reafons upon which the maxim itself is founded? Or fhall the reasons of juftice and equity prevail to fuperfede a general law, which is not applicable to the prefent cafe?

Now there is the fame difference between the judgments of God, and the judgments of men, as there is between the rules of law, and the reason of law for men are tied down to judge by the rules which the law prescribes; but the judgment of God does not arise from any rule or maxim of law, but in every inftance follows the reason of the thing to be judged of; otherwife his judgments would not in every case be reasonable. It is mere weakness that makes men go by rules; and because they are not able to judge accurately upon all emergent cafes, therefore they have general rules for their direction. But how abfurd would it be to imagine God as acting by any such rules, as having recourfe to ftated laws or maxims for the direction of his judgment in particular inftances? As reafon is in all cafes the fountain of justice, and of all laws and principles of law, fo the divine reafon, which is perfect, is in every case the true measure of justice. From hence it evidently appears, that fince the judgments of God are not formed upon the general notions and principles of justice which we are converfant in, thofe notions can be no fafe rules for us in the examination of the ways of Providence, because our rules do not always extend to the reason of particular cafes; but the judgments of God do always regard the reasons and circumftances of every cafe.

Farther these confiderations will help us to

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form diftinct notions of juftice and mercy, and discover to us, if not what they always are, yet at leaft what they always fhould be. Juftice is thought to be a thing fixed and certain, and to have its proper bounds and limits, which it cannot tranfgrefs without lofing its name; but mercy is taken to be of a more variable, uncertain nature, to have no rule to go by, but to arise from the will of the governor and confequently we ufually fpeak of justice and mercy as oppofites to each other, and fuppofe that mercy can have no place, unlefs juftice recedes to make room for it. What does or may happen in the world we are not concerned to inquire; our business is to search after the true notions of juftice and mercy, not the corrupt practices in either. Now mercy and juftice would not be diftinguished, were it not for the intervention of general and particular laws, which often fall very heavy upon particular perfons; whence it is that we complain of the rigour and hardness of the law: but were men perfect both in their reafon and in their wills, fo that they could neither judge amifs nor act amifs, they would then do that which is exactly right and reasonable in every cafe, and there would be no room to correct the rigour of juftice by the interpofition of mercy; for there is no rigour in that which is perfectly right and reasonable. For confider what are the pleas for mercy do they not arife from the circumftances of the perfon, or the action, which fhew that the law is too hard in his cafe, and that he ought in reafon to be eased against the extremity of the law? But had all these circumftances been weighed in the firft judgment,

and justice adapted to the very merits of the cafe, all the pleas for mercy had been prevented, and confequently there had been no room for mercy; for mercy without reafon is a mere effect of arbitrary power, and not of goodnefs. But now that all cafes are judged by laws made long before the cafes happened, and which cannot confider the alleviations or aggravations of particular facts, it comes to pass fometimes, that the law is a very inadequate rule of juftice in cafes that fall under it. Shall the perfon then fuffer according to the rule of juftice against all reafon of juftice? No; he ought to have the benefit of mercy, and to be relieved against the rigour of the law. What then, because the punishment of the law is too heavy for his crime, ought he therefore to go unpunished? because this punishment is unreasonable, fhall he therefore escape that which is reasonable? No; for though mercy ought to take off the rigour of juftice, yet it ought not to deftroy juftice itfelf. It is evident then, that it is the proper work of mercy to correct the rules of juftice by the reafon of juftice; and, confequently, were all judgments formed upon the true reafons of juftice, juftice and mercy would be one and the fame thing.

Hence, perhaps, we may be able to account for a difficulty, which is apt mightily to disturb men when they ponder the judgments of God: they confider him as effentially juft, and effentially merciful, from whence they rightly conclude, that he can never be otherwife than merciful, never otherwife than juft; and yet how to reconcile thefe attributes in every cafe they fee not. In human judgments, it is plain,

where mercy prevails, juftice fleeps; where juftice acts, mercy is filent: but this cannot be the cafe in divine judgments, because God can neither cease to be juft or merciful. But, if we confider that the acts of mercy and juftice, as they are diftinguished from one another, are relative to ftated rules and laws, and that they are both the fame with respect to the reason of juftice; we fhall eafily difcern how God, who always acts by the pureft reason, that is, by his own, may be faid in every judgment to do juftly and mercifully. For when God does that which is perfectly reasonable, all circumftances weighed, in every cafe, there is no case in which any one can complain for want either of mercy or juftice; for, if there be any reason to complain, it must be because the thing, in fome respect, is not reasonable; and therefore, when the reason of justice is exactly purfued, you have the true point, where mercy and juftice meet together: and this is the point in which all the judgments of God do centre. I speak here of the judgments of God properly fo called; for those acts of gaadnefs which he exercifes in right of his fupreme fovereignty and dominion are not within our prefent view. And that this account is true, you may partly collect from the inftance in which the text is concerned: our Saviour does not justify God for delaying the punishment of the wicked, by diftinguishing between the mercy and juftice of God, and fhewing how mercy triumphed over justice in this delay; but he appeals to the reason of the cafe, and fhews that God did what was fit and becoming a wife judge and governor; and that the thing

complained of as a defect of justice, was, all its circumftances confidered, the height of juftice and equity and this will plainly appear in the application we are to make of what has been faid to this particular cafe.

The parable, of which the text is part, is evidently intended as an answer to the common objection against Providence, drawn from the profperity of finners, or rather, in the prefent cafe, 1 from the impunity of offenders. If you examine upon what principles the objection proceeds, and upon what principles the answer, you will find that the objection is founded upon one of the common and general maxims of juftice, which, as I have already fhewn, do often mifguide our judgments in particular cafes; and that our Saviour's anfwer is drawn from the reason of all law and equity, which can never fail. Afk the man, who makes this objection against God's government, why he thinks it unbecoming the wisdom of God to delay the punishment of finners? he will readily answer, because it is contrary to his juftice; and, to support his reafon, he will farther add, that it is an undoubted maxim of juftice, that all finners deferve punishment. And here, I think, he must stop; for he cannot enter into particular cafes, unless he knew more of men than he does, or can know. anfwer to this, our Saviour owns the truth of the general maxim, as far as it relates to the defert of finners; and therefore teaches us, that God has appointed a day in which he will judge the world: but then he fhews, from fuperior reafons of justice, that the applica tion of the principle in the present

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