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302

BEAUREGARD'S RETREAT.

[SECT. X.

So obstinate was the resistance he had made, that he had inflicted on his antagonist as severe a loss as he had himself sustained. The well-known approach of Buell doubtless did give him moral assistance. In the battle of that day Sherman stands forth as the central figure: the incomparable tenacity with which he held the national right against the enemy's utmost efforts, gave Grant the means of staying the disaster that was befalling the left. Not without reason, therefore, did Halleck say, "It is the unanimous opinion here that Brigadier Gencured the victory. eral W. T. Sherman saved the fortunes of the day on the 6th, and contributed largely to the glori ous victory of the 7th."

Sherman had se

treat to Corinth.

Fortune had denied to Beauregard victory. He was Beauregard's re- compelled to retreat. An eye-witness, an impressed New-Yorker, says: "I made a detour from the road on which the army was retreating, that I might travel faster and get ahead of the main body. In a ride of twelve miles alongside of the routed army I saw more of human agony and woe than I trust I shall ever be called again to witness. The retreating host wound along a narrow and almost impassable road, extending some seven or eight miles in length. Here was a long line of wagons loaded with wounded, groaning and cursing, and piled in like bags of grain; while the mules plunged on in mud and water belly-deep, the water sometimes coming into the wagons. Next came a straggling regiment of infantry, pressing on past the train; then a stretcher borne upon the shoulders of four men, carrying a wounded officer; then soldiers strag gling along with an arm broken and hanging down, or other fearful wounds which were enough to destroy life. And to add to the horrors of the scene, the elements of heaven marshaled their forces, a fitting accompaniment of the tempest of human desolation and passion which was

CHAP. L.]

THE RETREAT TO CORINTH.

303

raging. A cold drizzling rain commenced about nightfall, and soon came harder and faster. It turned to pitiless blinding hail. This storm raged with unrelenting violence for three hours. I passed long wagon trains filled with wounded and dying soldiers, without even a blanket to shield them from the driving sleet and hail, which fell in stones as large as partridge eggs, until it lay on the ground two inches deep.

"Three hundred men died during this awful retreat. Their bodies were thrown out to make room for others, who, although wounded, had struggled on through the storm, hoping to find shelter, rest, and medical care."

Was this the triumphant invasion of the North? Was it for this that Beauregard had issued forth from the fortifications of Corinth?

Sherman's pursuit

of the Confederates.

The following day (April 8th) Sherman was sent for ward with two brigades to follow on the traces of the enemy, and ascertain what they were doing. On reaching the Confederate hospital at the White House he was attacked by Forrest's cavalry, but repulsed it. He then learned that Beauregard had retreated to Corinth. All along were evidences of the great discomfiture-the dead scattered on the road-sides unburied, the farm-houses full of wounded, abandoned wagons, caissons, ammunition, and tents.

Beauregard's report

As soon as Beauregard reached Corinth, he telegraphed to Richmond that he "had gained a great to Richmond. and glorious victory; had taken from eight to ten thousand prisoners and thirty-six guns, but that Buell having re-enforced Grant, the Confederate army had retired to Corinth." He had sent a flag of truce to Grant asking permission to bury his dead, but Grant informed him that that had been already done.

The battle of Shiloh was thus a conflict in which, dur

304

battle of Shiloh.

COMMENTS ON THE BATTLE.

[SECT. X.

Character of the ing two days, one hundred thousand men had been engaged-engaged in the heart of a forest. From that circumstance it presented no brilliant military evolutions. It may be said to have been a gi gantic and bloody bush-fight. The twenty thousand killed and wounded men bore testimony to its severity. On the side of the Confederates it was simply a vigorous ef fort to push straight down to Pittsburg Landing; on the national side it was a determined effort to resist. The confusion into which both armies fell was the necessary consequence of the wooded and broken field. The brave Confederate General Johnston, who, in such an untimely manner, lost his life in the front of the battle, saw from the beginning that his duty was to act, not as the commander, but as the leader of his men. The mixed-up condition, the inextricable confusion into which, as related by Bragg, that army had fallen at the close of the first day, had more than its counterpart on the national side. In the very crisis of the battle, the guns with which Grant checked the last rush of the Confederates were brought from all quarters, and were worked by chance volunteers, soldiers, artillerists, and a doctor.

