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diers from the most unwholesome exposure of the South. They will cultivate the corn and forage, which will feed our cavalry and artillery horses, and save the country a portion of the enormous burden now attending their purchase and transportation from the North. This cultiva tion would have been of greater advantage to us on the southeastern coast than even that of the great staple of the Sea Islands. Probably the people who remained upon these islands, within protection of our armies, could, under wise control, have supplied all the forage needed Its effect on military this year by the forces in the department of the South. The full ration for a horse weighs twenty-six pounds, that of a soldier three pounds. An army, well-organized and equipped for active operations, with a due proportion of cavalry, artillery, and baggage-trains, will have not less than one horse or mule to every four soldiers, so that the weight of food for the an imals is more than double that of the rations for the men. How important an aid, how great an economy, in a long contest, therefore, there would be in raising by this cheap labor the greater part of the forage alone for the Southern department-thus, for a great portion of our wants, transferring the base of supplies, now at New York, to Hilton Head or New Orleans.
EFFECTS OF USING THE SLAVES.
"The department has found it difficult to transfer this labor from one part of the seat of war to another. Local and family ties seem to be very strong with these people, and, with all their faith in the power and good-will of our military commanders, it was found difficult to get volunteer laborers to leave Port Royal for other dépôts.
"A population of four millions, true to the interests of the Union, with a slight assistance from the army, will, under proper regulation and government, be of the greatest assistance in holding the territory once recovered. The principal staples of the South are the products ex
EFFECTS OF USING THE SLAVES.
clusively of their labor. If protected upon the lands they have heretofore cultivated, with some organization, and with support from small detachments of loyal troops, they would not only produce much of what is needed to feed our armies and their trains, but they would forever cut off from the rebellion the resources of a country thus occupied.
"The rebel armies move with ease through portions of the Border States, living upon the country in which our commanders find no supplies. The people bring forth their hoards and offer them to the rebels for sale or gift. Protect the laboring population, who are the ma jority in the greater part of the South, in the possession of the land and its products, and this great advantage will, for whatever portion of the country we occupy, be transferred to us. As soon as the coast is thoroughly occupied and the people organized, trade will revive. Cotton, rice, sugar, and other products will be exchanged by the producer for what he needs. Their wants will be in restoring indus- supplied direct from the Northern factories, try to the South, and the cultivation of the great staples will pay for what they use. A perfectly free trade may thus again grow up between the North and the South, and, with greater or less rapidity, it will spread over the whole country as our forces succeed in meeting and dispersing the rebel armies.
"The greater part of the whole country which formerly produced the sea-island cotton is now thoroughly restored to the Union. The laborers are there-the soil and climate. It needs only assurance of protection to revive the cultivation of the staple, as well as to produce vast quantities of corn and forage for our troops. Since this war must be conducted by marches, and battles, and sieges, why neglect the best means to make them successful and their results permanent? It is worthy of notice
that thus far the portions of territory which, once recov ered, we have most firmly held, are precisely those in which the greatest proportion of colored men are found. By their assistance our armies will be able permanently to operate in and occupy the country; and in labor for the army in raising its and their own supplies, full occupation can be given them, and with this there will be neither occasion nor temptation to them to emigrate to a northern and less congenial climate. Judging by experience, no colored man will leave his home in the South if protected in that home. All possibility of competition from negro labor in the North is avoided by giv ing colored men protection and employment upon the soil which they have thus far cultivated, and the right. to which has been vacated by the original proprietors, deeply involved in the crimes of treason and rebellion. No great territory has been permanently reduced without depriving the leaders of its people of their lands and property. It is these that give power and influence. Few men have the commanding genius and talent to exercise dangerous influence over their fellow-men without the adventitious aid of money and of property. By striking down this system of compulsory labor, which enables the leaders of the rebellion to control the resources of the people, the rebellion would die of itself.
and in holding conquered territory.
Slaves employed on
LOYALTY OF THE SLAVES.
"Under no circumstances has any disposition to servile insurrection been exhibited by the colored population in any Southern State, while a strong loyalty to the federal government has been displayed on every occasion and against every discouragement. By the means suggested, the rebellion may be disarmed and subdued swiftly and effectually, and the lives of our own people saved from slaughter on the battle-field. By the occupation of all their ports on the Mis
Universal loyalty of the slaves.
sissippi and the sea-coast, a market will be opened in every rebel state for the industry of our people to supply the wants of the army, and also of a loyal population, in exchange for the valuable products of their labor. Another point of attack is by armed settlements upon the vacant government lands in Florida and Texas. Thousands in the Northern and Western States are impatiently waiting the signal of military movements to plant their homes in the best territory of this continent, and bring it Political weakness back to the Union as loyal states. So far from the Southern States being invincible, no enemy was ever so vulnerable, if the means at hand are employed against them. If your (the President's) proposition for compensated emancipation and a voluntary return to loyalty be blindly rejected, still the proper appli cation of the means at command of the government can not fail to accomplish the suppression of the rebellion and a restoration of those peaceful relations which were designed to be established forever on this continent by the Union of the States."
of the South.
WEAKNESS OF THE SOUTH.
Navy report of 1862.
As respects the navy. Mr. Welles was the Secretary of the Navy during the war. He made a report of its condition on December 1st, 1862, to the following effect:
"Since the commencement of our national difficulties Four great squad- four powerful squadrons have been collected, organized, and stationed for duty on our maritime frontier, with a rapidity and suddenness which finds no approach to a parallel in previous naval history, and which it is believed no country but our own could have achieved. These squadrons have been incessantly maintaining a strict blockade of such gigantic propor tions that eminent foreign statesmen in the highest scenes of legislation did not hesitate, at its commencement, pub
NAVY REPORT FOR 1862.
They have com
licly to denounce it as a 'material impossibility;' and yet, after this most imposing naval undertaking had been for a period of eighteen months in operation, and after its reach had been effectively extended along pletely blockaded the entire sweep of our Atlantic and Gulf coasts, from the outlet of the Chesapeake to the mouth of the Rio Grande, the same eminent authorities, with a list in their hands of all the vessels which had evaded or escaped the vigilance of our blockading forces, could not refuse, in their official statements, to admit, with reluctant candor, that the proof of the efficiency of the blockade was conspicuous and wholly conclusive, and that in no previous war had the ports of an enemy's country been so effectively closed by a naval force. But even such testimony was not needed. The proof of the fact abounds in the current price of our Southern staples in the great commercial marts of the world, and more especially in the whole industrial and commercial condition of the insurgent region. It should not be forgotten that no cir cumstance is wanting to attest the magnitude of this greatest of all naval triumphs. The industrial necessities and the commercial cupidity of all the principal maritime nations, armed and empowered as they are by the resources of modern invention, are kept at bay. A mul titude of island harbors under foreign jurisdiction, looking nearly upon our shores, and affording the most convenient lurking-places from which illicit commerce may leap forth to its prohibited destination and purpose, are so closely watched as to render the peril of all such ventures far greater than even their enormous gains when successful. And, finally, a vast line of sea-coast, nearly three thousand miles in extent, much of it with a double shore, and nearly honeycombed with inlets and harbors, has been so beleaguered and locked up that the whole
Proofs of the completeness of the blockade.