is, that what they require is inconfiftent with the prefent condition of men, and the goodness of God. As to the condition of men, they are in a state of trial and probation, and therefore it is fit they fhould have time to fhew themselves; which they would not have, were every offence to meet with its due recompence of reward immediately. As to the goodness of God, it would ill become him to destroy men, as long as there are hopes of their amendment; and therefore to bear with the fins of men, in profpect of their repentance, is both juft and merciful. Thus to bear with the fins of men is inconfiftent with punishing the fins of men, as foon as the world thinks they deserve it; for who can fay when men are past all hope? But farther, even as to incorrigible finners, though nothing can be faid for them, yet much may be faid to fhew, that this world is no proper place for their punishment: for the good and bad are here fo united together, that it is not poffible to separate them in temporal punishments; and therefore God bears with them out of mere mercy to the righteous.

Thus then the cafe ftands: and now confider who has reason to complain. Examine your own confcience; if you are a finner, it ill becomes you to call for vengeance; if you are righteous, or think yourself so, why fhould you murmur, fince it is for your fake that the wicked are preserved from immediate ruin, that you may not be overwhelmed in their destruction? Confider alfo, which is the conclufion of the whole matter, That God hath appointed a day in the which he will judge the world in

righteousness; in which all the feeming inequalities of providence shall be fet right, and every tongue fhall confefs, that the Lord is juft, and righteous, and holy in all his ways.

DISCOURSE XL.

PART II.

IT now remains that we confider the text as furnishing us with a principle of reafon and equity applicable to many cafes.

not.

It is the more neceffary to make this inquiry, because the rule in the text is liable to be mifapplied, unless we carefully attend to the reasons upon which it is founded, from which only we can learn in what cafes the rule is applicable, in what The mercy of God is the best pattern that we can copy after, and our Lord has recommended to us, to be merciful, even as our heavenly Father is merciful. Since therefore God fpares the wicked who deserve punishment, nay, who are ripe for final deftruction, for the fake of the righteous, that they may not partake in their sufferings, what fhall we fay? Is it reasonable that men fhould act in like manner that magiftrates, who are difpenfers of temporal punishments, should release the guilty, because of the innocent who are nearly concerned in the fortunes of the guilty, and who must share either in the fhame or the lofs of the punishment?

far

At first fight perhaps you may imagine there is a parity of reason in these cases; and yet upon ther confideration you will find, that the fame reafon which justifies God in delaying the punishment of the wicked, would condemn the magiftrate should he permit the guilty to live unpunished.

To come at this view clearly, we must attend to the difference between the reafon of justice, and the rules of juftice. By the rules of justice, I underftand the general principles and maxims of justice by which the laws of all countries are governed and directed. By the reafon of juftice, I underftand the fountain from which all maxims and all laws are derived, which is no other than right reafon itself: for laws are not juft, as partaking of the authority of the lawgiver, but as partaking of his reafon. And hence comes the diftinction between good and bad laws, though both derived from the fame authority; which shews, that authority, though

it

may make a valid law, yet it cannot make a good one, unless acting upon the reason of juftice. Now between the reafon of juftice and the rules of justice there is this great difference; the reason of justice takes in all circumftances of every cafe, and therefore cannot err in its judgment; but the maxims of juftice have no relation to the particular circumftances of any cafe, but are formed upon general abftracted ideas, and confequently they often may and do fail, when they are applied to fingle inftances: from whence it often happens, that the reason of justice, and the maxims of justice, ftand in direct oppofition to one another. And this gave occafion to that proverbial fpeech, Sum

mum jus, fumma injuria; for the words in themselves, unless you have refpect to the different rules to which they refer, are a plain contradiction. For it is not to be affirmed, that what is fummum jus according to this law, is, according to the fame law, fumma injuria: but the truth of the proverb is to be understood by referring the parts of it to their proper rules. Summum jus regards the written law, fumma injuria regards the original reafon of all law. And then in many cafes it happens, that the letter of the law contradicts the reafon of the law and the cause of this I before obferved, because laws and maxims of law have no regard to the circumftances of particular cafes, which circumftances nevertheless do fometimes entirely alter the nature of the cafe.

Hence it plainly appears, how liable we are to mistake, as long as we form our judgments by applying general rules of law or equity to particular cafes. Thus, for inftance, it is a right maxim of justice, that all finners fhould be punished; and the maxim is derived from the certain difference of virtue and vice, from the ends of reward and punishment, which are adapted to promote virtue, and difcourage vice. Place then before you a particular finner by the rule of juftice he muft die; but what if it fhould appear, from the circumstances of his cafe, that you cannot punish him confiftently with the ends of justice, that is, you cannot promote virtue, or discourage vice, you cannot diftinguish good from evil in his cafe, but muft afflict both alike? What will you fay? Shall the general maxim prevail contrary to the very

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