of the States could be subverted by the federal head was repugnant, he said, to every rule of political calculation.2 "All governments, even the most despotic, depend in a great degree on opinion," and, said he, as the will of the people constitute the essential principle of the new government their interests could not be other than safe.3

Smith, and the Anti-Federalists generally, insisted that in order to gain the confidence of the people there must be a numerous representation. "The true touch-stone," replied Hamilton, "is a good administration." This, indeed, would be the supreme test of the new plan, and it was one which Hamilton had elaborated in the Fed

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MELANCTON SMITH'S OBJECTIONS.

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eralist. Therefore, the value of the plan would depend entirely upon its practical organization, and he suggested that the requisite information, which was demanded of the representative, would be secured by dividing the States into districts and the representative chosen from the district would probably possess all the knowledge desired.1

But Smith replied that the only way to remove faults in the Constitution was to increase the representation and limit the powers of the government,-the major premise of all his later arguments.2 Hamilton, however, did not argue wholly on the defensive, but pointed out the incurable evils of the Confederation, one radical and dangerous defect of which was the necessity of the concurrence of nine States to pass the most important measures. This would be removed by the Constitution. Clinton advanced the argument used by Anti-Federalists in other States that the interests, habits and manners of the thirteen States were too diverse to permit a general and free government over them. To which Hamilton replied, that from New Hampshire to Georgia the people of America were as uniform in their interests and manners as those of any in Europe, and that they could not form an impediment to the regular operation of those general powers which the Constitution would give to the Union. In

1 Id., 255. Compare the New York act of apportionment of March 4, 1796, by which the State was divided into four great districts for the purpose of local government; also the act of April 12, 1792, dividing the State into four districts for the choice of presidential electors; the act of April 3, 1801, apportioning representation under the amended Constitution, all of which carried out Hamilton's principle.

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LANSING AND HAMILTON.

deed, if Clinton's argument was to be pursued to the end, Hamilton remarked, it would lead to the withdrawal of all confidence of the American people in any government.1

Lansing, making much of his knowledge of the proceedings in the Federal Convention, renewed the discussion pending when he had left it, on the danger which the small States would incur from the large in the extended representation; but Lansing having left before the basis of representation was agreed to, was ill qualified to explain the motives of the Convention. Hamilton remarking that Lansing and himself saw the facts substantially alike, observed that the "plan in all its parts was a plan of accommodation," a fact of great weight with thoughtful men and used to its full effect by the supporters of the Constitution in all the States. Even the most aggressive Anti-Federalist hesitated to set up his individual judgment against the consensus of opinion embodied in the plan. But Lansing could not understand how, if it was a system of accommodation, that the number as the basis of representation had been reduced from forty thousand to thirty thousand. This gave Hamilton an opportunity to make the effective reply that the change had not been made till the Convention was near rising and the business completed, when Washington, expressing the wish that the number should be reduced to thirty thousand, it had been agreed to without opposition.3

Smith did not see in the Articles of the Confederation the opportunities for corruption, incident to the required. vote of nine States in important matters, of which Hamilton had made so much. He thought that the power of

1 Id., 268.

2 Id., 274. 3 Id., 274.

HAMILTON'S GREAT SPEECH.

143

recalling the members of Congress and their annual election was an adequate check against corruption.1 It was in consonance with this idea that Gilbert Livingston, of Dutchess county, proposed, as an amendment, that a senator should not be eligible for more than six years in twelve, and that a State might recall him at any time and appoint another in his stead.2 Chancellor Livingston promptly pointed out that this would subordinate the Senate to factions in the States and prove a source of endless confusion. While the Senate was intended to represent the State governments, its members were also representatives of the United States, and were not to consult the interest of any one State, but that of the Union. This could never be done if there was a power to recall. It would open a wide door for bribery, factions and intrigue. But Livingston's proposition was defended with warmth by Lansing.*

This attack on the organization of the Senate called forth from Hamilton one of the most remarkable speeches of the times and the most complete exposition and defense of the Senate to be found in literature outside of the Federalist. He defended the provision in the Constitution, respecting the Senate, as being based on the principle of strength and stability in the organization of government and on the necessity for vigor in its operation.5 With equal effect, he met Smith's objections to the new plan by showing that it comported fully with the two great requisites in a government, the safety of the people

1 Id., 281.

2 Id., 289.

3 Id., 291.

4 Id., 293-296.

Id., 300-307; June 24, 1788. Compare the Federalist, Nos. LXII-LXV; for the authorship of this, see the introduction, by Lodge, to his edition of the Federalist.

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