which our weak nature will allow. Since then the perfections which are effential to God, confidered as a rational being, are the very fame which we, as rational beings, ought to afpire to, fince they are in him in the utmost perfection also; to say, that we ought to conform ourselves to the divine nature, and to imitate the excellencies of it, is no more than to say, that we ought to endeavour after those perfections, which are natural and proper to rational minds; and which belong to us in confequence of that image and likeness of our Maker, which was stamped upon us at our firft creation.

But though the example of God be in itself a very ftrong motive and argument for holiness; yet, in the nature of the thing, example is but a fecondary argument, and supposes an antecedent obligation to the duty, the due performance of which we learn from the example set before us. It is no reason for me to endeavour to do this or that, because I fee another do it; for it may be fit for him to do, and yet very unfit for me to attempt; and therefore example can have no place, till the rule of duty is firft fettled. It would be very abfurd to think, that every thing that God does yields a proper example for us to follow; and therefore we are to fearch for a reason, why fome of his perfections are proper examples, and others not fo; that is, we are to search for their primary rule of duty, which obliges us to endeavour after fome of the perfections discoverable in the Deity, and not the others.

In all inquiries of this kind, the laft refort muft be to the light of our own minds; from hence arises the obligation we are under to moral virtue. We

are a law to ourselves, and fuch a law as no power whatever can abfolve us from the obedience due to it, as long as we continue to enjoy the fame powers and faculties of reafon which at prefent we are endowed with. From this light of nature we learn both the law and the example which we are now inquiring after, that is, we learn our own obligation to holiness, and we learn to know God, who is perfect holiness. Did reafon difcover to us the moral perfections of the Deity, without shewing us, at the fame time, any obligation incumbent on us to follow after the like perfections, the holiness of God fo difcovered would be no more an example for our imitation than his power is. It is therefore from the light of our own minds that we difcover the difference of moral good and evil, and the obliga tions confequent upon that difference; it is from the fame light that we find the moral perfections to be poffeffed by the Deity in their utmost beauty: fo that the fame reafon and nature, which holds forth to us the rule of our duty, holds forth also the perfect example of it. Now, fince no example is a good one, which does not teach the fame doctrine with the rule of duty, and the rule of duty in this cafe being the light of our own minds; it must neceffarily follow, that to obey the dictates of reafon, and to imitate the example of God, is in the end one and the fame thing.

That it must be so, will appear by confidering, that we can no other way trace the perfections of the Deity, but from those natural notions of perfection which we find in our own minds: we fhould not ascribe to God holiness, juftice, and mercy, did

not the light of reafon discover to us the excellencies of these attributes. Now the holinefs, juftice, and mercy, which the light of reafon discovers, are the moral virtues which we are obliged to follow after; they are alfo the perfections which we afcribe to the Deity: fo that whether we follow the dictates of reafon in endeavouring after thefe virtues, or whether we look up to the Deity, and copy from the perfection of his nature; it is evident, that in both cafes we follow the fame virtues, though placed before us in a different view. For, fince our notion of the perfections of the Deity must be formed from fuch natural notions of moral perfection, as reafon and the light of nature can fupply; whether we confider these perfections as inherent in the Deity, and endeavour to copy after the first and great original, or whether we take our natural notions of moral virtue, as principles and rules of religion, which ought to influence and direct our lives, the iffue will be the fame with refpect to our practice. It is eafier for men, when once they have a notion of a perfect righteous Being, to confider, in particular cases, what fuch a Being would do or approve, than to run up in an abstracted way of reasoning to firft principles and maxims for direction. But whichever way you take, the inquiry is the fame, namely, what is fit and reasonable to be done in this or that cafe: and let the method of inquiry bẹ what it will, the judgment must be fuch as our prefent share of reason will enable us to make. And therefore the imitation of God is a principle of religion arifing from, and depending on, the right use and exercise of reason, as much as any other what

ever. And this may serve to shew upon what foundation the imitation of God ftands in natural religion, and how we may apply this principle for our. direction in particular cafes. It may fhew also what is to be understood by being perfect, as God is perfect it is abfurd to aim at the measure of his perfection; but we are then, to all the purposes of life and religion, perfect as he is perfect, when we do nothing but what he will approve for to ftand approved in the eye of an all-perfect and holy Being, is the true perfection of every 'creature. This is the Chriftian excellency, as described by St. Paul in the words once already quoted, and with which I shall conclude this difcourfe, That we may ftand perfect and complete in all the will of God.

DISCOURSE XLVI.

JOHN iii. 19.

This is the condemnation, that light is come into the world, and men loved darkness rather than light, because their deeds were evil.

MAN being a reasonable creature, and endued with faculties to judge and choose for himself in all cafes, it is contrary to nature to fuppofe, that there fhould be any thing abfolutely or neceffarily good to him; fince the advantage to be drawn from any thing whatever depends on the right use and application of that thing to its proper ends and purposes. Wholesome food is good for the found; but if taken in undue measure, it grows into a disease. Phyfic is proper for the fick; but if the patient will not fubmit to proper regulations, that which might have been his cure will certainly be his destruction.

As it is with respect to the body, fo is it likewise with refpect to the mind; there is no fuch thing as an abfolute or neceffary cure for the frailties and in-. firmities of it, but the propereft method for attaining that end must still depend on the proper use and application of it. The best inftructions are of no ufe whilft not attended to; and the greatest helps