104

NAVIGATION OF THE MISSISSIPPI.

sold in America, and the productions of America in Spain, by an arrangement of reciprocity which must benefit both countries. But there had been no idea of absolutely alienating the control of the river, it being understood that the temporary cession would fix the permanent right in favor of America and prevent a dangerous coalition between Spain and Great Britain.

Madison did not hesitate to say that he had uniformly disapproved of the proposition and did so now.1 The rational grounds against the cession of the river lay in the inevitable diminution of the value of the western country, which was considered the common fund for the States, and consequently the impoverishment of the public treasury. There can be no doubt that Madison's vigorous disapproval of the cession went far to convince the Kentucky delegates that it would never be made, for his activity in securing the proposed Constitution was well known, and the stand he now took fully answered the objections which Henry had brought forward relative to the surrender of the river. Certainly the last objection vanished when Madison declared that if he were at liberty to speak freely in the matter, he could convince the House that the project would never be revived in Congress, and therefore no danger was to be apprehended.2

But both Grayson and Henry returned to the subject, Henry at least throwing some light on the purpose of the Anti-Federalists when he observed that in the discussion of the navigation of the Mississippi, the opponents of the Constitution were accused of "scuffling for Kentucky votes."3 It appeared, however, that from the time Madison spoke on the subject most of the delegates were convinced that a President and two-thirds of the Senate,

HENRY AND MADISON.

105

necessary, under the Constitution, to make a treaty, would never be found willing to surrender the river.1

The chief defender of the new plan was Madison. Monroe inquired of him why an exception had been made as to the place of electing senators, in the clause giving Congress power to control elections. The reason, replied Madison, was, that otherwise Congress might compel the State Legislatures to elect senators in a different place from that of their usual session, which would produce some inconvenience, and was not essential to the regulation of elections, but it was necessary to give the general government a control over the time and manner of choosing senators, in order to prevent its own dissolution.2 The control over the election of representatives was to secure uniformity throughout the continent. It had been judged proper that the general government should be empowered to give a remedy in case the people of any State should be deprived, by any means, of the right of suffrage; but to fix the time, place and manner of the election of representatives was impossible in the Constitution, these could best be left to the State governments which were more intimately acquainted with the situation of the people and the power to secure it. Uniformity would prevent the dissolution of the general government.3

Henry objected that, as the Constitution stood, a Senator or a Representative might be appointed to an office which was not created, or the emoluments of which were not increased, during his term. Madison answered that it would doubtless have been best to fix the compensations in the Constitution so as to be independent of Congress

1 Id., 357.

2 Compare Hamilton's discussion of this point in the Federalist, Nos. LIX, LX and LXI.

3 Elliot, III, 366-367.

106

GRAYSON AND MADISON.

or of the State Legislatures, but the uncontrollable fluctuation of the value of money and currency forbade the one, and experience under the Articles prevented the other; for the States had been influenced by local considerations, which would ever produce discrimination in the amount of pay.1 Tyler and Grayson feared that Congress would fix the compensation so low as to exclude poor men and thus establish an aristocracy; to which Madison made answer that as the people were to choose their representatives, they would settle this question themselves.2

Grayson lamented the omission of a clause prohibiting nepotism; and objected to the power of the Senate to propose or concur in amendments to money bills. He preferred the British model. Whatever the practice in Great Britain, Madison replied, there was a sufficient difference between the two countries to render it inapplicable to our own; moreover, the matter was of no great importance; the House of Representatives would be judges of the propriety of the Senate's amendments, and the experience of Virginia justified the clause. The Virginia House of Delegates had been known to spend weeks in forming a money bill, and because the Senate had no power to propose amendments, the bill had been lost altogether, and it had been necessary to introduce a new bill, which the insertion of a single line by the Senate would have prevented.*

3

The power of Congress to call forth the militia to execute national laws was attacked by Mason, as it had been in the Philadelphia Convention, and for the same reasons; and the chief of which was the danger of estab

1 Id., 369.

2 Id., 372.

• Constitution, 1776, Section 5.

▲ Elliot, III, 377.

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107

lishing a standing army.1 Madison's reply was complete; that the most effectual way to guard against a standing army, which he thought one of the greatest mischiefs that could possibly happen to a country, was to render it unnecessary, which could be effected by giving the general government full power to call forth the militia and to exert the whole natural strength of the Union when needed. He did not believe that a government "of a federal nature consisting of many co-equal sovereignties," and, particularly, having one branch chosen from the people, would drag the militia, without a cause, to an immense distance.2 Such an abuse of power would incite public indignation and defeat its purpose. Moreover, the power over the militia was concurrent, not exclusive.3

But Mason and Henry persisted in representing the British system as superior, at every point, though Madison showed that the restrictions in that system, of which the Anti-Federalists made so much, were all directed against the power of the executive; whereas, in the proposed system, all the powers of government were limited and guarded, and the representatives would be more responsible to the people than were the members of the House of Commons. Henry insisted that the incentives to constitutional action, which distinguished the King of Great Britain, would not be found in the Constitution. The President's interests would be transient. The sword and the purse were not united in the same hands

1 This objection is fully answered by Hamilton in the Federalist, Nos. XXIV and XXV.

2 Elliot, III, 381.

* Id., 382. Compare Hamilton's argument on this point in the Federalists, No. XXIX, which appeared originally in the Daily Advertiser, January 10, 1788. In some editions of the Federalist, this number is incorrectly given as No. XXXV; it is No. XXIX in the first edition.

4 Elliot, III, 383.

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THE PRINCIPLES OF THE CONSTITUTION.

under the British system as they would be in the one now proposed. The security of the people demanded their separation.1 Madison replied that the objection was totally inapplicable to the plan. Henry could not mean that the sword and purse ought not to be trusted in the hands of the same government; for there never was, nor would there ever be, an efficient government in which both were not vested. The only rational meaning must be, therefore, that they were not to be given to the same member, which, in the case of the British government, meant that the sword was in the hands of the Crown; the purse in the hands of Parliament. As far as any analogy could exist between the two Constitutions, it would be so in America. Here the purse was to be in the hands of the representatives of the people; they appropriated all moneys, regulated the land and naval forces and called forth the militia. The President was to be in command, and, in conjunction with the Senate, to appoint the of ficers. The means ought to be commensurate to the end, and the end was the common protection, which could not be effected without a general power to use the strength of the Union. The Constitution, he said, was based on republican principles of government; power must be lodged somewhere.

The practical question was, in what part of the gov ernment to place it, and not whether any other political body, independent of the government, should have it or not. In Virginia and in other States in the Union, the relaxed operation of government had been sufficient to alarm the friends of good order. Population was increasing rapidly in every State, and additional checks on dissipation and licentiousness were needed. A change was absolutely necessary, and the friends of republican

1 Id., 388.