CHAP. LIV.] Opinions of the THEIR OPINIONS. 377 of the public edifices and archives of the nation. It would have instantly brought, though it would not have justified, European recognition of the Confederate power, and that, perhaps, not only as a Southern, but as the national government. The President clearly perceived that the capture of Richmond, no matter with what brilliant military operations it might be attended, could not balance for a moment that dreadful catastrophe. He therefore correctly and firmly took the ground that, whatever the movements of the Army of the Potomac might be, the city of Washington must be left absolutely secure. And now appeared that incidental advantage of the appointment of corps commanders to which corps commanders. reference has just been made. To McClellan and to them the President referred the question. In the conference which accordingly took place they consented to the movement by the Peninsula, among other conditions, however, expressly stipulating unanimously "that the forces to be left to cover Washington shall be such as to give an entire feeling of security for its safety from menace." Keyes, Heintzelman, and McDowell agreed that, with the forts on the right bank of the Potomac fully garrisoned, and those on the left bank occupied, a covering force in front of the Virginia line of 25,000 men would suffice." In Sumner's opinion, "a total force of 40,000 men for the defense of the city would suffice." Hereupon the Secretary of War addressed the following: 66 "War Department, March 13th, 1862. 'To Major General George B. McClellan : “The President, having considered the plan of operations agreed Orders to General upon by yourself and the commanders of army corps, makes no objection to the same, but gives the McClellan. following directions as to its execution: "1st. Leave such a force at Manassas Junction as shall make it entirely certain that the enemy shall not repossess himself of that position and line of communication. 378 DEPARTURE OF THE PENINSULAR EXPEDITION. [SECT. XI. "2d. Leave Washington entirely secure. "3d. Move the remainder of the force down the Potomac, choosing a new base at Fortress Monroe, or any where between here and there; or, at all events, move such remainder of the army at once in pursuit of the enemy by some route. The Peninsular expedition sails. "EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War." The movement by Fortress Monroe being determined upon, there were chartered 113 steamers, 188 schooners, 88 barges, with which, in 37 days, there were transported to Fortress Monroe 121,500 men, 14,592 animals, 1150 wagons, 44 batteries, 74 ambulances, besides a vast quantity of equipage. McDowell's corps against that deten tion. Scarcely had McClellan set out from Washington when it was discovered that the entire force about detained. to be left for the protection of that city was only 19,022 men. The President was therefore constrained to withhold McDowell's army corps from the force under McClellan, and detain it for the security of the capital. Against this detention McClellan earnestly protested. McClellan protests He seemed to have forgotten that the protection of Washington had been made an imperative part of his duty, and that all his calculations must be on that condition. A letter written to him at the time by the President not only justifies completely the course that had been taken, but also exhibits Mr. Lincoln's firmness and courteous forbearance, his views respecting the campaign now undertaken, to which he had given a most reluctant consent, and his ap. prehension that, instead of action, there would be an invention of new delays. "Washington, April 9th, 1862. "Major General McClellan : "MY DEAR SIR,-Your dispatches, complaining that you are not The President's let properly sustained, while they do not offend me, do pain me very much. Blenker's division was withdrawn from you before you left here, and you know the pressure ter to him. CHAP. LIV.] LINCOLN AND MCCLELLAN. 379 under which I did it (p. 371), and, as I thought, acquiesced in it— certainly not without reluctance. After you left I ascertained that less than 20,000 unorganized men, without a single field battery, were all you designed to be left for the defense of Washington and Manassas Junction, and part of this even was to go to General Hooker's old position. General Banks's corps, once designed for Manassas Junction, was diverted and tied up on the line of Winchester and Strasburg, and could not leave it without again exposing the Upper Potomac and the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. This presented (or would present when McDowell and Sumner should be gone) a great temptation to the enemy to turn back from the Rappahannock and sack Washington. My explicit order that Washington should, by the judgment of all the commanders of the army corps, be left entirely secure, had been neglected. It was precisely this that drove me to detain McDowell. "I do not forget that I was satisfied with your arrangement to leave Banks at Manassas Junction; but when that arrangement was broken up, and nothing was substituted for it, of course I was constrained to substitute something for it myself; and allow me to ask, Do you really think I should permit the line from Richmond via Manassas Junction to this city to be entirely open, except what resistance could be presented by less than 20,000 unorganized troops? This is a question which the country will not allow me to evade— "And once more let me tell you it is indispensable to you that you strike a blow. I am powerless to help this. You will do me the justice to remember I always insisted that going down the Bay in search of a field instead of fighting at or near Manassas was only shifting, and not surmounting a difficulty-that we should find the same enemy and the same or equal intrenchments at either place. The country will not fail to note-is now noting that the present hesitation to move upon an intrenched enemy is but the story of Manassas repeated. "I beg to assure you that I have never written to you or spoken to you in greater kindness of feeling than now, nor with a fuller purpose to sustain you so far as in my most anxious judgment I consistently can. But you must act. Yours very truly, Siege of Yorktown "A. LINCOLN." The Army of the Potomac was now fairly landed on the Peninsula, and there lay before it, under General Magruder, a Confederate force of 8000 men, defending a line of thirteen miles from York commences. 380 SIEGE OF YORKTOWN. [SECT. XI. town across the Peninsula. "To my utter surprise," says that general," he (McClellan) permitted day after day to elapse without an assault. In a few days the object of his delay was apparent. In every direction in front of our lines, through the intervening woods and in the open fields, earthworks began to appear." The whole month of April was consumed in these operations. The troops were not triumphantly marching on Richmond, but, unacclimated, were busily digging their own graves. A request was sent to Washington to have siege-guns taken out of the works of that city and brought to Yorktown; miles of corduroy road were constructed; miles of trenches and batteries were made. It was expected that on the morning of May 6th fire would be opened. Two days previously, however, the Confederates quietly abandoned their works and retired up the Peninsula. "With 5000 men," says Magruder, "exclusive of the garrisons, we had stopped and held in check over 100,000 of the enemy." Disease, contracted in the swamps and trenches of Yorktown, had taken a fearful hold on the army, as its chief engineer reported, and "toil and hardship, unredeemed by the excitement of combat, had impaired its morale.” The Confederates abandon the place. The battle of Williamsburg. As soon as it was discovered that the Confederates had withdrawn, a column was sent in pursuit. It came up with the retreating rear-guard at Williamsburg, now re-enforced from Johnston's army. Longstreet's division, which had already passed beyond the town, retraced its steps to aid in resisting the attack, and for nine hours Hooker's division alone made head against the whole Confederate force. That general says, "History will not be believed when it is told that the noble officers and men of my division were permitted to carry on this unequal struggle from morning until night, unaided, in the presence of more than 30,000 of their comrades with arms in their hands; nevertheless, it is true." The entire loss during the day was 2228, of whom 456 were killed. Hooker complains that he was not sustained. General Hooker was justified in this bitter complaint. It has been reported that he was relieved by a bayonet charge made by Hancock; but there must have been an error in this assertion. The troops by whom it was said to have been made first encountered the enemy about 4 P.M. of the preceding afternoon. It was a drizzly day, and the men marched forward in no small confusion, over leaves in the woods, slippery with the rain, over fallen trees, and across ravines, so that it was impossible to preserve an alignment of a company, much more of a brigade. The night came on pitch-dark; the 43d New York fired by mischance into a Pennsylvania regiment. Next day the for |