CHAP. L.]

Concentration of the Confederate forces.

CONCENTRATION OF THE ARMIES.

287

forces from every outlying position. He was joined by Bragg, from Pensacola, by Polk, from the Mississippi, and Johnston's army was brought from Murfreesborough. The whole force was concentrated at Corinth, where the two great railroads connecting the Gulf of Mexico and the Missis sippi River with the Atlantic Ocean come together. That place is the key of the railroad system of Mississippi and Tennessee. Beauregard issued the customary and characteristic address to his troops: "Our mothers and wives, our sisters and children, expect us to do our duty. Our cause is as just and sacred as ever animated men to take up arms.

Corinth was thus selected not only because of its relation to the railroads, but also because it was necessary to hold it for the protection of Memphis. The national army, advancing on the line of the Tennessee River, would strike the second Confederate line perpendicularly. It had been Halleck's expectation to intervene between the Tennessee army under Johnston at Murfreesborough, and the Mississippi army under Beauregard at Corinth. Through the delay that had occurred after the fall of Donelson, the junction of those armies had, however, taken place. As soon as it was discovered that Johnston had disappeared from Murfreesborough at Buell's the national armies. front, and was about to form a junction with Beauregard, Halleck, whose command now embraced Buell's, ordered that officer to join Grant, with a view to counteract the Confederate concentration at Corinth. Buell's force was about 40,000. He accordingly at once set out on his march, and reached Columbia on the 20th; but, though he pushed forward as quickly as he could, so bad were the roads and so dreadful the weather that it took seventeen days to accomplish the rest of the distance to Pittsburg Landing-about ninety miles. Nelson's divis

Concentration of

288

BEAUREGARD'S PLAN OF THE CAMPAIGN.

[SECT. X.

ion was in advance; it was followed by the divisions of Crittenden, McCook, Wood, and Thomas.

The concentration of the Confederate army, which had begun early in March, went on with great rapidity. In three weeks its strength had risen from 11,000 to 45,000 men. Van Dorn and Price were coming from Arkansas with 30,000 more. After the junction with Johnston took place, that general had assumed the chief command, Beauregard's plan Beauregard being second. The conception of the campaign. of the ensuing movements was, however, due to the latter. As Halleck had intended to destroy him before Johnston could come to his aid, so now he proposed to destroy Grant before Buell could arrive. He knew from the country people every thing about Grant's movements, but it was little that Grant could find out from them about him. The question for him to decide was, Should he wait for Van Dorn and Price to come up, or strike Grant at once? At this time Breckenridge was on his right at Burnsville with 11,000 men; Hardee and Bragg, with more than 20,000, formed his centre at Corinth; Polk and Hindman were on his left with 10,000 north of the Memphis and Charleston Railroad. Grant overthrown, Buell was next to be attacked, the victorious army then taking up its line of march to the north. On Johnston's assuming the chief command, he issued an address, such as was at that time customary in the Confederate armies: "You are expected to show yourselves wor thy of your valor and courage, worthy of the women of the South, whose noble devotion in this war has never been exceeded in any time.”

Pittsburg Landing.

Pittsburg Landing is a steam-boat station on the west bank of the Tennessee River, 219 miles distant from its mouth, and near to the intersection of the state lines of Alabama, Mississippi, and Tennessee. On the north of the landing, Snake Creek, and

CHAP. L.]

THE FIELD OF SHILOH.

289

on the south, another stream, Lick Creek, fall into the Tennessee, the former having received a branch known as Owl Creek. These rivulets rise near each other, beyond Shiloh Church, and inclose between them a plateau, about eighty feet high, on which took place the great battle now to be described.

The two creeks formed the right and left defenses of the national army, obliging the enemy to make a front attack. When first occupied the country was flooded, and many of the streams impassable. In Snake Creek the water was so high that a horse would have to swim

290

POSITION OF GRANT'S ARMY.

[SECT. X.

to reach the bridge. Lick Creek, ordinarily fordable, had become quite a river. Grant largely depended on these overflows for protection. They were among the reasons. which induced him to throw up no defenses.

army.

On this plateau (Saturday, April 5th) five divisions Position of Grant's of Grant's army were encamped in the order just described (p. 285). Sherman and Prentiss were therefore in front, McClernand on the left and rear of Sherman. Still nearer to the Landing was Hurlbut, with W.H.L.Wallace on his right. Lewis Wallace's division was at Crump's Landing, five miles below.

Grant's army thus lay with the Tennessee River at its back, without available transportation to the other bank, and no defensive preparations on its front. The changes that Halleck had made in its command operated to its disadvantage in unsettling its purposes and impairing its unity of action. It was not understood at first that the Confederates were concentrating so rapidly at Corinth; on the contrary, it was supposed that they had a force of only about 10,000; and hence there was at that time no apprehension of being attacked. Even after it was known that Johnston had withdrawn from Murfreesborough, it was expected that Buell's re-enforcements would join Grant in time. When the battle began, Buell's leading division, Nelson's, was at Savannah, nine miles down the river, and on its other bank, but the rear of that army stretched off for thirty miles beyond.

The Confederate generals intended to fall by surprise Johnston marches on Grant's army, encamped thus at Pittsfrom Corinth. burg Landing, before Buell should have joined it. Accordingly, on the 3d of April, their available strength being about 40,000, they commenced their march. The dreadful condition of the roads, and a rainstorm which fell on the afternoon of the 5th, delayed the proposed attack. That night they had advanced within

CHAP. L.] THE CONFEDERATE ATTACK EXPECTED.

291

three quarters of a mile of the national pickets. No fires were allowed, though the air was cheerless and cold. Hardee's corps was in front; Bragg's in a second line be hind; Polk's corps formed the third, with Breckenridge's division on its right rear.

On Friday, April 4th, an infantry picket belonging to Colonel Buckland's brigade having been captured, Sherman had taken that brigade and some cavalry, and driven back the Confederate cavalry six miles from the front of the camps. On the evening of that day several cannon Grant expects were fired and plainly heard by the whole. army. Grant was at this time at Sherman's lines. On coming back, his horse slipped over a log and lamed him. On the same day, Lewis Wallace reported eight regiments of infantry and 1200 cavalry at Purdy, and an equal force at Bethel. Grant gave the necessary orders to Lewis Wallace in case they should attack him.

an attack.

The Confederate attack was therefore not unexpected, and, properly speaking, there was no surprise. Prentiss had doubled his grand guards the night before, and had pickets out one and a half miles. Sherman ordered his troops to breakfast early, and got them at once into line: Grant was perfectly aware of what had been going on.. He was in doubt, however, from what direction the blow would be delivered: whether the Confederates would. attack his main camp, or cross over Snake Creek to the north and west of him, falling on Lewis Wallace's division so as to force it back, and make a lodgment on the Tennessee below, compelling Grant either to attack them and. drive them away, or to cross over to the east bank of the Tennessee and give up his boats. It was better for him to risk a battle on the ground on which he stood. For the Confederates, the attack on Wallace would have been the proper movement.

For want of engineer officers, Beauregard had been un