432 PRINCIPLES OF THE CAMPAIGN. [SECT. XI. along railroad and telegraph lines were held responsible for damages done to them otherwise than by the Confederate army; if a soldier was fired at from a house, the house was to be razed to the ground. Disloyal citizens were to be arrested, and, if they refused to give security for good conduct, were to be sent South, beyond the extreme pickets; should they return, they were to be treated as spies. As the Confederate army largely counted on the aid it expected to receive from the inhabitants of the country through which it intended to pass, these orders were received with indignation at Richmond. A retaliatory order was issued, declaring that Pope and his commissioned officers were not entitled to be considered as soldiers; that, in the event of his capture, he should be placed in close confinement. His officers were to be dealt with in the same manner; and if any Confederate citizen was executed under his order, a prisoner selected from the national commissioned officers should in retaliation be hung. Retaliatory measures of the Confederates. In a letter from Lee to Halleck (August 2d) in relation to these retaliations, the former so far forgot himself as to extort from Halleck the rebuke, "As these letters are couched in language exceedingly insulting to the government of the United States, I must respectfully decline to receive them. They are returned herewith." As a guide to the reader through what he might otherGeneral sketch of Wise find confusing and perhaps unintelligiLee's campaign. ble details, it may be stated that, at the outset of the campaign, Pope's front was perpendicular to the Potomac, his left wing resting against that river. Writers on military affairs insist that, when an army points thus with one wing against an insurmountable object, the other wing being "in the air," it is always to be attacked on this last wing and pressed against the obstacle, when it will be forced to surrender. The Confederate general accord CHAP. LVII.] on both sides. ingly followed that precept. It was his intention to have defeated Pope before the Potomac Army could come to his support, but delays taking place rendered that impracti cable; he then proceeded to turn the right wing of the national army by sending Jackson through Thoroughfare Gap, and afterward again he outflanked it at Centreville. This brought Pope into the fortifications of Washington. Not that these movements were executed without erMilitary mistakes ror. When Lee divided his army in front of his antagonist, he committed a serious mistake. He gave Pope an opportunity of dealing him a fatal blow. On the other hand, it was a grave mistake that Pope was not sufficiently re-enforced to take advantage of that opportunity, and the persistence with which the left wing of his army retained its position was also a serious fault. Burnside ought to have been brought from Fredericksburg. For these things, however, Pope can hardly be held responsible, since he was under injunc tions from Washington-injunctions arising from reasons connected with the movements of the Potomac Army. The first contact of the opposing armies took place The affair at Cedar (August 9th) at Cedar Mountain, half a doz Mountain. en miles south of Culpepper Court-house, where Pope had established his head-quarters, and was threatening Gordonsville with a view to facilitate the withdrawal of the army from the Peninsula. A contest ensued between the divisions of Ewell and Jackson on the Confederate side, and the corps of Banks on the national. After a severe struggle the latter was defeated. Jackson held his position on the mountain for the two following days, and then, finding that his communications were endangered, retired across the Rapidan. From an autograph letter of Lee which fell into Pope's hands (August 16th), it was ascertained that that com CHAP. LVII.] THE TURNING OF POPE'S RIGHT. 435 mander was moving by forced marches, with the whole Confederate army, to attack Pope before a junction could be formed between him and the Potomac Army, and to outnumber and destroy him. Under instructions from Pope retires from Halleck, Pope therefore abstained from crossing the Rapidan, and, retiring, took post behind the North Fork of the Rappahannock (August 19th). On the same day, Lee, with a large force, crossed the Rapidan. the Rapidan. Finding himself about to be overmatched, and yet or dered to maintain his communications with Fredericksburg, Pope telegraphed again and again to Washington that he must either be re-enforced or retreat; that the enemy was moving toward his right, and that it was impossible for him to extend his lines to resist it without abandoning Fredericksburg. He was instructed to hold his ground for two days longer, when he should be re-enforced: he did so for four days, and had then only re ceived about 7000 men. On the night of the 22d the Confederate General Stuart, having the previous day crossed the river at Waterloo Bridge with some cavalry, surHis head-quarters prised Pope's head-quarters at Catlett's Sta tion during the darkness of a violent storm, Pope himself being at the time near Rappahannock Station. Stuart captured his personal baggage, with his dispatch-book, and destroyed several wagons. captured. Lee turns Pope's right. It was not Lee's intention to force a passage of the river. His object was, by a flank movement, to turn Pope's right, get in his rear, and cut off his supplies from Washington, and place the Confederate army in such a position that it could either move upon that city or through Leesburg into Maryland. While Jackson was executing this movement on the national right, Longstreet was operating on Pope's front to engage his attention. Jackson passed through Thor 436 Jackson passes through Thor oughfare Gap, reaching (August 26th) Bristow's Station on the Orange and Alexandria Railroad. Without delay he sent a detachment under oughfare Gap. Stuart to Manassas Junction, and captured it that night, taking 8 guns, 10 locomotives, 7 trains, and immense quantities of quartermaster and commissary stores. Pope waiting for Pope was thus attempting to hold at bay the entire Confederate army, anxiously expecting the the Potomac Army. promised re-enforcements from the Army of the Potomac. He had assigned those troops as they should come up to suitable positions, directing, among other things, that the first division which should reach Manassas Junction should take post in the works of that place, and that its cavalry should be pushed forward to watch Thoroughfare Gap. On the day following the capture of Manassas Junc tion, an attempt was made by some troops stationed on the other side of Bull Run to recover it; but they were unsuccessful, and the Confederate cavalry, passing the Run, advanced beyond Fairfax Station. Jackson had now brought up from Bristow his own and Hill's divisions; but, finding that Pope's army was converging upon him, he abandoned Manassas, having destroyed large quantities of supplies, and fell back toward Longstreet, who was to come. Jackson destroys supplies at Ma nassas. Pope again falls back. through Thoroughfare Gap. When Pope discovered the Confederate movement on his right flank, and found that he was dis appointed in the re-enforcements from the Potomac Army, he fell back, in three columns, from Warrenton and Warrenton Junction. His force, as estimated by himself, was at this moment about forty thousand, that of the Confederates at least eighty thousand. He was, however, now joined by Heintzelman's corps of ten |