In some remarks which he published on this battle, Sherman has pointed out how strikingly it displayed the characteristic qualities of the two armies. Opposed to the energy, vigor, vivacity of the South was the inflexible determination of the North. On the national right Sherman himself had been hammered by main force from his camps of the morning until he had been brought to the bridge at Snake Creek. It was then of no use to hammer at him any longer; he could be driven in no more; the hammer merely rebounded from its own blows. Grant, at the ravine on the national left, had not been conquered, but only compressed. He was certain to recoil the more violently in proportion as the pressure was more severe.

CHAP. L.]

of the battle.

SHERMAN BREAKS THE RAILROAD.

305

This battle was made the subject of the most extraor Misrepresentations dinary misrepresentations. Reporters who were not upon the plateau, but on board the steam-boats, or down at the Landing, gathered from the raw troops who had fled many false statements. Thus Prentiss, who fought desperately until four o'clock in the afternoon, and was then taken prisoner, with four regiments, because he would not recede when Hurlbut and Wallace were forced back, was said to have been surprised in bed in the morning, and captured in his shirt; Grant, whose movements from daybreak we have related, was said to have been absent from the army; Buell was said to have purposely delayed his march out of jealousy. From such authorities Beauregard received credit for having taken Grant by surprise, and so completely overthrown him that he was rescued from total ruin only by the arrival of Buell.

No resolute pursuit, however, having been made by the national army from Shiloh, Beauregard occupied himself in strengthening the works of Corinth, his fortifications extending more than fifteen miles. He destroyed the roads and bridges of approach, and made every thing ready for the reception of Halleck, who, leaving St. Louis on the news of the great battle, had arrived at Pittsburg The national army Landing. The national army was rapidly re-enforced. Pope brought to it from Missouri 25,000 men; eventually it became more than 100,000 strong.

re-enforced.

A few days after he had reached Shiloh, Halleck or dered Sherman to take some fresh troops from Buell's army, ascend the Tennessee to the mouth of Bear Creek, and there break the Memphis and Charleston Railroad, which crosses the creek by a bridge of two spans and about five hundred feet of trestle-work. Accordingly, Sherman burnt that bridge on

Sherman breaks the great railroad.

306

HALLECK'S ADVANCE TO CORINTH.

[SECT. X.

the 14th of April, and effectually severed the line of communication.

Halleck reorganizes the army,

Halleck, on joining the army, put Grant as "second in command," without any real duty. Grant had fallen under his displeasure, being blamed for the manner in which the battle of Shiloh had been fought. The army was now completely reorganized, and slowly advanced on Corinth during the month of May. As if to indicate the cause of the reproach that had been cast upon Grant, Halleck intrenched himself incessantly as he moved forward. As Grant had been blamed for want of precaution, so now Halleck was blamed for overprecaution. His adversaries affirmed that it took him six weeks to march fifteen miles. They abstained, howfrom giving weight to the fact that, though his army and advances very had won a great battle, it was still a raw army, needing drill and time for cementing. In the opinion of the best officers in it, it was not fit for marches or for military risks. He had before him two grand operations which demanded great efficiency — a march southward for the complete opening of the Mississippi, and a march eastward for the seizure of Chattanooga.

ever,

slowly on Corinth.

s

Halleck determined to conduct his operations against Corinth by regular approaches. On the 21st of May his nearest batteries were three miles distant from that place. He had become persuaded that the works were exceed ingly strong, adequately garrisoned, and that an energetic resistance would be made. Beauregard had, however, concluded that it was impossible for him to resist such an army as that which was approaching. Accordingly, he commenced secretly evacuating the place on the 26th of May, and in three days had removed or destroyed every thing of value. He then retreated by the southern road to Tupelo. On the morning of the 30th the national troops entered the town.

The fall of Corinth.

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